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ABSTRACT OF THESIS (Regulation 7.9)
This study has a number of aims. It is intended to explore the
historical development of the law relating to collective
agreements. At the same time this will be set against the general
development of British Labour Law. The current law of collective
agreements will be critically evaluated. The study then moves on
to take a brief look at the position in the US and Canada.
Finally, the issue of future developments is raised and the
implications reforms would have for adjudication are discussed.
The industrial relations background is also raised and the question
of whether legal enforcement between the collective parties is now
a realistic option analysed.
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CHAPTER 1
THE CEVEDDFMEOT OF LABOUR IAW - 1867-1906
In 1867 a Royal Commission on trade unions was appointed.1 The
appointment followed the 1Sheffield outrages': 1... the culmination
of a long series of acts of violence directed against non-unionists
in the Sheffield cutlery trades'.2 At the end of the day "two
reports were issued. The Majority Report was 'an inconclusive and
somewhat inconsistent document', which saw little value in trade
unions for society in general, or even for the workers themselves,
but argued for same legal protection of organisations whose rules
were free from such restrictive clauses as those limiting the
number of apprentices and the use of machinery, or prohibiting
piecework and subcontracting".3 The Minority Report was much more
sympathetic to trade unionism.
The Royal Commission on Trade Unions and the 1871 Act
Much of the discussion in the Royal Commission report on Trade
Unions of 1869 centres on the legal status of trade unions in
society. For the purposes of the present study interest in this
discussion is prompted by two factors. Firstly, proposals as to
the legal status and capacity of trade unions, such as
incorporation, are directly related to the legal standing of
collective agreements. Secondly, the policy view taken as to the
role of law in labour relations and, in particular, trade union
affairs is of interest in so far as it sheds light on the
"voluntarist" tradition. It was, however, the minority report
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which the 1871 Act was largely modelled on and I will place more
emphasis on that.
The Report is dominated by the ideas and values of the then
prevalent laissez-faire philosophy. Within that philosophy a
number of tensions existed. In particular, Dicey has pointed to
the fact that "... utilitarians ... had not given sufficient
attention to the difficulty of combining the contractual freedom of
each individual when acting alone with that unlimited right of
association which, from one point of view, is a main element of
individual freedom".4 To restrict freedcm of association is to
curtail the contractual power of individuals. On the other hand,
the exercise of freedom of association may restrict the contractual
freedom of the individuals contracting for the future and their
concerted action may interfere with the freedom of third parties.5
The minority report (and the subsequent Act) represent a move
towards favouring freedom of combination.
Two reasons might be suggested by way of explanation.
Firstly, there may have been a general tendency at this time to
place greater emphasis on freedom of contract.6 Heydon quotes an
1875 judgment of Jessel, MR which expresses a concern lest
contracts be held void as against public policy and continues "...
contracts when entered into freely and voluntarily shall be held
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sacred and shall be enforced by Courts of Justice.
Secondly, there may have been a realisation that whatever the
theoretical neutrality of laws against combination their impact was
by and large suffered by labour, not capital.8 Accordingly, it
3
was time to concede to the forces of labour the right of
combination. Also helping in this direction was a growing
intellectual rejection of an important facet of classical
economics: the wages fund. It was becoming increasingly accepted
that trade unions had a role to play in setting wage levels and
even that the existence and exercise of collective force was
essential if the bargaining power of employees was to increase. To
exercise the right of combination was, therefore, carrying with it
greater legitimacy.
Let us now look at the policy behind the 1871 Act in more detail.
At common law 'Whatever doubt there may have been as to the effect
of the doctrine of restraint of trade upon the position of trade
unions in criminal law, its effect upon their civil status was
sufficiently clear. As combinations for imposing restraints
which the court considered unreasonable, they were unlawful bodies
to whose agreements and trusts the law would afford no
protection.,10
Both the majority and minority reports favoured the legitimisation
of trade unionism. The majority of the Commission had recommended
that :"... facilities should be granted for such registration as
will give to the unions capacity for rights and duties resembling
in some degree that of corporations."11 Such registration would
be contingent on the union constitution containing no objects
regarded as objectionable (e.g. the object of preventing workmen
from working in common with men not members of the union). The
minority, on the other hand, rejected incorporation and believed
that the State should accord "... to them bare legal recognition
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under the condition of ample publicity. They would thus be
secured against robbery and enabled to protect their property, but
would have no other assistance in enforcing contributions or
managing their affairs. In return for this recognition a
guarantee of perfect publicity in their laws and in their
expenditure would be exacted, but these would in no way be
interfered with so long as they were clear from crime."12
A number of reasons for this stance can be gleaned from the report.
Then, as now, there was no consensus in society as to the
legitimate role of trade unions. "... the conditions on which
alone the public would give the full aid of the law to the unions
to recover their contributions would be such as few unions would
accept."12 The highly tendentious nature of labour law was noted
by one judge who declared:
•By the expression that a thing is "contrary to public
policy" I understand that it is meant that it is opposed
to the welfare of the community at large. I can see
that the maintenance of strikes may be against the
interests of employers, because they may be thereby
forced to yield, at their own expense, a larger share of
profit or other advantage to the employed; but I have no
means of judicially determining that this is contrary to
the interests of the whole community; and I think that
in deciding that it is, and therefore, that any act done
in its furtherance is illegal, we should be basing our
judgment, not on recognised legal principles, but on the
opinion of one of the contending schools of political
economists.,14
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Accordingly the minority believed in a minimum of control over the
objects, rules and other aspects of the internal affairs of trade
unions, a minimalist approach being adopted of necessity; the
absence of consensus meaning that a detailed legal regime for trade
unions would not be possible. The minority report was
nevertheless a clear endorsement of the legitimacy of trade union
functions. Secondly, the minority regarded trade unions as
voluntary associations. In the words of the report "Trade Unions
are essentially clubs and not trading companies, and we think that
the degree of regulation possible in the case of the latter is not
possible in the case of the former. All questions of crime apart,
the objects which they aim, the rights which they claim and the
liabilities which they incur, are for the most part, it seems to
us, such as courts of law should neither enforce, nor modify nor
annul. They should rest entirely on consent."15
The report contains little discussion as to the regulation of
collective bargaining. This is scarcely surprising since during
much of the nineteenth century employers continued to determine
terms and conditions of employment unilaterally. Collective
agreements were therefore thin on the ground; partly it must be
said because of unilateral action on the part of employees. For
example, 'In the craft industries ... employers ... had given the
lead towards collective bargaining, and same of the national
agreements represented a joint victory for employers and trade
union leaders over the hostility of a rank and file which was still
wedded to the traditions of unilateral regulation.,17
In keeping with the libertarian philosophy of the times neither the
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majority nor the minority sought to carpel legal regulation of
collective bargaining, the majority, for example, stating that "it
does not appear to us that any system of compulsory arbitration is
practicable, since there are no admitted principles of decision on
• • "1 ft t
which the arbitrator may proceed ...". The Commission placed
its faith in the institutionalisation of conflict through the
workings of joint institutions. Collective bargaining and its
product, the collective agreement, were more likely to produce
stable industrial relations. Thus the minority found that "...
where a distinct code of rules exists, no questions appear to arise
but those of interpretation and we find the employers on perfectly
amicable footing with the union, and both parties often co¬
operating with each other."19 Moreover, "... (the) addition of
boards of arbitration... appears to us the nearest solution of the
labour and employment question which has yet shewn itself."20
This view as to the benefits of joint regulation was evidently
shared by the government. Hughes, remarking in the Commons that
'... the existence of these unions as legal associations would
greatly help the system of arbitration which had done so much to
settle disputes between the employer and the employed ... •.21
The minority also dwelt briefly on the subject of legal
enforceability of jointly agreed terms, awards, etc. Prior to
1871 the legal status of trade unions would have prevented any
legal enforcement of collective agreements. The minority believed
that "... it is expedient to declare that whilst all combinations
of workmen untainted with a criminal purpose are lawful, certain
agreements to be defined, will not be directly enforceable at law
...".22 At the same time while it would be "... inexpedient to give
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any legislative character to courts of conciliation or arbitration;
... it is expedient to give increased facilities in cases where
regulations exist under mutual agreement for the enforcement of the
contract against either party who has bona fide accepted it."23
Such a recommendation had a certain logic to it. In a society
where freedom of contract was a cornerstone of the dominant
ideology there must have been a reluctance to do anything but allow
the parties to the agreement to endow it with legal force.
Moreover, the implementation of the recommendation would be a
legislative endorsement of the value of joint regulation. On the
other hand, it was not difficult to foresee potential difficulties.
If it was politically unacceptable to allow a union to enjoin
workmen from going to work it would be difficult to countenance a
union suing an employer for breach of a collective agreement
through the employment of non-unionists.
The 1871 Act
To implement the Commission's aim of legitimising trade unions
section three of the 1871 Act provided that "... the purposes of
any trade union shall not, by reason merely that they are in
restraint of trade, be unlawful so as to render void or voidable
any agreement or trust". Section four of the Act was to restrict
enforcement of trade union agreements. Henceforth, trade unions
were to be free to combine unhampered by the doctrine of restraint
of trade. Hie recognition by the law of the right to combine was
partly motivated by an awareness of the weakness of the bargaining
power of the individual employee and his consequent dependence on
association with his fellows to Improve his lot. As pointed out
in parliamentary debate: "Employers of labour were in themselves a
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great combination, and there ought to be a great countervailing
power permitted to the employed to guard their own interests".24
In line with the minority's recommendation, full incorporation was
not favoured.
As we have seen, the minority believed in a regime whereby minimal
control over trade union internal affairs would be exercised by
parliament or the courts. S 4 of the 1871 Act prevented any court
from entertaining "... any legal proceedings instituted with the
object of directly enforcing or recovering damages for the breach
of ... (a number of specified agreements) ...". The proposer of
the bill, explained that "If such contracts were enforceable, our
Courts of Equity might be called upon to enjoin masters against
opening their works, or workmen from going to work, or
discontinuing a strike; whilst our County Courts would have to
make decrees for contributions to strike, or to enforce penalties
from workmen who had felt it their duty to resume employment."25
The lack of an underlying consensus as to the development of Labour
law again played its part. The making and carrying out of the
agreements enumerated was not prohibited; instead, trade unions
were to be denied access to the courts to enforce such agreements
and were confined to the use of social sanctions. Another
possible factor was that if trade unions were to be exempt from the
general law of restraint of trade the consideration for this should
be restricted access to judicial proceedings.
It is important to note at this stage the role of the English
positivists. Harrison has written that "... they played a
decisive part in securing a satisfactory legal basis for trade
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unionism. They formulated trade unionists demands and - in the
end - the Government' s own measures".27 "It was ... [their] ...
ingenious suggestion that unions should enjoy the protection of the
Friendly Societies Acts while acquiring the privilege of being
incapable of being sued or proceeded against as a corporate entity.
The positivists had to work hard to explain to Trade Unionists that
mere legalisation would expose them to endless litigation and end
• • • 9ft •
in crippling them." Sections 3 and 4 of the Act were based on
the minority's recommendation that the legal enforcement of certain
trade union agreements be restricted.
Curiously s 4 of the 1871 Act only affected agreements between a
trade union and an employer's association. Gayler has stated:
"How far the legislature intended this result is
difficult to say. Although a definition of the term
'trade union' to include an employers' association is not
usual, nevertheless the legislative intention to include
that type of association within the definition can hardly
be denied. But an examination of the agreements set out
in section 4, together with the views of the Royal
Commission of 1869, must lead us to the conclusion that,
so far as section 4 is concerned, it was merely the
intention of the legislature to put union 'domestic'
agreements outside the purview of the courts. It was
the intention of the legislature that the courts should
not interfere with the payment of benefits, imposition of
fines and so forth. By the phrase 'any agreement between
one trade union and another' the draftsman probably meant
an agreement between one workers' union and another
workers' union as to membership, terms of apprenticeship,
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lines of demarcation, amalgamation, etc. It cannot be
believed that he had in view a collective agreement
between an employers' association and a workers' trade
union. This may be first deduced from the fact that
multi-party bargaining was not very common in the
seventies. If the legislature was trying to stop the
slow growth of industry-wide bargaining, it would have
been a little more explicit. Secondly, and perhaps
alternately, if it had been the intention of the
legislature to let collective agreements be merely
'gentlemen's agreements', provision would have been made
for agreements made between a single employer and a
workers' trade union."29
The failure to give legal effect to collective agreements between
trade unions and employers' associations may therefore have been
accidental.
Let us now try and assess the state of Labour Law policy after the
1871 Trade Union Act. The premise of the legislation might be
thought to be a recognition of the right to combine so that the
forces of labour might be able to stand against capital.
Consequently, various legal obstacles would have to be removed.
On the other hand, no use would be made of the law to redress any
imbalance in the power of the opposing social forces: "...
absolute impartiality appears to us to be the only safe rule for
the State."30 Similarly, any interference with the operation of
the labour market, such as compulsory arbitration, was ruled out.
It was hoped that conflict might be reduced through the voluntary
use of joint regulation. In a society where freedom of contract
11
was promoted the minority desire for the facilitation of legal
enforceability of collective bargains was understandable.
With respect to the legal status of trade unions there was to be no
incorporation. To lay down positively the terms upon which
incorporation would be granted would be too controversial.
Moreover, in a laissez-faire world, to disallow objects of a
voluntary association was seen as undesirable: "... it is not the
duty of the State ... to punish unsocial conduct, and that such
part of the conduct of the unions as is unsocial without being
criminal ought not in good policy to be visited by legislative
disabilities or penalties."31 Again, as discussed, it was felt
desirable to restrict access to the courts. The implementation of
this restriction in the form of s.4 was rather at odds with the
desire to facilitate optional legal enforceability of collective
agreements.
While the minority report and the parliamentary debates both
contain references to the value of a policy of State neutrality it
would be erroneous to assume that a policy of non-intervention can
be equated with neutrality. At any one time the balance of social
and economic forces my be heavily in favour of one class in
society. Accordingly, to emit to redress the balance by
legislative intervention is to favour one class. The legislation
of 1871 permitted a relatively free hand to the monopoly forces of
capital and labour but this was scarcely a policy of neutrality.
The Royal Commission of 1892
A Royal Commission on labour was set up in 1891 1.. to enquire into
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the relations between capital and labour with a view to their
improvement'.32 It followed concern over the unrest associated
• • •
with the rise of 'New Unionism'. However, '... the unrest
subsisted before the commission reported and the majority report
declared relations to be at their best when both sides were well
organised and negotiation was facilitated by voluntary collective
bargaining procedures'.34 More far-reaching reports have been
known to emanate from Royal Commissions; "The majority of the
Commissioners ... contented themselves with deprecating, and mildly
arguing against, every one of the projects of reform that were then
in the air."35
The premise of the report, based on the belief of both sides of
industry, was that the route to industrial peace lay through
collective bargaining: "... where a skilled trade is well
organised, good relations tend to prevail and countless minor
quarrels are obviated or nipped in the bud",36 It was not
imagined that industrial conflict could be eliminated, merely that
joint regulation would produce greater stability. Despite the
fact that the Commission believed that "... where both sides in an
industry are strongly organised and in possession of considerable
financial resources, a trade conflict when it does occur, may be on
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a very large scale, very protracted and very costly".
It is interesting to note that the Commissioners believed that
strong organisation on both sides and a "fairly equal" balance of
power were pre-requisites of successful joint regulation. While
in 1867 there had been seme understanding of the need for strong
organisation there was little understanding of the need for a
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balance of power. Two reasons might be offered. First, joint
regulation was very much in its infancy in 1867 and the role of the
balance of power in producing stable industrial relations would be
unlikely to be perceived. Second, any notion of balance in a
matter to be settled by market forces would be difficult to
reconcile with the tenets of economic liberalism.
The conduct of industrial relations varied greatly at this time;
the use of sliding scales and wages boards being much discussed.
Wages boards were "... to be distinguished both from more
occasional meetings or conferences between representatives or
committees of employers and employed in a trade for the purpose of
discussing wage rates or other points at issue, and from the joint
committees which are frequently constituted in trades for the
purpose of hearing and determining in a judicial manner questions
arising between individual employers and those whom they employ.
The object of a true wages board is to prevent conflicts by means
of periodical and organised meetings of representatives of
employers and employed for the purpose of discussing and revising
general wage rates in accordance with the changing circumstances of
the time."38 The number of such boards was distinctly limited in
the 1890s.
If joint regulation was a worthy aspiration it is not surprising
that the Commission looked at ways in which existing institutions
could be developed and improved, particular attention being paid to
modes of conciliation and arbitration. Of a number of points
which arise for discussion one of the more interesting is the
treatment of the distinction between conflicts of rights and
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conflicts of interest. The majority viewed conflicts of rights as
adjudicable matters; such issues "... being for the most part
connected with the application of rules already recognised, can
usually be dealt with and settled, upon the ascertainment of facts,
without much difficulty by simple methods or institutions of a
• • • . 1Q . #
judicial kind." Where a wages board existed a standing
committee might be established to deal with such questions; in the
absence of a wages board a joint committee of employers and
employees might be set up to deal solely with rights issues.
Similarly, for the Webbs "rights" issues were highly adjudicable.
They believed that when the application of an agreement was the
question at issue "... the settlement should be automatic, rapid
and inexpensive. The ideal machinery for this class of cases
would, in fact, be a peripatetic calculating machine."40 When it
came to conflicts of interest it was noted that "... the method of
judicial arbitration has, as experience shews, not yet been
successfully applied to this class of questions, except under
special circumstances and in a few industries . ..".41 The
majority believed that the reason for this was because "such
questions are in fact not suitable for judicial decision. They
are questions of practical politics in which the relative strength
of the apposite parties is an element that can hardly be left out
of account".42 The minority believed the explanation to be even
more fundamental and one that lay in the realm of disputes over
questions of political economy: "The points at issue are not such
as admit of decision upon any principles which both sides admit."43
In fact, arbitration over conflicts of interest would present a
number of difficulties: "... even where there is a disposition on
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both sides to refer to arbitration, there is often a difficulty in
finding suitable arbitration or umpires. Either the arbitrator is
quite unconnected with industrial work, and then the process of
informing his mind upon the matter is too long and costly, or he is
in same way connected with the industrial world, and then one party
or the other is apt to suspect him of bias and partiality".44
Moreover, the respective bargaining power of the parties often
meant that one side would have considerably more interest than the
other in making use of an independent arbitrator. In the words of
the Commission, "in cases where very strong organisation enables
the workmen fully to hold their own, and even gives them advantages
in bargaining, they are the more apt to be averse to arbitration by
individuals regarding these general questions, while employers are
more disposed to resort to it. Certainly the desire for
arbitration on general questions, and especially, for some form of
State arbitration, seems usually to be stronger among workmen of
poorly organised trades."45
The Commission devoted a considerable amount of time to canvassing
various legal solutions. One issue discussed was the legal status
of collective agreements, the Commission believing that a
combination of a lack of legal personality on the part of a trade
union and the effect of s 4(4) prevented collective agreements from
being legally enforceable. The Commissioners considered proposals
which would have allowed trade unions and employer's associations
to ":... be able by registration to acquire legal personality and
to enter into industrial agreements for specific terms, enforceable
by monetary penalties of a limited amount upon the organisations
parties to it, and upon other persons at any time during the term
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of the agreement members of such organisations".46 In the eyes of
the Commissioners the acid test for the use of the law would be in
its potential value for securing greater adhesion to collectively
agreed terms. More particularly, would the respective
organisations be able to control their memberships? For example,
the question was posed as to whether an organisation "... would
continue to be liable for any breach of agreement by those who had
ceased to be members".47 The report continues: "This is an
important point; for though it would certainly seem a strong
measure to make an association legally responsible for the conduct
of persons who were no longer its members, on the other hand if
this was not done the scheme hardly appears to dispose of the old
difficulty of enforcing legal penalties against a mass of working
AQ , #
men". However, a paradox arose in that in the strongly
organised trades "... agreements are, as matters stand now, best
observed, even without any right to sue for compensation, while on
the other hand a weak and poor union, even if endowed with legal
personality, and made legally responsible for any breach of
agreement by the persons who had ceased to be members of it, would
constitute but a feeble guarantee to employers that the terms of
AQ ,
the agreements would be loyally observed". Ultimately,
therefore, the report did not recommend facilitating legal
enforcement; it was most needed where organisation was weak but
equally that was where it was least likely to be effective.
Some of the Commissioners were more inclined to facilitate legal
enforcement - as is clear from their observations appended to the
report - and it is interesting to assess their position. They
believed "... that the extension of liberty to bodies of workmen or
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employers to acquire fuller legal personality than that which they
at present possess is desirable in order to afford, when both
parties wish it, the means of securing the observance, at least for
fixed periods, of ... collective agreements . ..",50 one reason for
this being the view that it would "... result in the better
observance for definite periods of agreements ... (and) ... would
also afford a better basis for arbitration in industrial disputes
than any which has yet been suggested".51 More interestingly,
the view was expressed that "... further legislation is desirable
in order to bring the law into harmony with the present state of
facts and public opinion".52 Since 1871 there had been an
increasing acceptance of collective bargaining and trade unionism:
collective agreements are "... on the whole, in accordance with the
public interest and with the circumstances of modern industry".53
To move towards treating such agreements in the same fashion as
other contracts would be a recognition of the value placed on
conducting industrial relations by joint regulation. Similarly
collective agreements "... would be subject, like agreements
between individuals, to the restrictions flowing from the common
law doctrine in discountenancing restraint of trade".54
Nevertheless, the final conclusion of this body of Commissioners
was that "The evidence does not show that public opinion is as yet
ripe for the changes in the legal status of Trade Associations
which we have suggested; but we have thought it to be desirable to
indicate what may... ultimately prove to be the most natural and
reasonable solution of seme at least of the difficulties which have
been brought to our notice".55
The Commission also considered whether special tribunals should be
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set up to deal with cases involving employment contracts. In
rejecting such proposals the same pragmatism was demonstrated that
appeared in the discussion of the legal enforceability of
collective agreements. Thus the establishment of such tribunals
would be of limited value since "... in this country, the only
disputes which lead to serious actual conflict are those relating
to the terms, not of existing, but of future agreements.'56 In
addition, there appears to have been a prejudice against any type
of legislative intervention. Here, for example, all that was at
stake was ease of access to the courts. There was no question of
seeking to regulate collective bargaining by law. Yet the report
was quite content to rely on the power of social forces to guard
the interests of employees, it being noted that "... in large and
well organised trades the employees have already quite sufficient
means of obtaining remedy for grievances connected with existing or
implied agreements or trade customs".57 Quite consistently social
power would not be legally reinforced even where it was manifestly
unable to protect workers. So "... in unorganised occupations,
especially in the case of unskilled labour, a dispute on questions
of this kind is more likely to be terminated by cessation of the
engagement between an employer and an employee than by a resort to
CQ
any tribunal however constituted."30
Various suggestions as to compulsory arbitration were aired and the
Commission considered suggestions such that strikes and lock-outs
should be unlawful unless arbitration had been resorted to. This
ran up against the practical obstacle of finding a method to
enforce a law prohibiting strikes and lock-outs against large
bodies of employees and employers. Following their view
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concerning facilitating legal enforceability of collective
agreements a number of the Commission appended observations with
the aim of encouraging arbitration backed by legal sanctions.
However, it seemed to them "... to be obvious (1) that the State
cannot compel either individuals or bodies of men to enter into
agreements; and (2) that the State cannot compel employers to give
employment or workmen to do work upon terms which they do not
respectively accept. In as much as lock-outs and strikes are, in
practice, the assertion of these essential liberties on the part of
employers and workmen, it is clear that the State cannot prohibit
acts of this kind and compel the parties to resort to tribunals of
• RQ
any sort instead". 3 It was felt that if trade unions could
secure legal personality they could voluntarily enter into legally
binding contracts to submit present or future questions to
arbitration, the hope being expressed that if "... a more concrete
guarantee was given to arbitration, it would be more frequently
resorted to by those who have a bona fide preference for it over
more violent modes of settling differences".60
Finally, it falls to be considered what the Commission actually did
recommend (it may be noted that four of the seven trade unionists
signed a minority report). The Commission commended the work done
by the Labour Department of the Board of Trade and wished to see
its expansion. Their main recommendation was that legislation
should endow the Board of Trade with discretionary powers with
regard to conciliation and arbitration in trade disputes. This
was to be embodied in the Conciliation Act, 1896. It is vital to
note that, under the Act, an arbitrator or conciliator could only
be appointed on the application of both parties.
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The Commission was, therefore, adamantly opposed to the legal
regulation of collective bargaining. All it was prepared to offer
to the two sides of industry were certain facilities which they
could utilise if they wished. This approach had both a pragmatic
and an ideological basis. The pragmatic base stemmed from the
fact that the conduct of industrial relations by voluntary
collective bargaining was, in fact, conducive to industrial peace.
The ideological basis, on the other hand, was rooted in an aversion
to State intervention (this aversion not being confined to the
sphere of industrial relations). Cole, in his discussion of the
labour movement in the 1880's, notes that "... Trade Unionism,
under the control of the older leaders, held surrendered completely
to laissez-faire ideas, just at the time when these ideas were
wearing out in the face of the changing conditions of trade and
industry. The leaders, with a few exceptions, were as vehement as
the employers against State interference, and believed in settling
all issues by conciliation based on the assumption that the real
interests of capital and labour were the same".61 Six of the seven
trade unionists on the Commission belonged to the "old school"
(though only three trade unionists signed the majority report).
While Dicey believed that this period of time bore witness to a
decline in the popular authority of the doctrine of laissez-faire
the report is still very much in keeping with that doctrine.
An indication of the continued influence of laissez-faire is given
by the comments of the Commission as to the dangers of employer and
trade unions "... combining together to control an industry
injuriously to the public interest".62 The report simply states
that "... it may be hoped that such combinations would in the end
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either fall from within or be defeated by competition arising from
unexpected quarters or be destroyed by changes in methods of
production".63 Nevertheless, the influence of laissez-faire was
definitely on the wane. In the House of Commons in 1895 Mundella
justified the need for a Conciliation Bill on the basis of the
damage to the public interest arising from the economic harm caused
by trade disputes.
It is clear frcm the observations appended to the report that a
significant section of the majority would have regarded greater
legalisation of industrial relations as a natural development.
Thus they wished to facilitate the conclusion of legally
enforceable collective agreements. Whereas the report was to
recommend the use of certain statutory based facilities there were
those who wished to facilitate an increase in the resort to law.
It is vital to appreciate that they did not wish to see the use of
the law made compulsory. They adhered to the tenets of laissez-
faire but equally saw no reason why the law should abstain from
industrial relations.
It deserves to be pointed out that the discretionary powers in
respect of conciliation and arbitration recommended by the
Commission would already have been within the authority of the
Board of Trade. It being felt, though, that legislation would give
the Board greater authority: "This Bill would enable them to say
to the parties: 'The legislature thinks it our duty to place the
matter fairly before you'."65 The envisaged legislation was seen
as an avcwal of State policy that joint regulation, assisted where
necessary by conciliation or arbitration, was the way ahead.
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Interestingly enough, many people at this time seem to have viewed
"public opinion" as a neutral force but at the same time as a
potent weapon that could be deployed to help resolve disputes.
Thus one MP stated - "Neither side to a great industrial dispute
could carry on the conflict long if the force of public opinion was
against them; but there was the difficulty of forming an
intelligent and well instructed public opinion. If there could be
an authoritative body - a body wham the public could trust - to
make a report as to what ought to be done in the future, much would
• , , , CLfL
be done to bring a conflict to a termination."
Dicey saw the Commission' s policy as having important consequences
in the longer term. "We have reached a merely transitory stage in
the effort of the State to act as arbitrator. The attempt, if not
given up, must be carried out to its logical conclusion, and assume
the shape of compulsory arbitration which is a mere euphemism for
the regulation of labour by the State, acting probably through the
courts".67 Certainly sane trade unions were in favour of
compulsory arbitration at this time. The unions concerned
belonged to areas where labour organisation was weak and what, in
fact, was probably desired was legal regulation of wages. Where
trade unionism was stronger compulsory arbitration was unlikely to
be in demand. (See above, pp 18-19.) Employers too were unlikely
to be in favour, viewing it both as an infringement of their 'right
to manage' and "... on its economic side, as indefensible an
interference with industrial freedom as a legal fixing of wage
rates".69
The Commissioners, therefore, placed their faith firmly in the
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institutions of voluntary collective bargaining, the view being
expressed that "... the custom ... (of collective bargaining) ...
may became so strong, even without assistance from law, as to
afford in such trades an almost certain and practically sufficient
guarantee for the carrying out of industrial agreements and
70 • .
awards". Moreover, it was hoped that the extension of
voluntary boards would continue.
The signatories to the minority report wished to see much greater
state intervention in society to better the working and living
conditions of the working class. To this end they desired greater
legal regulation in the area of employment just as much as they did
when it came to housing, etc. They wished to see legislation
preventing manual workers from being employed for more than 8 hours
a day. A demand which had became part of the policy by 1890.
Again a number of adherents of 'New Trade Unionism' wished a
minimum wage to be established by legislative fiat. This desire
for greater state intervention was not shared by trade unionists of
the older school. Thus we find Howell adamantly stating that •...
an interference with the hours of adult male labour, ... is outside
the domain of law' .73 The minority were opposed to incorporation
(though same unions would have welcomed compulsory arbitration at
the time, see above p 22):
'To expose the large amalgamated societies of the country
with their accumulated funds, sometimes reaching a
quarter of a million sterling, to be sued for damages by
any employer in any part of the country, or by any
discontented member or non-unionist, for the action of
same branch secretary or delegate, would be a great
24
injustice.,74
They envisaged greater state intervention which was not in conflict
with the 1871 settlement. They wished trade unions to be free to
pursue their claims without fear of litigation while, at the same
time, seeking greater legal protection for employees.
Developments in Industrial Relations
The Royal Cammission of 1892 had dealt extensively with measures of
reform which were often concerned with devices to reduce conflict
by curbing rank and file militancy. Similarly, employers searched
for ways to maintain or restore control over workplace relations.
For example, from 1860 onwards the establishment of Boards of
Conciliation and Arbitration became common. Such boards often met
with considerable success, especially in the initial years after
formation. However, "... as time passed the charm seemed to fail
The boards belonged to the era when it was an achievement for
the unions to gain recognition and take an equal part in reasoned
negotiation. As industrial relations moved on to a new stage,
they had less meaning to the men and less work that they could
do".75
Of particular interest are the events in the Boot and Shoe
industry. The early years of the 1890's witnessed considerable
dissatisfaction among sections of both sides with regard to the
operation of the dispute settlement machinery in the industry. To
the employers two factors were proving particularly disquieting.
The apparent inability of the union leadership to secure the
adhesion of its membership to agreed procedure and, the quite
legitimate, use of procedure to challenge the extent of managerial
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prerogative. Events were to culminate in the lock-out of 1895.
This lasted for nearly six weeks and resulted in a settlement
favourable to the employers whereby they "... secured important
limitations in the scope of collective bargaining".76 What of
worker discipline? The employers looked to the union to control
their membership but in addition to the standard institutions of
joint regulations they imposed a trust fund. The following
elements of the settlement are of great interest:
"Should any provision of the Settlement, or any award,
agreement, or decision be broken 'by any manufacturer or
body of workmen belonging to the Federation or the
National Union; and the Federation or the National Union
fail within ten days either to induce such members to
comply with the agreement, decision, or award, or to
i
expel them from their organization, the Federation or the
National Union shall be deemed to have broken the
agreement, award, or decision".763 The penalty for
breaking an agreement, award, or decision was to be a
financial one. A Guarantee Fund was set up; each side
contributing £1,000. Either side could claim before the
Umpire that the other side and defaulted, and should the
Umpire agree, he could 'determine that all or any part'
of the Guarantee Fund be forfeited to the side 'in whose
favour the Award shall be made'. The side thus
penalized would then have to make good the diminution of
the Fund by bringing it up to it original level."77
The use of the Guarantee fund is fascinating: the agreement
corresponds to a legally enforceable collective agreement with a
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liquidate damages clause. The greater interest might well be
thought to arise from the fact that this particular agreement was
adopted without prompting from any State body and, given the time
of its introduction, represented a highly innovatory move in a
quasi-legal direction. On the other hand, the extent to which
employers regarded the trust fund as a guarantor of industrial
peace must be questioned. Fox has argued that "... the Guarantee
Fund had much less significance than has often been thought.
Certainly, it was guaranteed to drive Union leaders into great
efforts to prevent or settle unofficial strikes of which they
disapproved. But the sums involved were relatively so small that
the prospect of paying even the full penalty would be hardly likely
to induce Union leaders to submit on any issue which they felt to
be of more than trivial importance. It could never, by itself,
have secured industrial peace".78 Perhaps the real threat to the
power of employees in the industry was posed by the demonstration
of employer power provided by the lock-out.
Subsequently, the Industrial Council commented on the Scheme in the
course of their enquiry into industrial agreements.79
"If the fund is intended to be one out of which a penalty
is payable equivalent to the amount of damage suffered,
it is clear that, in order to provide for a case
involving a large number of persons, the sum of money
which it would be necessary to deposit would be such that
many of the smaller organisations would be unable to set
aside so large a proportion of their funds, or to obtain
money for such a purpose. If, on the other hand, the
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penalty to be paid is merely in the nature of a fine, it
does not appear that the adoption of the principle adds
much to the restraining influence which is already




The famous case of Taff Vale Railway Company81 led to the
• • • P9 ,
establishment of a Royal Commission and ultimately to the Trade
Disputes Act, 1906. The latter Act, along with the Act of 1871,
were to be the key components of British trade union law until, in
1971, the enactment of the Industrial Relations Act. Nevertheless,
1906 did not bear witness to a comprehensive review of the law
relating to industrial relations. Both the Royal Commission
report and the 1906 Act were exercises in problem-solving in the
wake of Taff Vale. Thus the Commission's terms of reference
obliged the members "... to enquire into the subject of Trade
Disputes and Trade Combinations and as to the law affecting them
...". The Commission refused "... to go into such general
topics as were covered by the Report of the Royal Commission on
Labour, 1894 ..,".84 In legislating Parliament was, of course,
aware of the role of the right to strike in industry; given that
the conduct of industrial relations through the medium of
collective bargaining was regarded as successful but contingent on
strong trade union organisation. The burden of litigation could
severely weaken the unions, one MP declaring that "He had heard
workmen say more than once that they would not continue to
subscribe at personal sacrifice if the money so contributed was to
be confiscated by the lawyers, or to go as technical damages ...
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was the House prepared to witness the gradual decay of those great
Labour associations as a result of the Taff Vale judgment".85
Despite this problem-solving approach the nature of the legal
solution adopted would obviously be of great significance to the
development of British labour law. Essentially there were two
possible avenues of reform in vogue at that time. One could
restore the pre-Taff Vale position, or trade unions could be
incorporated: "... the Trade Unions should forego their position of
being outside the law, and should claim, instead, full rights, not
only of citizenship, but actually of being duly authorised
constituent parts of the social structure, lawfully fulfilling a
recognised function in industrial organisation".86 It was, of
course, the first line of approach that was adopted and it is
necessary to consider why this was favoured.
The most immediate explanation was simply that this course of
action had eventually became the approach desired by the unions.
Given the political influence they were able to exercise, and the
strength of trade union feeling in favour of restoration, the
outcome of the debate became inevitable. (One must also note 1...
the comparative weakness of employer's organisations which might
have provided a counterweight to the influence of the unions in the
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Westminster lobbies and in the constituencies. )
Many trade unionists believed that the 1871 Act had been intended
to put them "outwith the law" and that the passage of time had
accorded a "prescriptive right" to this immunity. Indeed,the
Attorney-General, was to state in the Commons that "... without
fear of challenge from either lawyer or constitutional historian
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that Parliament in 1871 or 1875 intended to create this immunity,
and according to the general assent of politicians and lawyers of
that date, and of a whole generation of their successors, down to
the year 1901, this immunity had, in fact, existed ard had
authority". The Royal Commission, though, believed "... that
the law laid down by the House of lords involved no new principle
and was not inconsistent with the legislation of 1871".89 Once
the procedural changes of 1875 had taken place (see p 42) it became
increasingly likely, in the view of the Commission, that the courts
would allow a trade union to be sued.
Let us look more closely at the union insistence on restoration.
Undoubtedly, distrust of the judiciary played its part; the view
being expressed in the Commons that "... trade unions had very
great difficulty in getting level justice in a court".90 On the
other hand, the underlying motivation was basically the pragmatic
belief that the 1871 settlement had worked and that the sensible
thing to do was to restore it (all the more so as in the light of
the general feeling that the immunity was a basic right).
While undoubtedly political pressure moved the Liberal Government
from its original position it requires to be considered why they
were inclined to accept this. Apart from anything else they
shared, to a certain extent, the views of the labour movement,
though undoubtedly, on the other hand, having considerable
misgivings as to the enactment of the privilege of s 4. The
Government themselves had proposed to give protection against Taff
Vale by restricting the law of agency's operation in relation to
trade unions. One technical reason for dropping this was a desire
30
for clarity: "... there was less risk of actual legislation on
disputed questions going to the Courts of Law, passing from one
stage of appeal to another, and involving loss of temper, money and
time, by adopting the perfectly simple and cammonsense method
embodied in the alternative clause, then if they were to lay down
in regard to industrial combinations a new code of the law of
agency".91 Again as in 1871 it was argued that trade unions were
essentially voluntary associations arid while this might have became
a good deal less convincing it still seems to have carried some
weight.
The alternative would have been to proceed down the road to
incorporation. The Royal Commission had recommended that "...
facultative powers be given to Trade Unions, either (a) to became
incorporated subject to proper conditions, or (b) to exclude the
operation of s 4 of the 1871 Act, or of seme one or more of its
sub-sections, so as to allow Trade Unions to enter into enforceable
agreements with other persons and with their own members".92
This option was strongly favoured by employers. In terms of
solving the problem caused by Taff Vale such an approach could have
given the unions what they required. Incorporation could have
gone alongside protection, whether in the form of a right or
immunity, against simple conspiracy and inducing breach of
contract. If picketing had been legalised as well trade unions
would not have needed any further protection and the privilege of s
4 of the 1906 Act would have been superfluous. An argument that
had proved significant in 1871 arose again; to give trade unions
full legal personality would raise the controversy as to the
enforcement of the union rule book. The Webbs noting that such a
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move would require "... a great advance in public opinion"93 and
the Government certainly did not wish to see injunctions being
issued against strike breakers, etc.
We have already seen that the labour movement was not in favour of
incorporation. However, trade union reaction to Taff Vale had
been mixed and if legislation had came earlier things might have
turned out very differently. Initially, same union leaders appear
to have accepted the increase in legal involvement in their
organisations' activities; others may have been prepared to resign
themselves to it. Indeed, Brown has stated that ... "Same
unionists saw in legal liability a way of encouraging responsible
behaviour or limiting rank and file militancy. It also followed
that if unions could be sued as corporate entities then they could
also enter into legally binding contracts, especially with
employers; and to same union leaders this was quite an attractive
proposition'.94 Bell of the Railway Servants' Union believed that
strong union executives would command more respect from employers
and that this would ease the passage of compulsory arbitration.95
However, Brcwn continued by saying that "on the whole ... those
major unions which had already gained recognition frcm employers
preferred to keep the law out of industrial relations".96 Again
the political climate in the aftermath of Taff Vale was not over
sympathetic to trade union demands and the labour movement might
well have been prepared to accept any reasonable settlement. In
fact the Bill introduced into Parliament in 1903, with the support
of the hierarchy of the labour movement, did not give trade unions
immunity in tort if the 'member or members ... acted with the
directly expressed sanction and authority of the rules *.97 "With
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the announcement of the Royal Commission these prospects had gone.
If the Government had desired to obtain a moderate bill with the
consent of the unions, they could certainly have had it in 1903.
Since the Government chose to reject the overtures of the union
leaders, however,the latter had very little incentive to oppose the
clamour of their followers for complete immunity, the 'permanent
remedy'."97a
The rejection of incorporation meant that the UK was unlikely to
see greater legal regulation of industrial relations. It should
be noted that it would have been feasible to have modified the
settlement of 1871 with the effect of increasing legal involvement.
The statutory immunities could have been modified to regulate by
law certain instances of industrial action. Thus the
parliamentary debates contain references to moves to restrict
immunity to primary strikes and to render employee-only disputes
illegitimate. Such proposals tended to be rather summarily
discussed and met with little enthusiasm, the discussion in
Parliament being concentrated around the proposed s 4 and the law
on picketing. Nevertheless, the Government expressed the view
that "... the whole policy of the Bill was founded on the
established right of workmen for any reason which they in their
judgment thought sufficient to abstain from work... They were the
best judges of that".98 Much of the current controversy over the
proper ambit of the purposes for which industrial action may be
taken relates to so-called "political" strikes. This was not an
issue in 1906 though the Government believed "... that trade
disputes should be limited to those concerned with questions of
employment and conditions of employment".99 Their concern was
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presumably to prevent personal grudges, etc, from masquerading as
trade disputes.
CONCLUSION
By way of conclusion it is necessary to try and assess labour Law
policy in the aftermath of the 1906 Act. At the end of the period
1871-1906 two features were worthy of note. First, the recognition
of the benefits to be gained by conducting industrial relations
through the institution of collective bargaining. Second, the lack
of legal regulation of industrial relations and trade union
internal affairs.
While in later years many commentators came to regard the absence
of law as a virtue the position was different in 1906, Royal
Commission reports, for example, tending to suggest that the law be
changed to allow the parties to enforce legally collective
agreements if they wished, commercial relations being seen as no
different to industrial relations. While collective laissez-faire
was to go hand in hand with legal abstention, economic liberalism
and the use of the law were not incompatible. Recommendations as
to legal changes were, however, heavily influenced by pragmatic
considerations. Hence the reason that any scheme of compulsory
arbitration was ultimately rejected, was because voluntary
arrangements were felt to be working. On the other hand, had the
government intervened to regulate by law industrial relations in
the nineteenth century". ... unions might have became sufficiently
accustomed to legal constraints, and sufficiently convinced of
their long term benefits, to resist the temptation to cast them
aside when they became strong enough to do so".1 A further
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instance of pragmatism is furnished by the majority in 1894 who
felt that legally enforcing collective agreements would not achieve
much since it would be unlikely to work where it was most needed
(ie in weakly organised trades). Trade Unions too, especially
those of the new school, pressed for more legislation. They were
mainly interested in limiting working hours and similar protective
legislation.
By the 1890's there was a greater perception of the part to be
played by the balance of power between the collective parties in
producing stable industrial relations but there was no question of
the law intervening to redress any serious disparities. While the
first Fair Wages Resolution had been passed in 1891 and Wages
Boards were established in 1909 one could not rationalise their
role in the way that was subsequently done. They were not
established to support collective bargaining but were designed to
protect employment conditions in certain sectors of industry.
While same supporters of the Fair Wages Resolution undoubtedly saw
it as a means of promoting the development of collective bargaining
the wording of the 1891 resolution and, a fortiori, the
administration thereof told a different story. The true
significance of the Fair Wages Resolution for voluntarism was the
reliance on administrative sanctions (which were ineffectually
operated) rather than legal regulation. Bercusson has found that
"Not being able to rely on the Fair Wages Resolution, and in the
knowledge that they would not receive any other help in this area,
the trade unions took the hard road to self-reliant collective
bargaining, independent of any legal protection or privilege
through government intervention",2 the function of the resolution
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therefore being to regulate administratively employment terms. It
was not until 1918 that the Wages Councils legislation could be
properly categorised as auxiliary legislation when it became
possible to establish a new Council without showing that wages were
"exceptionally lew" in that industry. The policy of "collective
laissez-faire" was not yet upon us. While free play to the
collective forces of society was now permitted the law would not
intervene to promote a more equitable equilibrium in the power
balance. Terms and conditions of employment were to be settled by
the combined forces of capital and labour meeting in the market
place.
Once the 1906 Act was placed on the statute book it was going to be
very difficult to control effectually trade unionism by law. A
tradition was being allowed to develop whereby trade unions could
pursue their activities unrestrained by the law. Again as time
went on more unions became stronger and the prospect of legal
regulation would be less likely to be viewed by them as bringing
sufficient advantages to outweigh the disadvantages. Even before
1906 the efficacy of legal constraints would have depended on the
co-operation of trade union hierarchies. It has always been
difficult to envisage any type of sanction which could restrain a
body of employees from striking. The only practical avenue of
approach is for the State to try and utilise the disciplinary
powers of trade unions. This, in turn, is unlikely to be
successful in the absence of consensus as to the use of the law.
To impose legal restraints on unco-operative trade unions might
raise the level of conflict in two ways. First, the active
opposition of trade unions could lead to greater social conflict
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(for example, in response to a damages award being made against
them). Second, if trade union organisation is weakened by
litigation, collective bargaining, a mechanism which
institutionalises conflict, will become less effectual.
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CHAPTER 2
THE LAW AFTER 1871
The most fundamental barrier to suing a trade union was a union's
lack of legal personality. Anyone wishing to sue a union would
have been required to name all the members in the action. The
union funds were the property of the membership and •... judgment
could not be recovered against any person or persons not named as
defendants in the action.'1 So where '... an association
consisted of so large a number of persons that it was impracticable
to ascertain the names of all of them or to make them all
defendants, the property of the association as distinguished from
that of the individual members, could not be taken in execution in
a common law action'.2 It being widely assumed, prior to the
decision of the House of Lords in Taff Vale Railway Company v ASRS,
that a trade union could not be sued in its own name.3 The Court
of Appeal4 shared this assumption and had held that '... in
substance ... a trade union, though not an unlawful association, is
not a corporation nor a partnership, and, as seems to follow, that
for wrongful acts done by the union the funds of the society cannot
in any way be made responsible'.5 The House of Lords viewed the
matter differently holding that a registered trade union could be
sued in its registered name.
The Juridical Review commented that trade unions 'Hitherto ... have
acted on the assumption that they might commit through their agents
the most lawless acts and yet enjoy complete immunity so far as
their funds are concerned'.6
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Representative Actions After 1875
As a result of procedural changes in 1875 it might have been
thought possible to sue a trade union in a representative action.
An unsuccessful attempt to do so was made in the tort case of
Temperton v Russell in 1893.7 The reason for the failure of the
action was the Court of Appeal ■ s interpretation of the new
procedure; this interpretation was subsequently rejected by the
House of lords in 1901 in Bedford v Ellis.8 Bedford preceded Taff
Vale Railway Company which contained dicta to the effect that a
trade union could be sued by means of a representative action.
It must be considered whether a representative action could have
been brought over a collective agreement prior to Taff Vale. After
1893 Temperton v Russell would have served as a source of
discouragement to such actions, at least until Bedford v Ellis.
Admittedly a narrow explanation for the decision in Temperton might
be that the defendants named were not genuinely representative.
However, this is difficult to reconcile with the judgment of the
court. In any event it might have been argued that the effect of
Temperton was confined to actions in tort.9 Given the subsequent
rejection of the reasoning in Temperton by the House of lords it
might be thought that a successful use could have been made of the
representative action against a trade union prior to 1893. The
use of the representative action was always surrounded by a number
of severe technical impediments.10 It appears that it would have
been unlikely that an action for damages for breach of contract
would have been permitted.11 Subsequently it emerged that the
fact of a changing membership might exclude the possibility of an
action in contract.12 However, Tempertan aside no attempt seems
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to have been made to sue a trade union by using a representative
action and one may ask why this should be so. It is surely
significant that the 1870s and 1880s were very much litigation free
- in contrast to the 'litigation happy' 1890s. '... the period
which followed ... [the Acts of 1871-6] ... was one of trade union
weakness marked by a series of major defeats in the industrial
field. Employers therefore had little incentive either to seek
help from the courts or to agitate for the revision of the Acts'.13
The Ambit of s 9 of the 1871 Act
Prior to the Taff Vale, if one discounts the possibility of a
representative action, the only way to sue a trade union would be
to sue the trustees. S 9 of the 1871 Act empowered the trustees
of any registered trade union to defend any action '... touching or
concerning the property, right, or claim to property of the trade
union ...'. The ambit of the section is harder to ascertain:
'... are the legal proceedings contemplated by the section limited
to actions which concern specific property or does any claim which
threatens the general assets of the union fall within its scope?...
Within the narrow construction are claims arising out of particular
property, such as a breach of covenant in respect of land vested in
the trustees. Within the wide construction fall claims arising
out of the activities of the union, but not incidental to the
ownership of particular property, as, for example, a claim for
damages for wrongful dismissal by an employee'.14 Dicta in a case
prior to the House of Lords decision in Taff Vale had lent support
to the wider construction. In Linaker v Pilcher Mr Justice
Mathews had stated that '... an action for a breach of contract
entered into on behalf of the society would be an action touching
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their property: and likewise an action for damages for tort would
be an action touching the property of the society'.15 This leads
one to query whether an action for breach of a collective agreement
could have been brought under s 9.
That the case of Linaker was the cause of same concern to the
supporters of labour is evident from the parliamentary debates on
the 1906 Act. The view being expressed that a wide construction
of s 9 could nullify the effect of s 4.16 While the government
described such fears as being •... purely imaginary'17 they led to
the modification of s 4(2). As a result it was expressly provided
that the trustees could not be sued in respect of any tortious act
committed by or on behalf of the union in contemplation or in
furtherance of a trade dispute. Subsequent to the 1906 Act there
aire dicta going either way as to the proper construction of s.9
and, therefore, the position in respect of a collective agreement
• • 1 ft
remains a moot point.
The Representative Action in Scotland
The procedural obstacles which existed in England as to the suing
of voluntary associations by the means of a representative action
do not appear to have posed a problem in Scotland. Cases from
1862 onwards allow an unincorporated body to be sued in its own
name '... provided its responsible officers and managers are also
called in their representative capacity'.19
The Taff Vale Case
Two lines of thought can be found in the decision of the House of
Lords.20 The majority view treated a registered trade union as a
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quasi corporation. This was established by deducing the intention
of the legislature in enacting the 1871 Act. In the words of
Farwell J, whose judgment was adopted by the lord Chancellor and
Lord Brampton. 'The proper rule of construction of statutes such
as these is that in the absence of express contrary intention the
Legislature intends that the creature of the statute shall have the
same duties and that its funds shall be subject to the same
liabilities as the general law would impose on a private individual
doing the same thing. It would require very clear and express
words of enactment to induce me to hold that the Legislature had in
fact legalised the existence of such irresponsible bodies with such
wide capacity for evil.'
Farwell J acknowledged that by registering a trade union did not
became incorporated. On the other hand, he found it significant
that registration resulted in the granting of two of the essential
qualities of a corporation - the capacity to own property and the
capacity to act by agents. The minority view, which is to be found
in the judgments of Lords MacNaghten and Lindley, is that while one
can sue a union in its registered name the action is a
representative one.22 It must be said that discerning the ratio
of the two minority judgments is somewhat problematic.
Nevertheless lord MacNaghten remarks that 'The registered name is
nothing more than a collective name for all the members'23 and Lord
Lindley states that "The Act appears to me to indicate with
sufficient clearness that the registered name is one which may be
used to denote the union as an unincorporated society in legal
proceedings as well as for business and other purposes ... it is
only a more convenient made of proceeding than that which have to
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be adopted if the name could not be used'.24 Several years later
Lord Lindley was to remark, in a similar vein, that 'A trade union
is, and its name is only a convenient designation for, an
unincorporated society of individuals ...1.25 The minority view
creates more difficulties than it solves. In the main this is
because no explanation is given of how, if by suing a union in its
registered name one is essentially bringing a representative
action, the numerous and significant technical difficulties of
bring a representative action are overcome.
In the light of the majority view in Taff Vale it seemed clear that
a registered union could sue and be sued in respect of contracts
entered into by it.26 While none of the judgments specifically
deal with this issue their wording is so wide as to suggest that
this must be so. In the words of Lord Shard '... the power of
suing and liability to be sued in the society's name is clearly and
necessarily implied by the provisions of the statutes'.27
Farwell J assumed that the obstacle in the way of any contractual
action was s 4.28
Trade Unions Lawful At Common Law and the 1871 Act
It has been argued that where a trade union, which is a lawful
association at common law, is sued in its registered name s.4 will
pq , ...
apply. S 4 commences with the words 'Nothing in this Act shall
enable any court' and since the provisions as to registration are
contained in the Act then arguably the Act is enabling an action in
the registered name to be brought. This appears to have been the
view of lord Atkinson in Russell.30 Having noted that the Taff
Vale case was based on construing the 1871 Act he continued: 'the
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conclusion which... must necessarily be drawn from those judgments
is this: that if the Act of 1871 had contained a provision to the
effect that nothing in it should enable any Court to entertain any
legal proceedings founded upon any tort committed by a trade union
through its agents, the decision... in the Taff Vale case would
have been precisely the opposite of what it was ... But the
provisions of s 4, as regards the present action, are in effect
similar to the hypothetical provisions above mentioned in their
relations to such torts. All the reasoning based upon those
provisions of the Act of 1871 upon which the judgments in the Taff
Vale case were founded is therefore inapplicable to this action.,31
On the other hand, it might be argued that reliance on the 1871 Act
is unnecessary where the trade union is lav/ful at common law. The
Act does not enable an action to be brought but merely allows an
action to be brought in the registered name rather than by way of a
representative action.
Restraint of Trade
The existence of the doctrine of restraint of trade meant that most
trade unions would be unlawful at common law. It is a widely held
view that, as a result, trade unions were unable to enforce any
contract entered into. On the other hand, it has been argued that
while a trade union in restraint of trade could not enforce the
union rules at common law it may well be able to enforce a
contracts writh third parties which were otherwise law/ful. Thus
Selwyn goes on to argue that the '... courts would only refuse to
enforce a collective agreement if it was discovered that the actual
agreement itself was in restraint of trade. The extent to which
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this is so would have to be determined in each case, but prima
facie this would not appear to be generally the case'.34 The
latter view would appear to be very much a minority one. Perhaps
more importantly the minority view appears to have been slow to
emerge. So in all probability contracts entered into by unions
would be unenforceable but for the relief given by s.3 of the Trade
Union Act 1871. Hcwever, not every trade union was unlawful at
common law.35 By the beginning of the 20th century judicial
notions of what constituted a restraint of trade were becoming
rather fluid. However, the 1912 decision of the House of lords in
Russell v Amalgamated Society of Carpenters and Joiners 36
demonstrated that any relaxation of the operation of the doctrine
was unlikely to be fully extended to trade unions. While most of
the rules of the Society survived judicial scrutiny, a number did
not. It is not every rule which restrains trade which is invalid
but only rules which are unreasonable. In the eyes of lord Shaw
of Eunfermline Rule 9(5) which provided for a levy 'In the event of
any great struggle between capital and labour in our cwn or any
other trade ...' involved an improper restraint of trade. lord
Shaw stated that 'so far as the individual liberty of the worker is
concerned, it is accordingly fairly plain that trade in respect of
him is restrained, but that would not be sufficient to satisfy the
conditions of unlawfulness unless these were also such as to effect
trade in general or the public at large.,37 lord Robson focused
his attention on Rule 48 which dealt with the disciplinary measures
of fine, suspension and expulsion. These measures could be
directed at, inter alia, failure to comply '... with the decision
of the Executive Committee as to strikes and to obey the recognised
trade union rules of the district, whatever they may be, as to the
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conditions of his work'. There was also a suggestion in Lord
Shaw's speech that rules which furthered the closed shop would be
seen as being in restraint of trade. A view expressed much more
robustly by lord Justice Vaughan Williams in the Court of Appeal.40
After Russell it appeared that certain sorts of trade union rules
would be likely to fall foul of the restraint of trade doctrine, in
particular, certain types of rules on strikes, the furtherance of
the closed shop and rules affecting other trades or industries.41
Not every rule on strikes was struck at. Thus in Osbourne the
rules of the union were found not to be in restraint of trade and
the union was held to be a lawful association at common law.42
Rule 13 authorised the executive committee to sanction strikes but
not to order them. There was no specific provision in the rule
book dealing with members who did not go on strike but rule 9(14)
provided for expulsion should 'Any member ... [be] ... found guilty
of attempting to injure the society ...'.43 The Master of the
Rolls (Cozens Hardy) stating 'I am not prepared to hold that a
member who declines to join with the majority of his fellow workmen
in signing and handing in notices can be said to be "guilty" of
attempting to injury the society. Illegality must not be presumed
or inferred. It must be established, if at all, upon seme plain
provision in the rules ... I can find no such provision in the
rules of this society.'44 Had the position been that the union
could have ordered its members to go on strike the union would have
been an unlawful association.45 Kahn-Freund was later to comment
that 'the ground is shifted from the general nature of the
society's activities to a minute examination of the degree to which
46
the union attempts to control the action of its cwn members'.
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Despite the changes in the law of restraint of trade it was clear
that most unions would still be unlawful at common law. This was,
of course, a position welcomed by trade unions as they could then
invoke the restrictions imposed by s 4 of the 1871 Act. Given
that the 1871 Act remained in force until the passage of the 1971
Act one must consider whether there was every any significant
change in the legal position. Two 1960s Scottish cases47 which
concerned s 4 of the 1871 Act treated the unions involved as being
unlawful associations at common law. In reaching this conclusion
in McGahie Lord Fraser was particularly influenced by a rule which
gave '... power to the executive committee to call upon all members
of the union to withdraw their labour, and provides that if any
member refuses to obey he shall forthwith be expelled from the
t 4.R . .
union'. Given that trade union rule books commonly contain
power to order a strike and disciplinary powers which can deal with
recalcitrant members it would seem likely that most trade unions
would still be regarded as unlawful associations.
Finally, one must take into account judicial discretion in the
granting of remedies. The granting of injunctions and interim
interdicts is discretionary; though the issuance of a permanent
. . . 4Q .
interdict may be more a matter of right. 3 The question then
arises as to how this discretion might be exercised in cases where
s 4 is relevant. In Russell Lord Robson remarked that but for the
enactment of s 4 the courts would "have been compelled to give full
effect by decree, or injunction, to contracts whereby workmen had
bound themselves not to undertake certain legitimate kinds of work,
and to refrain, under certain circumstances, from working at their
trade at all, except by leave of their union, no matter what their
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immediate necessities might be". Thus it may be that the
restrictions imposed by s 4 were viewed as being directed in
particular at restrictions concerned with conditions of employment.
If that were the case there might often be a reluctance to issue
injunctions/interdicts in cases involving collective agreements.
On the other hand, given the range of matters to be found in
collective agreements it might be thought foolish to generalise.
Mention might also be made of two famous Labour Law cases:
Reynolds v Shipping Federation51 and Crofter Hand Woven Harris
Tweed Co Ltd v Veitch.52 These decisions demonstrate that the
courts adopted a much more accommodating attitude to the interests
of Labour in the post first world war period. Kahn-Freund claimed
that the Crofter case showed •... the acceptance by the courts of
the principle of non-intervention in industrial disputes'.53
While both cases clearly showed judicial understanding of
collective interests hew far a judicial policy of non-intervention
existed is problematic. If say a collective agreement between an
employer and union, had came to the courts would the courts have
declined to enforce it? In the absence of the Kahn-Freund theory
would the courts have made use of the concept of no intention to
enter legal relations?
The Trade Union Act 1871 - s 4
Section 4 stated that: Nothing in this Act shall enable any Court
to entertain any legal proceedings instituted with the object of
directly enforcing or recovering damages for the breach of any of













... (4) Any agreement made between one trade union and another.
In the case of an agreement between an employer's association54 and
a trade union s.4 would appear to be a bar to direct enforcement or
the recovery of damages in the event of breach. In a famous
article Kahn-Freund argued "... all that s 4 does is to prevent
"direct" enforcement and recovery of damages for breach. It does
not strike at the validity of the contract. Does it prevent an
action for a declaration as to the contents of the agreement?
Does it prevent an action for an injunction?... This is not the
place to answer these questions, but they are, to say the least,
arguable, and this shows that, after all, the collective agreement
cannot be the legal "nothing" which it is sometimes considered to
be".55 In fact, s 4 did not operate to comprehensively exclude
the issue of a declarator.56 In Re Eurham Miners' Association a
declaration was granted as to whether the rules authorised the
payment of strike pay.57 In ASCJ v Braithwaite lord Buckmaster
stated: "To construe a rule is not directly to enforce any
agreement between the members, and I am unable to see any reason
why the words of the statute should be so extended as to exclude a
trade union itself or any of its members from obtaining the
advantage of having obscure words construed by a wholly independent
and impartial tribunal."58 More interestingly, there are a number
of cases where injunctions were granted in relation to agreements
coming within the terms of s 4.59 So in Yorkshire Miners'
Association v Howien60 a court order was made restraining the union
from paying strike pay in cases not authorised by the rules. The
union had argued that "The plaintiff is really seeking to enforce
the agreement, which the Act says the court must not do. It can
never have been the intention of the legislature to enable persons
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to do negatively what they may not do affirmatively."61 This line
of argument resulted in Lords Davey and James dissenting, Lord
Davey commenting that "... the object of this action is to enforce
... the negative stipulation, and that is in fact and in truth for
specific performance of the agreement".62 While this view is
certainly not without its merits the arguments to the contrary
prevailed. The issue of declaratory relief can be justified on
the basis that no enforcement is involved; the issue of an
injunction turns on what the Act meant by "direct" enforcement.
Clearly a claim for payment of debt63 or the pursuit of an order
for specific implement would be an attempt at direct enforcement.
In Howden Lord MacNaghten was in favour of the granting of the
injunction since "The object of the litigation was simply to
prevent misapplication of the funds of the union, not to administer
those funds, or to apply them for the purpose of providing benefits
to members".64 It might be mooted that while the action may not
have been enforcing application of the funds it was surely
enforcing the agreement. "The object of the action was to enforce
the agreement, and the means sought were direct in substance though
negative in form."65
While Lord MacNaghten may have been in the majority the wording of
his judgment is not free from ambiguity. He is reported as saying
"What is the meaning of the expression "directly enforcing"?" I
cannot think that the legislature intended to strike at proceedings
for directly enforcing certain agreements, leaving untouched and
unaffected all proceedings (other than actions for damages)
designed to enforce those particular agreements indirectly. ...I
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venture to think that the word "directly" is only put into give
point to the antithesis between proceedings to enforce agreements
directly and proceedings to recover damages for breach of contract,
which tend, though indirectly, to give force and strength to the
agreement for breach of which an action may be brought."66 The
reasoning behind this statement would appear to be at odds with the
decision in Howden itself. The statement was later discussed in
the Scottish case of Smith v Scottish Typographical Association
where the First Division of the Court of Session refused to grant
an interdict against a trade union enforcing a resolution which was
alleged to be ultra vires expelling a member.67 Lord Mackenzie
stated that "No more direct method of enforcing the pursuer's view
of the agreement between him and the union concerning the
conditions upon which he was employed could have been adopted".68
His Lordship purported to follow Lord MacNaghten in Hcwden, stating
that the latter '... no doubt puts the wider instead of the
narrower construction on the words "directly enforcing" and reads
them as contrasted with an action of damages, and therefore
• • • ftQ
equivalent to enforcing implement. 3
Moreover, the Lord President stated that "... the case of
Chamberlain's Warf Limited is directly in point. I observe that
the decision was referred to with approval by the House of Lords in
70 • • • • •
... Howden ...'" This is quite astonishing. Of the three
judges in the majority in Howden to deliver judgments Lord Lindley
felt able to distinguish Chamberlain, the Earl of Halsbury and Lord
MacNaghten did not mention it. Furthermore, while the majority in
Howden may have been circumspect in any critique of Chamberlain
they were much more forthcoming in their distaste for Rigby v
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Connol.71 Riqfay was a case where the Court of Appeal refused to
grant a declaration and injunction to prevent a trade union member
being expelled from the union on the basis that to do so would be
to directly enforce the agreement. The remedy sought in Rigby was
, , 70 , ....
the same as in Chamberlain and Smith and the criticism voiced in
Howden might be felt to apply to all three.
A number of objections might be raised as to this 'wider'
interpretation. In the first place there must be a presumption
against treating the word "directly" as virtually superfluous.
Secondly, if the legislature had intended a blanket prohibition
against enforcement of s 4-type agreements why enumerate a specific
indirect means of enforcement, ie, recovery of damages for breach?
In any event, a subsequent House of Lords decision was to give
"directly enforcing" a "narrower" construction. In Amalgamated
Society of Carpenters etc v Braithwaite Lord Atkinson stated that
"I do not think Lord MacNaghten, in the statement made in his
judgment in Yorkshire Miners' Association v Howden, ever meant to
suggest that the word "directly" was to have no force given to it,
or that the words "directly enforcing" include any kind of indirect
enforcement of a contract other than a suit to recover damages for
the breach of it."73 In that case the Court granted an injunction
to restrain the threatened expulsion of two trade union members.
Admittedly, seme commentators have regarded Braithwaite as being a
case which concerns an agreement of a union which falls outwith the
remit of the Section. "... there is nothing in the Acts to effect
the enforcement by any proceedings of any agreement or any part of
an agreement which is not of a type mentioned in the Section. "74
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It is submitted that while the statement quoted in the preceding
sentence is correct it does not offer an explanation for the
decision in Braithwaite. It seems clear from a reading of the
judgments that the decision turned on what amounted to direct
enforcement. (The same explanation is sometimes offered for
Osbourne, but again I would reject it for the reasons mentioned.)75
The interesting question which arises is, could an interdict have
been granted to restrain a breach of a collective agreement between
a trade union and an employers association? What if a trade union
proposed to call a strike in breach of a term of a collective
agreement which stipulated that four weeks' notice had to be given
to withdraw from that agreement? Could an interdict be granted?
In Braithwaite Lord Wrenbury had stated that "But there is nothing
in the Act to preclude the jurisdiction of the Court to uphold the
integrity of the contract - to maintain unimpaired the contract as
it stand - notwithstanding that it cannot enforce the contract as
so maintained ... it is not enforcing an agreement against a party
to grant an injunction to restrain him from tearing it up."76
A number of doubts must be raised. First, much of the litigation
under s 4 was concerned with agreements for the application of the
funds of a trade union for the purposes listed in s 4(3). Cases
concerning agreements made between one trade union and another are
harder to find. In McLuskey v Cole77 one trade union, a member of
another, sought an injunction to restrain its expulsion. The
application was unsuccessful, Lord Sterndale MR declaring "I cannot
see a much more direct way of enforcing an agreement than by an
• • 7ft
injunction to prevent a person from breaking it ...". McLuskey
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is an odd decision, and would appear inconsistent with the four
cases which were cited to the Court though none of the judgments in
McLuskey contain any discussion of, or even reference to, any other
cases. McLuskey would also appear to be contrary to the subsequent
House of Lords decision in Braithwaite. Ultimately, McTnskey
illustrates the difficulty of reconciling the cases in this area of
law and hence the uncertainty as to legal remedy.
The second doubt is prompted by the fact that a number of the
Scottish cases demonstrate a more abstentionist approach in cases
arising after Howden than that adopted by the English courts.
Smith v Scottish Typographical Association79 (already discussed)
was subsequently followed by G & J Rae Ltd v Plate Glass Merchants'
• • 80 • •
Association. There an interdict was sought against the
enforcement of a fine. The interdict was refused and Lord Dundas
remarked that "I do not think it makes any difference that this
petition is laid in a negative form - to interdict the defenders
from putting into force the fine complained of - and not in the
form of a demand for payment of the fine. In substance it seems
to me to be, none the less, a legal proceeding instituted with the
object of enforcing an agreement for payment of a penalty to a
• 81 •
trade union. Both of these purport to follow the English Court
• • • . . 8? • •
of Appeal decision in Chamberlain's Wharf Ltd v Smith a decision
• • . . • • . 88
which is very difficult to reconcile with the ratio of Howden. °J
The Scottish courts, therefore, may have been somewhat less
interventionist than their English counter-parts. It should be
noted that "The earlier decisions ... (ie, Chamberlain's Wharf and
Rigby) ... were reviewed in the case of Braithwaite. It was there
decided that the wider view expressed in Rigby v Control was unsound
. 88a
and could not stand with the judgment in Howden's case".
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The third doubt, and arguably the most significant, flows from a
comment made by lord Buckmaster in Braithwaite: "I have not
referred to the case of Wolfe v Matthews for that depends upon
considering whether relief by way of injunction is a method of
directly enforcing an agreement, and that question does not admit
of a complete and comprehensive reply. It depends upon the
circumstances but ... an injunction as is here sought is not a
direct enforcement of any of the forbidden provisions".84 A
number of other dicta suggest that some courts may have looked to
the object of the action and asked whether granting relief would
, OC #
amount to direct enforcement. In what circumstances would an
injunction be a direct enforcement of a collective agreement? A
collective agreement may well contain clauses prohibiting one of
the parties to it from carrying out certain actions, eg, an
employer shall not employ non-union labour. If an employer
proposed to breach this clause the appropriate remedy to enforce it
would arguably be an interdict and therefore could not be granted,
being a direct enforcement. The clause being negative in form, a
negative remedy must provide the means of enforcement. What,
though, if the clause had stipulated that an employer must employ
union-only labour and an employer proposed to breach this by hiring
"free" labour? Would the object of seeking an interdict be to
directly enforce the agreement? Arguably, to grant an interdict
would not be tantamount to direct enforcement of the agreement
since you are not compelling performance (you are not compelling
him to employ anyone). If the above is correct this would mean
that the availability of a remedy could depend on such semantic
differences between agreements. Such a result might well have
been thought to be inevitable once the artificial divide between
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direct and indirect enforcement had been established.
So long as a collective agreement was not between a trade union and
an employers' association s 4 did not present an obstacle to
enforcement. What was the position then? Gloag on Contract
states that "The effect of a contract between a trade union and a
third party is but slightly illustrated by decisions. But as the
Trade Union Act 1871, removes the taint of illegality arising from
the objects of the union being in restraint of trade, it is clear
that there can be now no general objection to the enforcement of
such contracts.'86 What of the concept of 'intention to enter
legal relations'? In Scotland it may well be that, even today,
let alone in earlier times the concept is not known to Scots law.
In 1977 a consultative memorandum issued by the Scottish Law
Commission declared that '... if in Scotland the courts decline to
enforce, or to award damages for breach of an agreement on a purely
social or domestic or interned, family matter, the basis upon which
they do so is not stated to be the parties lack of contractual
intention, but rather that such agreements are "personal".... and
so the courts, in the absence of a patrimonial interest on the part
, 07
of the pursuer, will not afford a legal remedy for breach'.
In England the concept flows from the 1917 Court of Appeal decision
in Balfour v Balfour. Undoubtedly it was then confined to social
and domestic arrangements. Moreover, even within those spheres
the concept was highly controversial.
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CONCLUSIONS
Once a trade union could be sued in its registered name the
potential for litigation was obviously greater. S 4 of the 1871
Act was not an insuperable barrier to litigation over collective
agreements. For the litigious there were clearly a number of
potential entry-points. Again s 4 only applied to agreements
between employers associations and trade unions. At the end of
the day there remained an absence of case law.
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The greater extent of government involvement in industrial
relations in the early years of the twentieth century is striking.
While legal enactments were limited in number the state was able to
compel the end it desired in other ways. In 1907 the government
acted to end a national strike which had broken out on the
railways. A settlement was achieved by making it clear to the
employers that rejection of the mooted compromise would result in
the introduction of a statute '... making arbitration in railway
disputes compulsory in all cases where the Board of Trade considers
... the dispute warrants such a course being adopted.'1 Securing
a particular result by threatening to enact a more drastic solution
is, in substance, little different to enacting the more moderate
solution. Accordingly for anyone interested in assessing whether
Britain's labour Law system is 'voluntarist' such interventions
must also be taken into account. Subsequent events on the North
Eastern railway in 1913 furnish a further example of this sort of
process. A recognition dispute existed with that company which
was resolved by the employees getting '... Labour members to block
a private bill promoted by the North Eastern, at the end of 5 weeks
. . . ^ •
it gave way ... [and] ... recognised the union ...'. Again, the
implementation of the Whitley Report was given a boost by
government making '... the free use of the threat of the possible
establishment of a trade beard if a Council was not set up".
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Trade union recognition was also furthered by government contracts
requiring it.5 Government influence did not always create an
impact in such a dramatic fashion. Measures taken during war
time, for example, were to effect British industrial relations in
the much longer term. Flanders has written that ' [T]he change of
enduring importance which resulted from such intervention and other
war-time conditions was the shift from local to national
bargaining. After the war, national, centralised negotiations
between the headquarters of trade unions and employers'
associations, or between federations of these bodies, became the
predominant form of collective bargaining'.6
It is interesting to recall the work of the Board of Trade which
generally worked through non legal mechanisms. Those mechanisms
being utilised to promote union recognition and collective
bargaining.7 Again 'while the Board never imposed any formal
wages policy upon its umpires, the type of arbitrator selected
invariably conditioned the criteria adopted in the determination of
wages awards'.8 These criteria were generally unsympathetic to
the interests of labour. The Trade Boards legislation and the
reform of the Fair Wages Resolution must be assessed as part of any
analysis of the State's stance towards industrial relations. In
1909 the Trades Board Act was passed which provided minimum wage
legislation for the 'sweated' trades. Minimum Wage law was
subsequently to be regarded as a prep to collective bargaining but
one must consider how it would have been viewed in 1909. It is
far from easy to identify the motives which lead to the enactment
of any statute. However, perusal of a number of government
reports,9 bills10 and the parliamentary debates suggest mixed
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motives. It is submitted that the predominant motive was simply to
set a basic standard: '... it is quite as legitimate to establish
by legislation a minimum standard of remuneration as it is to
establish such a standard of sanitation ... and hours of work
...1.11 A secondary motive flowed from the view that such
legislation would promote the growth of collective bargaining. It
is important to appreciate that not all supporters of the
legislation espoused this belief. The 1908 committee on home-work
seem to have believed that workers in the sweated trades would have
to look to the law and not to the development of trade union
organisation for protection.12 Aves in his 1908 report on the
Wages Boards and Industrial Conciliation and Arbitration Acts of
Australia and New Zealand obviously found the issue a very
difficult one.
"In general the ultimate effect upon Trade Unionism of the
assumption of official responsibility for matters which under a
voluntary system would in organised trades be left to the trade
union itself, must be to weaken these bodies, since it weakens the
motives for their formation and development. At the moment,
however, the effect of the Special Boards, stimulated by a sense of
what is regarded as their defects and limitations, appears to be
tending to strengthen the Trade Union movement in Victoria'" 13
On the other hand Winston Churchill, then the President of the
Board of Trade believed that the legislation would foster
collective organisation.14
In what way or ways might the legislation foster collective
bargaining? In the sweated trades competition was severe and this
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would mean that there was little value in employees seeking to
collectively bargain with employers as the latter would not enter
into collective agreements for fear of undercutting. Trade boards
might be conducive to greater stability and the development of
trade union organisation. On the other hand, it might be felt
that employees would became dependent on such legislation to the
detriment of any expansion of trade unionism. Secondly, the
administrative set-up of the Trade Boards was possibly seen as a
basis for voluntary organisation. Moreover, same anticipated •...
that they may possibly by means of these Trade Boards and trade
committees, be able to educate the weak and unorganised trades and
encourage them after a while to combine for their own protection
just as other better organised and more advanced trades have
combined•.16
At the time of enactment one could not depict the legislation as
other than regulatory and Kahn-Freund appeared to recognise this.16
In 1909 it would most likely have been regarded as a natural
extension of the Factories Act.17
What of the Fair Wages clause after the 1909 amendments? The Fair
Wages Committee of 1908 which had been established by the
government to review the resolution certainly saw its function as
setting minimum standards and not as promoting collective
bargaining. While some of the supporters of the resolution
undoubtedly saw it as having a secondary role in the fostering of
collective bargaining, like the Trades Boards legislation, it could
not be viewed as auxiliary legislation.
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The Coal Mines Regulation Act 1908 was a further example of what,
at the time, must have been seen as a move towards more extensive
, "1 Q , , f
regulatory legislation. Phelps Brown's discussion of this is
illuminating: 'The miners ... had ... won from Parliament the
limitation of hours they could not wrest from the owners. It was
natural to infer both that it was easier to get industry-wide
regulation from the Government than Improvements district by
district from the employer, and that the way to get it was by the
industry-wide strike.'.19
1912 witnessed the passing of the Coal Mines (Minimum Wage) Act.
While the Trade Boards Act of 1909 was an earlier example of
legislative intervention in the fixing of wages it was confined to
the sweated industries where '... the rate of wages prevailing in
any branch of the trade is exceptionally low ...'.20 The Act of
1912 stipulated that it was to be an implied term of every miner's
contract of employment that he be paid a minimum wage fixed under
the Act. Minimum wage rates were to be fixed by joint district
boards for each district.21 'In point of fact, in 1912 the number
of district boards constituted was not great, the majority of the
boards or committees already in existence for other purposes being
accepted by the Board of Trade for the purpose of the Act. '22 The
wage fixed could be varied at any time by agreement between the
employee and employer representatives on the Board. Alternatively,
either side could apply for a variation after one year; provided
three months' notice had been given after the expiration of the
year. Should the board fail to reach an agreement the chairman
had power to settle the rate.
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It is said that on the passage of the Act 1... Keir Hardie jumped
with joy at the result, not because he agreed with all the terms of
the Bill, but because legislative enactment had recognised the
minimum wage1.23
It was against this background of increasing State intervention
(often through legal mechanisms) that the Industrial Council Report
of Enquiry into Industrial Agreements was produced.24 At this
time no widely-subscribed philosophy had yet emerged as to the
types of legal intervention which were salutary or as to the
division between areas appropriate for legal intervention and those
best left to voluntary action. The views of the Council as to law
and collective agreements are therefore of interest.
The Council were impressed by the level of adhesion to collectively
agreed obligations and went on to consider the circumstances that
were conducive to this. Like the Royal Commission on Labour of
1894 they stressed the importance of strong organisation to
successful voluntary collective bargaining: problems arising '...
in trades which are unorganised or in which on one side or the
other the organisation is incomplete or is of recent origin ...1.25
This corresponds with the fact that the industrial militancy in the
period between 1906-1914 was largely confined to low-paid and
unskilled workers.26
The question was posed as to whether the law could promote adhesion
to collective agreements but greater caution was displayed when it
came to recommending legal intervention.27 Ihis stemmed not from
an aversion to state interference in principle but from a concern
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lest the sound conduct of industrial relations be impeded. For
example, •... the ultimate result of the institution of a system of
legal money penalties for breaches of agreement or the legal
prohibition of assistance to members in breach might be that the
Trade Union leaders would find themselves precluded from entering
into agreements at all, or, if agreements were entered into, that
they would be compelled to insist upon the insertion of a clause
which enabled them to terminate the agreements upon exceedingly
short notice. An alternative to this might be defiance of the law,
when there would at once arise all the difficulties inherent in any
attempt to enforce the law against a large number of individual
workmen - with no ultimate source of pressure short of
, . no , , t
imprisonment '. The council believing that agreements were
complied with so far as could reasonably be expected, if the law
were to demand more the consequences might well be unfortunate.
Again there was the belief that the surest guarantee that an
agreement would be kept was for it to be voluntarily entered into.
Same legal reform was favoured. The Council wished to see a
process whereby the terms of a collective agreement could be
extended and made obligatory on employers who were not party to the
agreement but who were engaged in the same trade or district.
•Where an agreement has been so declared to be extended, it shall
be an implied term of any contract of service in the particular
trade or district that the terms of the agreement shall be an
essential part of such contract.*29 This proposal was motivated
by a concern that the stability of collective bargaining
arrangements might be undermined by undercutting. Extension was
to be conditional upon the agreement containing two specific
72
clauses. First, that there should be an agreed term that there
shall be no stoppage of work or alterations of the conditions of
employment until the dispute has been investigated by some agreed
tribunal, and a pronouncement made upon it. This fitted in with a
general exhortation that all agreements should contain such a
clause. Secondly, it was to be a pre-requisite of extension that
at least X days notice be given by either party of an intended
change affecting conditions as to wages or hours. In addition, it
was recommended that consideration should be given to whether the
collective agreement or the rules of the employer's association or
trade union party to the agreement contained a rule forbidding
financial assistance to any member taking action in breach of the
'peace obligation'. The insistence on such conditions before the
'common rule' would be made obligatory was an indirect method of
seeking to promote 'model' collective agreements.
Any discussion of greater legalisation naturally leads to questions
as to the amenability of collective agreements to the legal
process. It was felt that '... industrial agreements cannot
fairly be compared with the ordinary commercial contracts made
between individuals or corporate bodies ... in the case of
industrial agreements circumstances may arise subsequent to the
date of the agreement which might be held to justify a right of
relief from the whole or same part of the terms of the
agreement'.30 More interestingly, the difficulties involved in
the interpretation of collective agreements were discussed. The
council found that '... the form of words adopted is frequently
only an approximation to the real intentions of the parties, the
stress of the moment rendering it impracticable (and sometimes even
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undesirable) to enter into a strict analysis of the possible
literal meanings of a form of words which has been suggested by one
side or the other ... so it sometimes happens that when the
agreement comes to be put into practice different interpretations
may be put upon same part of the document'.31 It is open to
question whether it would have been appropriate to leave the
interpretation of such an agreement to traditional judicial
proceedings. On the other hand, the Council appeared to feel that
it was possible to make the distinction between conflicts of rights
and conflicts of interest.
It can be seen, therefore, that the Council placed its faith in the
institution of voluntary collective bargaining. Strong
organisation and more sophisticated agreements (e.g. ones with
improved disputes procedures) would lead to further improvements.
No theory of non-intervention in the Labour Law field existed to
restrain the Council, nevertheless, no practical benefits were
envisaged from direct legal enforcement of collective agreements.
PART TWO: THE IMPACT OF WAR
In 1914 British Labour Law had yet to develop to a position whereby
any satisfactory rationalisation might be made. Various
occurrences over the next four years were to throw further factors
into the melting-pot. The First World War saw a great escalation
in the level of state intervention in all aspects of British
society and industrial relations was naturally affected;
compulsory arbitration being introduced in 1915. In 1916 the
Whitley committee was established as part of the planning for post-
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war reconstruction and a number of reports were produced.
A policy committee established in such times could potentially set
in motion far reaching changes. The domestic conduct of such a
major war challenges many assumptions and leads to an atmosphere
receptive to reform. While it is arguable that ' caution was ...
made necessary by the inevitable reaction against government
interference once the war was over'33 it may be mooted that in such
innovatory times the options open to Whitley were distinctly open.
The committee stressed the benefits that could be gained from co¬
operation between the two sides of industry though at least same of
their number believed in an inherent conflict of interest. So
despite the value in improving collective bargaining '... a
complete identity of interests between capital and labour cannot be
thus effected, and that such machinery cannot be expected to
furnish a settlement for the more serious conflicts of interest
involved in the working of an economic system primarily governed
and directed by motives of private profit1.34
The committee placed its faith in the improvement and expansion of
joint decision-making. The general purpose of the proposed Joint
Industrial Councils was to 'secure the largest possible measure of
joint action between employers and workpeople for the development
of the industry as a part of the national life and for the
o c
improvement of the conditions of all engaged in that industry*.
Moreover, '... an essential condition of securing a permanent
improvement in the relations between employers and employed is that




and workpeople.' Industrial self-government was a worthy
aspiration and an important factor in dealing with industrial
problems was being able to draw on the knowledge of capital and
labour. The essence of the reports was the recommendation of
improved conciliation methods, trade union recognition and
extension of the scope of collective bargaining.37
If joint regulation was the desired goal how was this to be
furthered? Whitley paid same attention to the question of the
role of the law. Proposals for compulsory arbitration were
emphatically rejected: '... there is no reason to believe that
such a system is generally desired by employers and employed and,
in the absence of such general acceptance, it is obvious that its
imposition would lead to unrest. The experience of Compulsory
Arbitration during the war has shown that it is not a successful
method of avoiding strikes, and in normal times it would
undoubtedly prove even less successful.'38 The Committee also
considered whether agreements made by the JIC's should be legally
enforceable. They were opposed to any scheme which sought to
compel legal enforceability but believed that consideration should
be given to making the necessary legislative changes which would
allow the parties to enter into legally enforceable collective
agreements. Regulatory legislation was not a favoured mode of
approach and this ties in with Whitley's vision of the state's
place in industrial relations. "It is fundamental to the idea of
a Joint Industrial Council that it is a voluntary body set up by
the industry itself, acting as an independent body and entirely
free from all state control."39 Where industrial organisation was
adequate Whitely saw no justification for external interference:
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'... our proposals are that the content of state assistance should
vary inversely with the degree of organisation in industries'.40
Where government intervention was required its function should be
to promote voluntary institutions. In effect the Committee was
calling for auxiliary legislation: 'We do not ... regard
Government assistance as an alternative to the organisation of
employers and employed. On the contrary, we regard it as a means
of furthering the growth and development of such organisation. '41
In the light of the favouring of auxiliary measures Whitley's
discussion of the Trade Boards deserves attention. The committee
believed that the scheme of JICs was inappropriate where
unorganised and badly organised industries were concerned. In
those areas it would be more profitable to set up Trade Boards
until there was sufficient organisation to allcw collective
bargaining, the Committee stating in their second report that •...
Trade Boards should be regarded ... as a means of supplying a
regular machinery for negotiation and decision on certain groups of
questions dealt with in other circumstances by collective
bargaining between employers' organisations and trade unions'.42
Subsequently the criteria for the establishment of a new board was
amended so that one could be set up where 'no adequate machinery
exists for the effective regulation of wages throughout the trade,
and that accordingly, having regard to the rate of wages prevailing
in the trade, or any part of the trade, it is expedient that the
Act should apply'.43 So while the principal aim of the 1909 Act
had been to secure mumhmum rates of wages the new legislation was,
in addition, clearly intended to foster collective bargaining.
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The proposer of the amending legislation, the Minister of Labour
Mr G Roberts, put forward his vision of its operation:
'I would like to regard the wages boards as a temporary expedient
facilitating organisation within the industry, so that, in the
course of time, the workers or the employers will not have need for
the statutory regulations, but that their organisation will have
then developed into a JIC, whereby the affairs of the industry will
be controlled and managed by the people concerned in the industry
themselves, without any recourse to any legislative expedient.,44
The experience of the operation of the existing regime led to the
belief that, in practice, trade boards actually encouraged
organisation in the industries concerned. The 1918 Act was viewed
as a part of an industrial relations structure which upheld '...
the voluntary principle of negotiation... [whereby] ... employers
and workers should continue to manage their cwn affairs'.45
In retrospect the importance of the Whitley report can be seen as
existing as much in its underlying policy as in the detail of its
proposals. It can be seen as marking the beginning of a period in
which State policy came to be viewed, fairly consistently, as being
based upon certain lines. Voluntary collective bargaining was
believed to be the best way to manage industrial relations, the
role of law was an auxiliary, not a regulatory, one, and compulsory
arbitration was unacceptable except in exceptional circumstances.46
Arguably, it marked the beginning of the voluntarist or
abstentionist era: the essence of which was 'that collective
bargaining is the preferred method of job regulation and legal
enactment is accorded a necessary but secondary role'.47 This,
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however, must all be read in light of the fact that various bodies
in society (both State and otherwise) differed in their perceptions
of and commitment to voluntarism. Such differences were also to
vary with the passing of time. A valuable illustration of this is
provided by the report of the National Industrial Council (NIC).
The lack of minimum wage and maximum hours legislation in the UK
has been an important component in the voluntarist theory. In the
light of this it is worth recalling some of the recommendations
made by the NIC. They favoured a maximum number of hours being
stipulated by statute. The statutory limit would be capable of
being raised or lowered through a collective agreement, provided
the appropriate minister had no reason to deem it contrary to the
public interest. The joint regulation of overtime within the
mooted legal framework was also envisaged. A legal minimum wage
was proposed as well. These proposals were made knowing that "The
Government ... had no objection to the reduction of hours or the
establishment of minimum wages by law provided that production
• Aft
costs did not suffer".
With an improvement in the industrial relations situation the
Government's enthusiasm for legislation steadily evaporated. With
the employers' side deserting the cause labour was left as the sole
standard bearer. From 1924, under Rule 2 of its Constitution, the
TUC included among its objects a legal maximum working week and a
. . . . AQ
legal minimum wage for each industry or occupation.
It can be seen, therefore, that the Union movement would have
welcomed more in the way of regulatory legislation (and had the
political pressure been sustained the government might have
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conceded). The conception of the level of legal intervention
which was compatible with a voluntarist system was considerably
different to what it later became.
The State's lack of enthusiasm for regulatory legislation was on
occasion extended to auxiliary legislation. So while the Trade
Board's regime was boosted in 1918 the legislation was soon being
administered in such a way that no Trade Board would be set up
unless there existed both unduly lew wages and no adequate
machinery.50 In essence this was a reversion to the 1909
position. In 1921 a committee was established under the
Chairmanship of Viscount Cave to inquire into the working and
effect of the Trade Boards Acts of 1909 and 1918.50a The report
of the Cave Committee was completely hostile to the policy of the
1918 reforms and believed the 1909 position as regards
establishment of Boards should be re-enacted.51 The Committee
believed that legislation in this area should be limited to
instances where "sweating" existed and that no scope existed for
auxiliary legislation. Indeed, Cave had an aversion to State
interference in industrial relations and would have been unlikely
to support more than a minimal labour law framework. Subsequently
"... a Bill was presented to Parliament which would have gone back
even on the 1909 Act, and only a change of Government prevented its
passage".52
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PACT THREE: THE INTER-WAR PERIOD
During this period no Statute sought to make collective agreements
directly enforceable. On the other hand, there were a number of
moves to use the law to strengthen the impact of collectively
agreed norms. Two types of legislation were involved: "Common
rule"53 provisions and "Fair Wages" provisions.
(1) "Common Rule" provisions
One means of increasing the impact of collective agreements is by
legislation which gives effect to the "common rule". An early,
though unsuccessful, attempt to enact such a provision came with
the moving of the Industrial Agreements Bill, 1912. The Bill
applied to agreements between employers and employees in or about
the Port of London concerning wages, hours, or other conditions of
labour. Either side of industry could apply to the Board of Trade
to have such an agreement registered. The effect of registration
would be that the terms of the agreement would became implied terms
of the individual employment contracts and any attempt to contract-
out would be void. The main motivation behind the Bill was the
desire to prevent under-cutting and the problems arising as a
result. In the words of Ramsay MacDonald, "The great difficulty
has always been with the outsider, I mean the outsider both on the
side of the employer and the men ... The result has been that the
conditions of the agreement have been broken, and it was inevitable
that a dispute would arise, and consequently a strike has taken
place".54
The Industrial Councils Bill of 1924 passed its second reading by
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236 votes to 16 "... and it was only the accident of dissolution
which prevented it becoming law".55 The crux of the Bill was
Clause 3 which entitled an industrial council to submit any written
decision for confirmation by Ministerial order. It is important
to note that the Minister was obliged to make such a confirmation.
This duty was, however, subject to certain provisions as to
modification, etc. Any order made could apply to the whole or
merely to a part of the industry and any evasion of, or non¬
compliance with, any order made was to be a criminal offence,56 it
being felt that the agreements made by JIC's required the support
of legislation, the mover of the Bill claiming that "the lack of
this power has caused many of these Councils to be disbanded,
because they felt that there was no use in going on when they could
not use any discipline over their members and had no power to bind
them".57
The mooted legislation was clearly seen as a support for voluntary
collective bargaining. Clause 4 demonstrated a strong commitment
to voluntarism. It provided for the establishment of a central
industrial board (CIB) composed of an equal number of
representatives of employers and workers, one representative from
each side to be appointed by each industrial council. The two
principal functions of the Board were "The consideration of appeals
against the interpretation of an order issued by the Minister" and
"to act as an arbitration board in case of dispute if and when
requested by both parties concerned".58 Decisions made by the
CIB were also to be the subject of Ministerial order and breach
would be a matter for the criminal law.59 The allocation of this
adjudicatory role to JIC representatives demonstrates a desire to
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draw on the industrial knowledge and expertise of labour and
capital as much as possible. While the aim of the mooted
legislation was to encourage conditions whereby voluntary
collective bargaining might flourish the legislative structure
would itself be based upon the better features of the existing
voluntary machinery.
After initial opposition the TUC favoured such legislation: "In
1925 Congress resolved in favour of giving national agreements
freely entered into by JICs or similar bodies the same validity as
trade board agreements when the parties involved requested it."60
Irrespective of the potential benefits trade unions and employers
would have been a good deal less likely to welcome such legislative
intervention twenty, or even ten, years previously.61 On the
other hand, support was not forthcoming from the Ministry of
Labour. The Ministry persistently viewed requests for this type
of legislation as for "... a law compelling the observation of
agreements made by all JICs ..." rather than "... a law permitting
compulsion to be applied when the JIC concerned and hence both
employers and employed wished to possess such powers."62 Another
difficulty was a fear on the part of seme trade unionists that
legislation might lead to legal sanctions being deployed against
trade unions and or employees.63 Indeed at least one government
minister believed that any legal provision on the 'common rule'
should be accompanied by •... provisions which made it obligatory
upon trade unions to observe the decision, that is to say, made it
illegal for them to pay strike pay to those on strike against the
decision, and made those responsible for any such act amenable to
the law'.64
83
Clay made a number of more technical objections: "Sharp
definition and precise statement are essential in any rule that is
to be enforced in a court of law ... Joint Industrial Council
determinations are not likely to satisfy this condition".65 For
example, "The terms in Which agreements are couched are often very
general; which raises no difficulty so long as the carrying out of
them depends upon the people who made them, and any
misunderstanding or obscurity can be corrected by reference back to
the Council."66 Though it must be said that this view sits
rather uneasily with his belief that similar difficulties did not
arise in the case of Trade Boards, their orders were "... drafted
with a view to being enforced in the Courts".67
It may also be noted that the Bill sought to impose a duty on the
Minister of Labour "... to promote the establishment of an
industrial council in respect of every industry for which in his
opinion the establishment of such council is practicable and
expedient".u The Minister also had a role as regards the
approval of the constitution and rules of industrial councils.69
A number of bills similar to the Industrial Councils Bill, 1924,
. • . • 70
were introduced in Parliament during the 1930s.However, "...
under the Governments of the 1930s there was never any real
prospect of success".71 One significant different between the
later Bills and the 1924 version was the absence of a Central
Industrial Board.
An indication of TUC interest is provided by the fate of the
Industrial Councils Bill, 1930. The TUC pressed for its
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withdrawal in favour of the Rates of Wages Bill, 1931, which had
been agreed to by the TUC and employers' representatives. "The
agreed measure was presented in 1931, but at that time the
Government had other things on its mind and by November the
national Government was in power and hopes of the required
legislation were doomed again".72 The 1931 Bill applied to all
agreements between trade unions and employers' associations and not
simply to decisions of JICs. On the other hand, it only applied
to agreements as to rates of wages.73 Any order made entitled an
employee in the industry (or part thereof) '... to receive from his
employer wages at a rate not lower than the rate ... sanctioned".74
Enforcement was to be by way of civil action at the instance of the
employee; no criminal sanction was contemplated.75 It appears
that there had been a measure of trade union opposition to Bills
covering only JIC awards.76 One reason for this may have been a
suspicion that the true motivation behind the Industrial Council
Bills was a desire "... to force JICs into every industry
throughout the country".77
The Cotton Manufacturing Industry (Temporary Provisions) Act, 1934,
was introduced at the request of the industry itself, the Minister
of labour remarking, in moving the Bill, "In this branch of this
industry the system of collective agreements is in the process of
disintegration and a state of chaos is threatened which could be
disastrous to the industry and indeed to the country. ... The
question before the industry new is hew to secure that the whole
nna
principle of collective bargaining does not break dewn". The
legislation sought to secure adhesion to the "common rule". An
application could be made to the Minister of Labour seeking an
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order to give statutory force to a collective agreement "as to the
rate of wages" made between a trade union and an employers'
organisation in the cotton manufacturing industry.78 Should the
application be successful a term would be implied into the
individual employment contract making payment of the collectively
agreed wage mandatory.79 Moreover, failure to pay such a wage
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would be a criminal offence.
Certain features of the legislation are worthy of note. First, any
application had to be jointly made by both sides of industry.
Legislation would not be allowed to jeopardise the relationship of
the bargaining parties.81 On the other hand, either side could
unilaterally apply for an order to be revoked and the failure to
require a joint application here demonstrates the preference for
purely voluntary machinery.82 Second, there was an express
statutory prohibition on any order modifying the collectively
agreed terms.83
The legislation appears to have been regarded as something of a
success.84 For example, a board of inquiry noted that only one
prosecution had taken place in respect of a particular order "...
but expressed ... satisfaction that this did not suggest that a
"high standard of compliance" had not prevailed ... (and went on to
comment that the industry had)... "for the first time for many
years enjoyed immunity from the evil effects of wage-cutting and
price-cutting"85 Again Sharp reports that "Before the advent of
War in 1939 the prospect of extending the machinery of the Act to
the spinning branch of the industry was under consideration."
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The Act was a classic example of auxiliary legislation. As was
stated in the House of Lords: "... the provisions of the Bill have
been drawn up with the single aim of strengthening and upholding
the principle of voluntary agreements, freely negotiated and
07 , #
loyally observed". Indeed, the Act was originally to cease
operating after three years but was subsequently renewed from year
• • •
to year until being revoked in 1957.00
(2) Fair Wages Provisions
Curing the inter-war period there emerged numerous 'fair wages'
provisions. They were designed to promote adhesion to
collectively set norms and often embodied collective agreements as
the requisite standard much more explicitly than the 1909 Fair
Wages Resolution. The insertion of such provisions into statute
was generally uncontroversial. By way of example it is proposed
to discuss the provisions which applied to the Road Traffic
Industry.
Section 93 of the Road Traffic Act, 1930 made the holding of a road
service licence conditional on an employer observing terms and
conditions of employment which would comply with the current fair
wages resolution.03 This provision was aimed both at combating
unfair competition and the payment of unreasonably lew wages.
Ihe Road and Rail Traffic Act, 1933 extended the foregoing
• 90
provisions to cover further sections of the industry. The
Government having taken into consideration the potential dangers
that a scheme containing an element of compulsion might have for
the existing system of voluntary collective bargaining, a
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Government spokesman acknowledging the "... risk of disturbing the
network of industrial agreements which now covers a great part of
the industrial field". Following the Act the National Joint
Conciliation Board was established "... in order to ascertain and
fix rates of wages which would be considered fair for the industry
QO , ,
..." Interestingly enough, the Act had not obliged the
Government to set up any such Board. "It had, however, the
direct support and encouragement of the Minister of Labour and the
Minister of Transport, which were given in accordance with an
undertaking by the Government during the passage of the Bill
through Parliament".93 Ihe Board "... endeavoured to do justice
to existing known agreements in drawing up its scheme of wages and
conditions. It accepted parts of seme agreements as they stood
and sought to adapt others".94
Public policy, at least formally, favoured voluntary collective
bargaining, as the State's establishment of the Board demonstrates,
and there arose "... formal recognition, throughout the industry,
of the need for establishing and enforcing standard wages and
conditions ... "95 Again, due to the work of the Board,
• • • # . QRa
organisation m the industry improved.
The commitment to, and perception of, voluntarism varied between
State organs. The Baillie Committee, which was set up in 1936 to
review the regulation of wages and conditions of service in the
Road Motor Transport Industry, believed in the efficacy of
collective bargaining: however "... proper organisation of the
industry ... is an antecedent condition of ... any effective method
# • 9fi
of regulating wages and working conditions." Moreover,
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voluntary collective bargaining was seen as "... a potent influence
in securing industrial peace and stability and in promoting that
close co-operation between employers and employees which is
. . . Q7 . .
essential for the prosperity of the nation. Legislation was
viewed as a means of encouraging such developments and the
Committee displayed a commitment to strengthening the existing
measures in the road haulage sector. The Committee recommended,
inter alia, that the "fair wages" award be an implied term of the
employment contracts of the workers concerned. This was a less
than novel recommendation but, more interestingly, it was also
recommended that "... pcwer be given to an appropriate enforcing
authority to deal with non-observance of the terms of ... an award
by judicial proceedings."98 The task of selecting the enforcing
authority was left to the legislature. Should a trade union be
allocated a role in the enforcement of such standards the situation
parallels collective enforcement of a collective bargain.
The aforementioned legislation proved to be a limited success.
Subsequently the Road Haulage Wages Act, 1938 emerged as "... the
outcome of requests made to the Minister by both sides of the
industry to provide effective machinery for determining and
. ... QQ
enforcing proper rates of wages and conditions of service ..." ,
the Government believing that the State had a duty to foster and
encourage the establishment of voluntary collective bargaining
machinery.1 Hence the creation of a Trade Boards-type scheme for
the road haulage industry.2 Under the Act a Central Board had
power to submit to the Minister proposals for fixing remuneration.3
In framing such proposals the Board were obliged to "... take into
consideration any decision of a joint industrial council,
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conciliation board, or similar body relating to the remuneration
of workers employed on road haulage work ... "4 This obviously
promotes obedience to collectively agreed standards.5 At the
same time, the Act's structure demonstrates a concern that its
operation might have a regressive impact on already existing
collective bargaining arrangements. Thus s.4(4) gave priority, in
certain circumstances, to jointly agreed disputes procedures over
the Act's own enforcement mechanisms. Anticipating the language
of later trade union legislation one may categorise the subsection
as a "contracting-out" provision: "The Government are anxious to
minimise compulsion and to do everything possible to encourage and
help voluntary wage negotiating machinery".6
(3) Other measures
An example of an instance of auxiliary legislation of a unique sort
was Part IV of the Railways Act, 1921.7 This gave legal form to
the collectively agreed procedures of the industry: s 62 provided
that in the absence of agreement between management and labour
disputes as to pay and conditions of service were to be referred to
the Central Wages Board (CWB) or, on appeal,the National Wages
Board (NWB). The CWB contained an equal number of representatives
froti both sides of industry. The NWB was similarly constituted
but, in addition, contained representatives of the users of
railways, with an independent chairman nominated by the Minister of
Labour.
Despite this legislative intervention into the industrial relations
of the railway industry no statutory obligation was placed on
either management or labour apart from the statutory duty of
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referral. In particular, any agreement reached would be purely
voluntary in import. The unions had previously agreed that no
industrial action was to be taken until one month after a dispute
had reached the NWB, but this provision did not find its way into
the legislation.8 Finally, either side of industry could
terminate the procedures laid down by the Act by giving twelve
• Q .
months' notice. It can be seen that the result of resorting to
law was simply to give a statutory basis to certain institutions of
the industry. The legislation was in no sense comparable to a
legally enforceable procedure agreement.
Flanders has commented that "(G)iven the pre-war resistance of most
of the companies to full recognition of the unions, they felt more
secure in having their agreements supported by law."10 It seems
very questionable whether this statement accurately depicts the
motivation of the unions involved. In the light of the non-
compulsory nature of the legislative scheme one might doubt whether
labour felt more secure by virtue of its existence. While it has
been said that " (o)n the whole the machinery worked exceedingly
well over a very difficult period and was a great improvement on
the pre-war position"11 the impact of the law was arguably
negligible.
It should also be recalled that, during the inter-war period,
legislation in respect of wages was on occasion regulatory and not
auxiliary. An example of this was the Agricultural Wages Bill,
1924, which was introduced by the first Labour Government.
This sought to impose a Trade Boards-type scheme for the industry.
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Legislation was required because "... the labourers cannot get a
living wage by trade union methods alone. The difficulties of
organisation are so great that we cannot get our organisation
• 1 9
strong enough to enforce it". So poor were the prospects for
collective organisation that it does not appear to have been
envisaged that the implementation of the Bill would do a great deal
to foster it. The Parliamentary debates make little mention of
collective bargaining and simply focus on the regulation of wages
by statute. The effect that legal regulation might have on trade
union organisation and collective bargaining was not discussed.
The Act which emerged was almost certainly intended to be
regulatory in effect.
S 2(4) which prescribed the standard by which wages were to be
fixed stated "In fixing minimum rates a committee shall, so far as
practicable, secure for able-bodied men such wages as in the
opinion of the committee are adequate to promote efficiency and to
enable a man in an ordinary case to maintain himself and his family
in accordance with such standard of comfort as may be reasonable in
relation to the nature of his occupation." No reference was made
to collectively agreed norms. S 1(1) provided for the
establishment of an Agricultural Wages Committee for each County
which came under a duty to fix minimum rates of wages. The
tripartite composition of those councils resembled that of Trade
Boards. It may be noted that the original bill had provided for
minimum wages to be determined by a central body like a Trade Board
but opposition amendments produced s 1(1).
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PART FOUR: AN APPRAISAL
Any discussion of the period 1906-1939 must be set against the
background of a widespread acceptance of the value of collective
bargaining from about 1917 onwards. The Balfour Report on
Industry and Trade stating that "collective bargaining between
employers and workpeople has, for many years, been recognised in
this country as the method, best adapted to the needs of industry
and to the demands of the national character, for the settlement of
the conditions of employment of the workpeople in industry".13
The TUC was also firmly committed to collective bargaining and so
1 Oa t #
were many employers. a It was also a period which saw an
unprecedented level of Government intervention in society (which
obviously reached a peak during war-time). The question of State
support for collective bargaining (particularly by means of the
law) was a more controversial one.
Despite the acceptance of collective bargaining different
approaches in the upper echelons of Government clearly existed. A
comparison of the reports of the Balfour and Baillie Committees
will illustrate.14 The Balfour Committee believed that the
collective bargaining system worked well and praised its
flexibility. They also took the opportunity to make the ritual
denunciation of compulsory arbitration. Successful collective
bargaining was regarded as implying the "... existence of strong,
active and representative organisations on both sides, interested
in conducting voluntary negotiations and capable of enforcing the
general observance of agreements which depend wholly on moral
obligation".15 And the role of law? The Committee appear to have
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viewed the Trade Board's legislation as a prop to collective
bargaining and to have approved of the law playing such an
auxiliary role.
It must be said that the Committee's commitment to auxiliary
legislation was distinctly lukewarm. Trade Boards were viewed as
being "... only appropriate to those exceptional branches of
industry which combine absence or weakness of organisation with
relatively low rates of wages, and we should strongly deprecate the
encroachment of this type of institution on the field of normal
organised industry".16 (On the other hand, same statutory support
for JICs was backed and was seen as complementing the work of the
Trade Boards.) Again, limited enthusiasm was shewn for schemes
like the Industrial Councils Bill of 1924. A number of criticisms
(same rather technical) being made of that particular measure. On
the other hand, scope was felt to exist for a bill of the 1924 type
which was restricted to the fixing of the basic minimum rate of
wages and would be enforced by civil action. Ihe generally
restrictive view taken by Balfour is demonstrated by his assertion
that "... the action of the State has been generally confined, and
... should continue to be confined, to efforts to promote voluntary
agreements between the parties by means of such conciliatory
machinery as was originally established by the Conciliation Act of
1896..."1V
The Baillie Committee too had been a firm believer in the virtues
of collective bargaining. At the same time they had, within a
more limited remit, appeared to be much more strongly committed to
auxiliary legislation.00
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The Role of Law
Going hand in hand with the recognition of collective bargaining
was the realisation that trade union recognition, strong trade
union organisation, etc. were an essential part of this process.
While legal regulation of industrial relations was not on the
political agenda there was an absence of a generally accepted
theory as to the residual role of law. It is suggested that, in
essence, two distinct approaches existed.
(a) Minimalist
While acknowledging the virtues of joint regulation, this model was
reluctant to countenance more than a minimal "propping up" through
the medium of Labour Law. The Balfour Committee might be said to
fall into this category; there the motivation may have been a
concern that legislation might shift the balance of power too far
in favour of labour. The Ministry of Labour frequently fell into
this category. This is demonstrated by, for example, its lack of
sympathy tcwards moves to give statutory powers to JICs and to make
the Fair Wages Resolution more effective.
(b) Auxiliary
This model gives a much greater role to auxiliary legislation.
So, for example, it is much more likely to support laws which would
guard against undercutting. Both because of the threat posed to
the institutions of collective bargaining and to the substantive
gains capable of being secured thereunder. Thus we can point to
TUC support for statutory backing to be given to JICs during a
period when under-cutting was rife. The Ministry of Labour,
during particular periods, also falls into this category. Again
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it appears that a number of local authorities operated a much more
stringent Fair Wages policy than central Government.19 One also
notes that as a result of the 1934 Act, a number of applications
had been received from various industries "... for enabling
legislation which would give them powers for the compulsory
enforcement throughout their industry of joint agreements".20
Adherents to the minimalist approach were possibly over-concerned
with collective bargaining as a control device; viz the Balfour
committee' s desire for strong organisations "... capable of
enforcing the general observance of agreements...". Where an
economic recession was placing an effective curb on the power of
labour, safeguarding collective bargaining might seem less
important. In 1923 the TUC/Labour Party had expressed the view
that there was a "... consistent policy of employers to invoke
either State or joint machinery for fixing wages, at a time when
Labour is in a strong bargaining position, and to repudiate and
abandon all such "interference" at a time when labour is
comparatively weak. In the former case "industrial harmony" is
the supreme principle, while now the salvation of industry lies in
• t • . . , 01
the unccstpramising acceptance of individualism". Adherents to
the auxiliary model paid greater attention to collective bargaining
operating in a meaningful fashion.
(c) Trade Disputes Act, etc 1927
One cannot depart from discussing the role of law without mention
of the Trade Dispute and Trade Unions Act, 1927 which made a number
of changes with regard to trade union law. The significance of
these changes is, however, hard to assess. The Act restricted
trade union rights in the following areas: trade union
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disciplinary powers, picketing, political donations and
organisation in the civil service. Major sympathetic strikes
would, in future, risk encountering both civil and criminal
sanctions. Finally, local authorities were barred from a union-
only labour policy or from stipulating that their contractors
employ union-only labour.
The legislation was strenuously opposed by the Labour opposition in
the Commons; it being claimed that the Bill would cause grave
damage to the industrial and political power of the Labour
movement. On the other hand, it has been argued that "... the Act
was more irritant than blood-bath ... (and that it) ... was
probably the least that Baldwin and his fellow-moderates could have
introduced".22
An attempt was made, during the passage of the Bill, to introduce
an additional clause which aimed to stipulate a mandatory "cooling-
off" period before strikes could take place in essential services.
This would facilitate conciliation and a "... real investigation
into the facts on which the merits of the case depend ...".23
Again "... Chamberlain (and this had attracted considerable support
in the Cabinet) had wanted to include a clause that no strike
should be allowed to begin without the parties first submitting to
a hearing by an Industrial Tribunal or, if this was disliked, a
statutory committee of employers and men".24 Such an element of
compulsion may be regarded as limited and not terribly significant.
One must, however, note that same backers of such ideas seemed to
have viewed them as steps on the road to compulsory arbitration.
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To what extent did the Act represent a break with voluntarism? On
the face of it the provisions were not too weighty. The
restrictions on the right to strike and the provisions on union-
only labour would hamper the trade union role in collective
bargaining (but not to any great extent). Government policy under
Baldwin was disinclined to be restrictive. Indeed, in the run-up
to the General Strike the Government seemed to be considering
legislation in the auxiliary mould. For example, it was at one
stage prepared to pass a bill "... to establish a national wages
board on the lines of the railway wages board".25
OONCIUDING REMARKS
It is interesting to note that despite the number of proposals and
interventions aimed at supporting collective bargaining no moves
appear to have been afoot to compel or facilitate the direct
enforcement of collective bargains. Fair Wages Provisions and the
like obviously offered a measure of indirect enforcement. One
explanation may be that the real issue may have been perceived to
be not the behaviour of the parties to agreements but undercutting
by other employers. The question of sanctions is also very
relevant. The colliery dispute of 1941 is often cited as an
illustration of the difficulties inherent in the use of sanctions
against the forces of collective labour. However, the problem had
been widely perceived for a considerable time. The unsuccessful
attempt to enforce the Munitions Act against the South Wales miners
in 1915 must, it is submitted, have been very influential in the
long term.26 Indeed, the Ministry of Labour were to adept the
view '...that formal sanctions against strikers, and non-
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recognition, had proved unworkable as well as unacceptable'.27
The climate of opinion as to legal enforceability is difficult to
adjudge though s 4(4) of the 1871 Act imposed limitations.
Undoubtedly a case could have been made out for a statute
permitting legal enforceability at the option of the parties. If
the parties wished to have access to the courts who could deny
them that?
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Academic writing on the law relating to collective agreements was
conspicuous by its absence prior to the work of Kahn-Freund. His
work proved to be highly influential and it is proposed to discuss
its development in this chapter. The Kahn-Freund theory came to
the fore in the case of Ford Motor Co v AUEW and I intend to
discuss this case at length.la Kahn-Freund came to Britain in
1933 from Germany. Subsequently he came to be regarded as '...
the leading scholar of British and comparative labour law ...'.^
Indeed even on arrival in the UK '... he was already a brilliant
technical and theoretician of labour law'.lc
In examining the development of the Kahn-Freund theory it is
important to remember his German background and experience. One
may note, for example, the influence of Professor Hugo Sinzheimer
and the fact that Kahn-Freund' s doctoral thesis was partly on the
normative effect of collective agreements.1^ Kahn-Freund's
interest appears to have been inspired to seme extent by the fact
that the social importance of collective bargaining was neither
reflected in case-law nor in legal literature.
Kahn-Freund took the view that any collective agreement had a dual
function: "... it constitutes a contract between the union and the
employer or employers' association (contractual function) and at
the same time it serves as a lex contractus for the contracts of
employment coming within its orbit (normative function).3 This
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analysis is based on Sinzheimer's who, however, split the
contractual function into two parts: "The obligatory (procedural
arrangements, the obligation of the contracting organisations to
observe the terms of an agreement and to induce their members to do
likewise): and the organisational (the duty of individual
employers and trade unionists to observe the terms of an agreement
by virtue of their membership of one of the contracting
organisations)."4 This 'dual function' approach subsequently
allowed Kahn-Freund to regard collective agreements as having legal
effect at the individual level but not at the collective level.
In the early 1940s, however, he regarded collective agreements as
being legally enforceable at both levels.
In a famous article in the 1943 Modern Law Review Kahn-Freund
discussed his view of the English position at greater length.5
One may begin by noting that Kahn-Freund appeared to believe that
one could make the distinction between conflicts of rights and
conflicts of interest. He stated that issues as to rights were
"... legal questions which - but for s 4 of the Trade Union Act,
1871 - could be taken before a Court of Law, and which can be
solved by applying the law and interpreting the contract ..."6
On the other hand, "... where no agreement exists or an existing
agreement has expired, or where one of the parties wishes to alter
an agreement in view of changed circumstances, there is no legal
problem at all".7 In stark contrast to his subsequently held view
Kahn-Freund saw no reason to distinguish the British position from
the continental.8
The difficulties of s 4 and restraint of trade aside, Kahn-Freund
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expressed no doubts that, even at the contractual level, collective
agreements were legally enforceable. Changes in the law of
restraint of trade were also considered important, it being argued
that a considerable number of collective agreements between
employers' associations and trade unions would no longer be in
restraint of trade at common law and would therefore be enforceable
independently of the 1871 Act. A lack of case-law was apparent
and Kahn-Freund acknowledged this. Technical legal problems, in
particular s 4, and reliance on the threat/use of social sanctions
may have been viewed as, to a large extent, explaining this
situation.
Closely related to the belief that collective agreements have a
dual function is the view that a trade union acts as principal, not
agent, in signing a collective bargain. In suggesting that this
was the British position Kahn-Freund was influenced by the views of
Sinszheimer on this topic. The latter was apposed to the adoption
of an agency approach not simply because of the technical
difficulties but because the role of trade unions in German society
was viewed from a collectivist perspective. In applying this
theory to Britain the point was taken that a number of obligations
could not sensibly be viewed as individual in nature: eg the fact
that a collective agreement might lay down conditions upon which
future contracts of employment are to be concluded. However, the
corollary of all this was that "If ... the members of collective
parties are not parties to the contract, they cannot derive any
benefit under it ... "9 Hence the need for the normative function.
Kahn-Freund turned his attention "... to the analysis of the legal
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relationship between collective and individual agreements" in a
case-note on True v Amalgamated Collieries of Western Australia
Ltd10 He noted that "... English law has not so far taken
cognisance of the normative function of collective industrial
law".11 This would not pose any problems where the employment
contract expressly incorporated collectively agreed terms. Even
where this was not the case Kahn-Freund expressed the wish that the
employment contract "... be deemed to have been concluded upon the
terms of the collective bargain".12 At this stage the legal
mechanism/fiction by which this was to be achieved had not yet been
discovered. However, in 1943 he expressed the view that a
collective bargain could be regarded as custom and the appropriate
terms implicitly incorporated: "... terms of employment can ...
become usages which, like commercial customs in mercantile law,
become the lex contractus, pre-determining the content of contracts
of employment, unless contradicted by the express terms of those
contracts".13 This deployment of custom was not fully explored
and Kahn-Freund left open such questions as whether the scope of
the usage would apply to non-union members.
Kahn-Freund's particular collectivist perspective led him to make a
number of interesting observations on the "peace obligation". He
remarked that "where an association of employers is a party to the
agreement, it undertakes to induce its members not to derogate, by
individual contracts of employment, from the collective terms to
the detriment of the workers. The trade union, in turn,
undertakes not to resort to collective hostile action for the time
of the currency of the agreement with the object of enforcing
better conditions".14 While many British collective agreements
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would have contained some form of express peace obligation whether
it would have been right to regard all agreements as containing
such a restrictive implied obligation must be problematic. Kahn-
Freund's view may well have been a product of his Weimar days.
There, while trade unions and employers' associations were viewed
as being autonomous from the State a certain corporatist role was
envisaged for them.
By the time that the article "Legislation through Adjudication" was
written Kahn-Freund had changed his mind as to the question of
enforceability between the collective parties. He was to state
quite categorically that "... voluntary collective agreements have
never been directly enforceable in this country either in war or in
peace time. They have, in Britain, no legal effect".15 Why the
change of view? Kahn-Freund cites an article in the 1931 Harvard
Law Review16 where the view is taken that in the UK breach of an
"... agreement has no direct legal consequences".17 The basis for
this view appears to be s 4 of the 1871 Act, the case of Holland v
London Society of Compositors18 and an article by Geldart in the
1912 Harvard Law Review.19 Geldart appears to have believed that
collective agreements were not legally enforceable because of s 4,
though he may only have been considering agreements between a trade
union and an employer's association.
In a discussion with Professor Hepple, Kahn-Freund stated that he
began to change his mind towards the end of the second war. He
acknowledges that contact with those who had a great knowledge of
the history of industrial relations proved to be an immense
stimulus.21 Certainly Kahn-Freund's article on inter-group
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conflicts and their settlement displays considerable knowledge of
research into UK industrial relations.22 In particular, he
distinguishes between dynamic and static collective bargaining:
"The static type prevails on the European Continent and largely in
the United States, but also in same British industries, the
"dynamic" type is a characteristic element of British
developments.1,23 The role of joint institutions was noted and
where dynamic bargaining was involved those bodies took on a wide-
ranging role: they were designed to permit a position whereby "...
existing standards can be continuously adapted to changing
conditions and the norm-creating process becomes permanent".24
The existence of "dynamic" bargaining was said to explain the
absence of fixed-term collective bargains in the UK and partly to
explain the importance of unwritten agreements/practices.
Also of note was the distinction made in same systems between
conflicts of rights and conflicts of interest. Kahn-Freund
pointed cut that the distinction tended not to be made in Britain
though it is not quite so clear why he thought this was the case.
It may have been that he believed that there was no need to make
the distinction since agreements were not legally enforceable. On
the other hand, it may be that it was considered that the
distinction between rights and interests could not be made and that
this went towards explaining the absence of law. In support of
the former possibility one may cite a passage which states that
"Conflicts of right and conflicts of interest do not have to be
kept in watertight compartments where the rights are enforced
mainly by social and not by legal sanctions ...,,2S In any event,
the failure of industrial relations practitioners to make a
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distinction which was central in systems where collective
agreements were legally enforceable obviously impressed Kahn-
Freund. He was later to stress that the same social sanctions
were deployed in rights disputes as interests disputes; "... the
uniform application of the same non-legal sanctions ... has almost
obliterated in the consciousness of the people the distinction
between a dispute about existing rights and a dispute about rights
to be created ...".26
There were political reasons, too, for regarding as satisfactory
the operation of collective bargaining in the UK. The absence of
law was seen as evidence of a mature system of industrial
relations. "Legal norms and sanctions are blunt instruments for
the shaping of intergroup relations which have developed into a
higher community".27 The knowledge Kahn-Freund had acquired of UK
industrial relations, in particular the importance of dynamic
bargaining, had led him to the conclusion that collective
agreements were not enforceable at law in the UK However, s 4 and
restraint of trade aside there was no reason in law to prevent
enforcement. Kahn-Freund was to advance the theory that
collective bargains were not legally binding because of a lack of
intention to enter legal relations. This was a highly imaginative
suggestion regarding the use of a rule which generally operates to
deny domestic/social arrangements legal effect. Commercial
contracts were generally regarded as legally enforceable in the
absence of evidence to the contrary.
Gayler, writing in 1955, advanced four arguments against the view
that collective agreements were intended to be binding in honour
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only.28 First, he argued that "... unless the agreement is of a
domestic or social nature it would appear that the parties may only
ensure that the terms of their contract are not legally binding
upon them by expressly providing for this in their contract."29
The main authority relied upon was Rose and Frank Co v Crompton
Of) , , ,
(JR) & Brothers, Ltd, it being asserted that a collective
agreement was akin to a commercial arrangement, rather than a
social one.
Secondly, reference was made to the fact that Bills had been
brought forward to make the enforcement of JIC awards compulsory,
Gayler arguing that "it cannot be thought that JICs would press for
the compulsory enforcement of their agreements if they entered into
them with the intention that they would be binding in honour
only".31 It is respectfully submitted that this conclusion does
not follow. While JICs may not have intended their agreements to
be legally enforceable they would have undoubtedly desired that
they be adhered to. For example, the prospect of industrial
action would be seen as promoting adherence. Should social
sanctions prove ineffectual JICs would be perfectly entitled to
press for legislation. Moreover, the main target of legislation
of the "common rule" type is the "outsider".
Thirdly, "No "clear judicial authority" can be produced to support
the view that collective agreements are binding in honour only".32
Indeed, as we shall see when we came to the Ford Case, the
authorities, such as they were, tended to assume that collective
agreements were directly enforceable in law. However, it is
obvious that a legal proposition can be correct despite the absence
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of direct authority on the point.
Finally, it was argued that in the United States, where there was
no equivalent of s 4, actions are brought for breach of collective
agreements. Gayler found it difficult to accept a disparity in
intention between the collective parties in the USA and the UK.
This does not seem to be a particularly strong argument. Labour
Law and collective bargaining in the US have developed in markedly
different ways and such disparities should not be seen as too
surprising.
It can be seen, therefore, that the real point of contention
between Gayler and Kahn-Freund was over the application of the
doctrine of intention to enter legal relations. This was to ccstve
to the fore in the Ford Case.
In 'Legal Framework' Kahn-Freund stated that "... Whether the
agreement express this or not, a trade union, and an employer or
employer's association in signing it, undertake to "keep the peace"
ie to put it at its lowest, not to resort, during the currency of
the agreement, to strike or lock out for the sate of changing the
terms agreed upon".33 So Kahn-Freund adhered to his belief as to
the content of an implied peace obligation, even though, in his
view, legal sanctions would no longer be available to enforce it.
Kahn-Freund referred to three cases which dealt incidentally with
the question of legal enforcement. The first of these was Read v
Friendly Society of Stonemasons34 which concerned the tort of
inducing breach of contract. The defendant trade union argued
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that a breach of a collective agreement by the employer supplied a
justification for the action. The defence was not made out but
the collective agreement was assumed to be legally enforceable
(subject to considerations of restraint of trade). Smithies v
National Association of Operative Plasterers35 was a similar case
and, again, the collective agreement involved seems to have been
treated as a normal contract. There is also an obiter statement
by lord Russell of Killowen in delivering the advice of the Privy
Council in Young v Canadian Northern Railway Co36 On one reading
he seemed to assume that a collective agreement could not be
enforced by legal remedies but only by strike action. Another
relevant case is East London Bakers'Union and Goldstein37 though
this was not mentioned in "Legal Framework". There the English
Court of Appeal seemed to regard a collective agreement as legally
enforceable.
Kahn-Freund was to be a highly influential member of the Donovan
Commission but in 1965 he had again set out his views on the legal
status of collective agreements in the UK.38 He justified his
view that collective bargains lacked contractual intent by pointing
to the absence of litigation: "The absence of such decisions,
though not conclusive, is an indication of the attitude of the
world of industry on both sides... (It may be objected that,
as with the failure to sue strikers for breach of the employment
contracts, the absence of litigation represents a wish for better
industrial relations in the future.)40 This empirical position
was, moreover, seen as one eminently justifiable on policy grounds.
To someone heavily influenced by experience of the Weimar Republic
the lack of legal intervention, and the strength of self-
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regulation, in collective bargaining were admirable.
As early as 1943 Kahn-Freund had noted the "British preference for
voluntary institutions" and the fact that "the proud edifice of
collective labour regulation was built up without the assistance of
the law".41 If the collective parties did not seek to enforce
through law collective bargains could this empirical fact not be
translated on to a more theoretical plane. In deploying the
requirement of "intention to enter legal relations" that was
precisely what Kahn-Freund did. Consequently the plaintiffs in
the Ford case found it much more difficult to establish that the
collective agreement was intended to be legally enforceable.
Indeed by translating the practice of employers and trade unions
into a legal theory Kahn-Freund was actually to influence the
future practice of industrial relations. The theory of
voluntarism, and in particular the position on non-enforceability,
can be seen as attaining the status of a prescription for good
industrial relations.
Kahn-Freund felt his view was reinforced by the nature of British
collective bargaining. In particular, the importance of dynamic
bargaining and the prevalence of custom and practice. Kahn-Freund
was also new uncertain as to whether a peace obligation would be
implied into British collective agreements. Moreover, there would
"be nothing to say ... to what extent the Continental view of the
"relativity" of the peace obligation could be read into English
law."42
Chapter eight of the Donovan Commission Report, which deals with
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the enforcement of collective agreements, was drafted by Kahn-
Freund and his influence is apparent.43 Of considerable
importance was the Commission's endorsement of the "no-intention"
theory. The compatibility of this view with the practice of
British industrial relations was emphasised (eg dynamic
bargaining). One gains the impression that the more Kahn-Freund
learned about British industrial relations the more convinced he
became that his view was to enforcement was right. Thus Chapter
eight details the difficulties in identifying the parties to
agreements. For example, "whether a shop steward or shop
stewards' committee bargaining at plant or workshop level could, in
the legal sense, be regarded as acting for the union or unions
concerned, or for the individual workers, is a difficult question
...1,44 The problem as to parties had, hitherto, not been given
much attention in Kahn-Freund's writings. The Commission were
not, in principle, opposed to the use of legal sanctions and set
out a potential scheme for the selective legal enforcement of
procedure agreements.45 This revealed something about Kahn-
Freund's particular pluralist perspective. As Lewis has pointed
out this particular model "... Implied a narrow idea of legitimate
industrial conflict and ultimately of trade union function.46
In 1969 the Ford Motor Co47 case gave the opportunity for the
competing views as to legal enforceability to be tested before
Geoffrey Lane J. The dispute stemmed from negotiations over pay
and a proposed settlement which involved "penalty clauses". The
unions at Fords bargained through the medium of a national joint
negotiating committee (NTNC) which comprised representatives of 15
different unions (and 3 representatives of sections within unions)
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as well as representatives of the Company. On 11 February 1969
Ford's side and a majority of the union side on the NJNC reached
agreement. However, unofficial strike action broke out and this
was subsequently made official by the AEF and the TGWLJ Fords then
sought injunctions to restrain the unions from attempting to
procure variation of the existing collective agreement otherwise
than by constitutional action and for a mandatory injunction
ordering the unions to call off the strike. On 27 February 1969
an ex parte injunction was granted. On 3 March 1969 a further
hearing was held before Geoffrey Lane J.
Union-Management relations at Fords were basically covered by a
1955 procedure agreement and a 1967 price list agreement. The
former agreement provided that "... at each stage of the procedure
set out in this agreement, every attempt will be made to resolve
issues raised and that until such procedure has been carried
through there shall be no stoppage of work or unconstitutional
action". The 1967 agreement provided that any variation should be
negotiated through the NJNC and that termination of the agreement
required three months' notice. Ford alleged that the unions had
deliberately broken both the 1955 and 1967 agreements.48
The case turned on whether the parties had intended the agreements
to be legally enforceable. It was argued that "It is significant
that in many of the cases already cited the collective agreements
there considered were discussed on the basis that they were
ordinary legal contracts, and none of the distinguished judges or
counsel or their union clients took the point that such agreements
were not binding."49 Two of those cases have already been
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discussed: Smithies and East London Bakers' Union.50 A third
case was Bradford Dyers' Association Ltd v National Union of
Textile Workers,51 where the defendant unions had expressly agreed
in submitting to a consent judgment that the collective agreement
involved was binding and enforceable. A fourth case cited by the
plaintiff was Holland v London Society of Compositors52 which
involved an agreement between two trade unions and it would be
difficult to draw any conclusions as to the legal enforceability of
collective agreements from it. National Coal Board v Galley53 was
also cited and it was submitted by the plaintiffs that "... the
point of enforceability of the NACODs Agreements was expressly
argued and the Court of Appeal dealt with and rejected that
argument."54 However, that case concerned the contractual
obligations of individual employees and any discussion of enforcing
collective agreements dealt in essence with enforcement at the
individual level. Counsel for the plaintiff were anxious to
distinguish the following dictum of Lord Russell dictum in Young:
"If an employer refused to observe the rules, the effective sequel
would be, not an action by any employee, not even an action by
Division No 4 against the employer for specific performance or
damages, but the calling of a strike until the grievance was
remedied." Counsel argued that "Lord Russell was saying only that
the union had a more effective weapon to hand than action in the
Courts, namely, the power to call a strike, and the union would
exercise this power to achieve its aim rather than take legal
action".55 In truth it is difficult to ascertain what Lord
Russell meant. Geoffrey Lane J. did not find these authorities
helpful. While this is understandable the dicta inclined more
towards enforceability than against.56
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The case was decided by applying the general law as to intention to
enter legal relations. One might have assumed that a collective
agreement concerned the business and economic relations of the
parties. In such a case the onus of proving a lack of intention
to enter legal relations would be on the party relying on it.57
Geoffrey Lane J. did not regard the agreement as a commercial one;
nor, for that matter, did he regard it as an agreement concerning
social or domestic matters, so how was the question to be resolved?
In the words of his Lordship "In the present case there is no
express provision by the parties to provide any assistance as to
their intentions. Consequently, it is necessary to look at all
the surrounding circumstances to ascertain what the intention of
the parties was".58 The judge made reference to Fords* chief
negotiator: "... Mr Blakeman, the protagonist of Fords ...
remained silent as to any intention on his part or that of Fords
that these agreements should have any legal effect."59 This would
seem to be of doubtful relevance; contract law is concerned with
outward manifestations of intention.
Counsel for Fords asserted that the "... primary matter to be
• • fkCi
considered is the form and wording of the agreements themselves. "ow
Certainly, in Ardley and Morey v London Electricity Board,
Pearson J saw his function as one of construction of the
agreement.61 In that case it had been argued that a declaration
made at the end of a strike was a legally binding premise. In
rejecting that contention the judge indicated that the factor which
had impressed him was the wording of the declaration itself.
Geoffrey Lane J was, however, to pose the question, "What then was
the general state of opinion as it existed during these times?"
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This might be expected to reveal how a "reasonable" trade
union/employer would have viewed a collective bargain. This might
furnish an objective view different from the view a Court might
have formed by simply looking at the form and wording of the
agreement. Testing objectivity by ascertaining "the general state
of opinion" might seem a curious process for a Court to enter into.
Nevertheless, it can be argued that industry's opinion as to the
legal status of collective agreements would be a factor which might
well be helpful in any objective assessment. As Devlin J stated
in Parker v Clark, "The question must, of course, depend on the
intention of the parties to be inferred from the language which
they use and from the circumstances in which they use it."62
The Court sought to establish "the state of opinion" by reviewing a
number of publications "... which inevitably would have came into
the hands of ... (the parties) ... to shape their views, shape
their opinions, and more importantly shape their intentions when
making these agreements".63 The views/opinions of either party
would not seem material. The question could only be solved
objectively. Nevertheless, the Court flirted with a more
subjective approach and one relevant publication was found to be
Kahn-Freund's "Legal Framework" where he asserts a belief in lack
of enforceability. Gayler's conflicting view was cited to the
Court but the judgment makes no mention of this. Kahn-Freund's
earlier view, in the 1943 Modern Law Review, was referred to but
was discounted on the basis that that particular publication was
"... unlikely to come into the hands either of the executives of
Fords or indeed of the executives of the union ... (and was not
likely) ... to have affected the minds of the parties'officers or
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their predecessors in title". However, while the parties may
not have been readers of the Modern Law Review that publication may
well have influenced others involved in the industrial relations
field and thereby had an impact on the "climate of opinion". And
how many people in industry would have come into contact with the
views expressed in Legal Framework? The Donovan Commission' s view
that collective agreements were not legally enforceable was also
canvassed. Hcwever, one must note the role played by Kahn-Freund
in the formation of this part of the report. Again, the Donovan
Commission did not report until 1968 and obviously could not have
influenced opinion at an earlier date though nevertheless it may be
an accurate reflection of post-war opinion on this subject.
Ministry of Labour, CBI and TUC evidence to Donovan all fell into
the non-enforceability school.65 While the precise approach of
the Court was to look to publications which would have been likely
to have been read by the parties, when the 1955 agreement was
signed all that would be published would be the two competing views
by Kahn-Freund,66 and probably Gayler's Industrial Law. The
publication by Kahn-Freund in favour of legal enforceability would
have been in circulation for the longest period of time. The end
result is that, "Legal Framework" apart, there was no publication
cited to the Court which advanced the non-enforceability view prior
to 1955. Nevertheless, the Court in Ford concluded that "...
certainly since 1954 the general climate of opinion on both sides
of industry has overwhelmingly been in favour of no legal
• • • fn
obligation from collective agreements.10' It must also be
stressed, taking into account all the publications considered by
the Court, that the influence of Kahn-Freund loans large.
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Having considered the "extra-judicial" authorities the Court in
Ford then had regard to the terms of the agreements themselves.
Counsel for the defendants placed considerable emphasis on the dual
function of collective agreements, it being argued that "The
collective bargain is made with a twofold purpose. First, it
incorporates clauses which it is intended from the start shall
became part of the contract between the employer and the individual
employee. These terms are clear and precise ... Secondly, there
are other terms of the collective bargain which are never intended
at any stage to give rise to obligations between anybody. It is
manifest from the language and content of these terms that the
nature of the obligation the parties intend to create by them is
fiR •
not legal."uo One may question the strict dichotomy mooted
between terms appropriate for incorporation and those which are
not. It is suggested that terms may be incorporated despite being
less than clear and that terms may be inappropriate for
incorporation despite their manifest clarity. Nevertheless, it
was argued that the "vague aspirational wording" of many of the
clauses regulating collective relations "...makes it as clear as
can be that the parties could not possibly have considered that
these contracts would be enforceable in a court of law".69 This
line of attack was well received by the Court who expressed the
view that "Agreements such as these, composed largely of optimistic
aspirations, presenting grave practical problems of enforcement and
reached against a background of opinion adverse to enforceability
are ... not contracts in the legal sense and are not enforceable at
law".70 Thus the Court were asserting that a more orthodox method
of objective assessment of intention, ie construction of the
agreement's wording, would produce the same result.
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Let us compare the judicial approach in the Ford case with that
taken in NCB v Galley.71 In that case the Court of Appeal did not
view collective agreements as being a class apart from commercial
agreements. Indeed, in dealing with issues such as the alleged
vagueness of the collective bargain the Court sought help in
precedents in the commercial law field. Thus reliance was placed
on Hillas & Co Ltd v Areas Ltd72 where it had been argued that the
contract was incomplete. The contract was held to be valid with
apparent gaps in the framework of obligations being filled by
implication, the Court in Hillas & Co Ltd v Areas taking a broad
view of their function, Lord Wright reasoning that "... in
contracts for future performance over a period, the parties may
neither be able nor desire to specify many matters of detail, but
leave them to be adjusted in the working cut of the contract: save
for the legal implication... such contracts might well be
incomplete or uncertain, with that implication in reserve they are
neither incomplete nor uncertain".73 So in the field of
commercial contracts the Courts will go to considerable trouble to
make agreements legally effective. This is despite the fact that
the materials on which they will have to form their decision will
often be somewhat rudimentary. The Court in NCB v Galley saw
collective agreements as being on a par with commercial contracts
in general and requiring the same approach. To look at the facts
of the case in closer detail, it had been asserted that Clause 15
was "... typical of an industrial agreement not intended to be
enforceable in the Courts."74 Clause 15 dealt with complaints
relating to unreasonable levels of hours of work being required of
deputies. Such complaints were to be "... settled by discussion
in such manner as the board and association in the division shall
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agree."75 No objection to this Clause was, however, taken by the
Court and it was stated that "... once discussion is repudiated or
fails the matter falls to be determined by the Courts."76 A Court
would, presumably, decide what was reasonable. The Court drew on
Foley v Classique Coaches Ltd for support.77 There a contract of
sale made no stipulation as to price and it was held that a term
should be Implied that the price be a reasonable one. The
litigation in NCB v Galley arose over the contractual obligations
of individual employees but the Court made clear it would strive to
keep collective obligations within a legal framework.
Having looked at NCB v Galley, let us look at the collective
clauses which seemed, to the eyes of Geoffrey Lane J, to suggest
unenforceability. Clause 3(a) referred to an "... adequate number
of representatives ... "78 Clause 4 contained an individual
grievance procedure with several stages which potentially
culminated in a report to "... the personnel manager who will then
arrange for a discussion between the appropriate persons
concerned. "79 In the latter case, counsel for the defendants
argued the Clause "... could not possibly be enforced effectively
at law when there are no time limits imposed for any of the steps
taken. "80 Would the Court in NCB v Galley not have felt able to
decide what amounted to adequate representation and also to imply a
term saying that the time limits were to be reasonable and
specifying what would be reasonable in the circumstances?
It may be noted that the judgment in Ford does not raise the
possibility of severance. On general contractual principles the
fact that a particular clause (or indeed clauses) would be too
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vague to be enforceable would not invalidate the "whole contract if
severance were possible". Thus in Nicolene Ltd v Simonds a
particular clause could be "... rejected without impairing the
sense or reasonableness of the contract as a whole and should be
rejected".81 It is important to consider how important and
central the clause sought to be severed is to the contract.
Treitel has pointed out that "... the Courts do not expect
commercial agreements to be drafted with strict precision, and
will, particularly if the parties have acted on an agreement, do
their best to avoid striking it down on the ground that it is too
vague".82 It might be thought likely that the Court in NCB v
Galley would have at least considered going dcwn this road.
The Court in Ford could approach its task unhampered by direct
authority on the direct enforcement of collective agreements. The
Court though seemed inclined to find in favour of the defendants.
Thus it readily accepted the view that cases involving intention to
enter legal relations could not simply be divided into the category
of canmercial agreements, on the one hand, and social/domestic on
the other. Collective agreements, while prima facie commercial
arrangements, would not be presumed to be enforceable. The result
of this approach was to ease the evidential burden on the
defendants. Yet at this time the text books were divided as to
whether the "no intention" cases could be divided into two classes
or not.83 Again, while the authorities did not amount to terribly
much they would seem to have inclined in favour of Fords. Yet
this weighed but little in the judicial scales. Why incline in
favour of the defenders? Lewis reports that "IXiring the time the
injunctions were in force, the strike continued unabated and
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negotiations and mediation were halted."0^ The fact that the law
might have been viewed as irrelevant may well have influenced
Geoffrey Lane J.
The test applied by the Court in trying to ascertain the parties'
intentions is not clear. At times it seems that the Court was
searching for the actual intention of the parties. "... Where a
court is endeavouring to discover the intention of the parties to
an agreement, it is impossible and indeed unreal to disregard
evidence of their knowledge and accordingly of their state of mind
at the time."85 However, such a subjective approach would be
unusual in contract law. On the other hand, while the parties'
intentions would manifest themselves in the form and wording of the
agreements, the agreements did not prove to be the focal point of
the Court's endeavours. Instead, searching for the general
climate of opinion proved to be the paramount consideration.
What is the significance of this? At one level it can be said
that any future case involving the enforcement of a collective
agreement would depend on the actual intention of the parties in
that particular case. It must be said though that the search for
the general climate of opinion puts a different complexion on
things. Should the climate be found to remain against
enforceability it may be treated, as in Ford, as a presumption
against enforceability. Obviously, if a collective agreement had
an express provision governing enforceability that would be
decisive at common law. In the absence of such a clause, it might
be difficult to infer that the parties intended an agreement to be
legally enforceable.
127
An interesting argument as to Parliament's view as to legal
enforcement was produced by the second defendants. It was stated
that s 3 of the 1906 Act offered no protection against procuring a
breach of a commercial agreement or a contract other than a
contract of employment. The argument continued: "is it
conceivable that, if the legislature had thought collective
agreements were enforceable at law, it would have protected the
official but left him open to action for procuring a breach of a
collective agreement?"86 The conclusion drawn was that Parliament
in 1906 must have imagined that collective agreements could not be
legally enforced. This argument has considerable merit. An
alternative explanation would be that the passing of the 1906 Act
very much represented the enactment of specific solutions to the
immediate problems of the time. Given that trade unions had been
sued for directly inducing breach of employment contracts, an
immunity was called for. At this time strike action had not led
to trade unions being sued in contract/tort for breach of a
collective agreement. Parliament was, therefore, much less likely
to confer an immunity. In any event, even if the argument is
accepted it is only relevant in so far as it evidences Parliament's
contribution to the formation of the "climate of opinion".
Kahn-Freund's final declaration of his view of the relationship
between collective agreements and the law came in the second
edition of labour and the Law.87 Membership of the Donovan
Commission had increased his knowledge and understanding of U.K.
industrial relations. This had confirmed his belief that legal
enforcement of collective agreements would be inappropriate. The
fate of the Industrial Relations Act was regarded as providing
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empirical evidence of this: "Those who at one time thought that
collective agreements could be made into legally binding contracts
by the ipse dixit of the legislature were, as events have shown,
insufficiently aware of the social facts to which I have
referred."88
Labour and the Law emphasises the significance that the practice of
collective bargaining has for the use of the law. Thus the
emphasis on the importance of dynamic bargaining and the consequent
failure to make the distinction between conflicts of rights and
conflicts of interests. He offers this, possibly with even
greater conviction than in 1954, as an explanation for the fact of
non-enforceability: "... it is (to say the least of it)
exceedingly difficult to apply to collective bargaining of the ...
(dynamic) ... variety the categories of the law of contract ...1,89
The evidence and research papers to Donovan must have been very
influential in confirming Kahn-Freund's existing views.
The importance of custom and practice is also discussed. In
addition, the wording of seme agreements was said to render them
void for uncertainty. The complex structure of bargaining levels
was also regarded as being relevant. This reminds us of Donovan's
concern that it might prove very difficult to identify the parties
to an agreement. However, despite the technical difficulties that
enforcement would present Kahn-Freund took a very pragmatic view:
"That collective agreements are not contracts is due to the
structure of bargaining, but if social necessities required it,
such difficulties would have to be faced and, if possible,
overcome. It is a matter of social expediency, not of social
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ethics."90 The real question was whether legal sanctions would
promote greater adherence to collective agreements. Consequently
he discussed, seemingly with approval, Donovan's proposals for
selective enforcement.91 Nevertheless, any such scheme was viewed
as exceptional and, in general, the use of law was not recommended.
Any notion that collective bargaining reform could be "... achieved
through the creation of a "legal framework" was as realistic as the
idea that the common law could, by a stroke of the legislative pen,
be transformed into a codified system." Thus, while "wildcat
strikes" were singled out as remaining a problem, it was industrial
relations reform that was to provide the answer.
By the mid 1960s industrial relations law reform was very much a
"live" issue. Much attention was focused on the legal status of
collective agreements. This tended to be very much tied in with
the issue of unofficial strikes and the search, in certain
quarters, for a device whereby the unions could be utilised to
control such action.
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CHAPTER 5
FROM FAIR DEAL AT WCKK TP THE INDUSTRIAL RETAJTCMS ACT
By the middle of the 1960s industrial relations reform had became a
major issue. Subsequently, after the return of a Conservative
government in 1970, the Industrial Relations Act became law. It
is proposed to discuss these developments.
Fair Deal at Work
In 1968 the Conservatives published "Fair Deal at Work" which set
out their intended strategy for industrial relations reform.1 In
stark contrast to the later Donovan proposals a major role was
envisaged for law. Looking to the experience of other countries
initial resistance to greater legal regulation was anticipated but
it was felt that the use of law would came to be accepted. One
facet of the reform strategy was a change in the legal status of
collective agreements. It was recommended that s 4 should be
repealed and that collective bargains be legally enforceable in the
absence of an express provision to the contrary. The enactment of
any statutory provision making all agreements legally enforceable
would be a mistake since "It would inhibit the settlement of many
day-to-day problems at local level - a process which is of vital
. ... . . . 0
importance to flexibility and efficiency in the factory". It was
acknowledged that initially most trade unions would seek to
contract out of enforceability. Hcwever, it was believed that, in
time, trade unions would see the benefits to be gained from legal
enforcement and be less likely to resist its ccming about.
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The legalisation of collective agreements was seen as a means of
restoring order to company/plant industrial relations. Indeed,
provided management "... acted in accordance with agreements,
management could normally depend on support from trade union
officials in any just action they took against inofficial strike
leaders or anyone who invited employees to act in breach of
agreement."3 What particular advantages were foreseen? First,
"It would provide a strong incentive to both employers and trade
unions to give much more careful thought than at present to the
detailed contents of collective agreements, and to explain them to
the people on whose behalf they had been negotiated."4 Given that
legal enforcement would be optional it might be reasonable to
assume that parties opting for legalisation would create agreements
which were clearer and more precise, etc. The possibility of
litigation might also encourage dissemination of information.
Whether rank and file militancy would have been stemmed by improved
communications must be highly questionable. Secondly, "It would
be a strong incentive, particularly to unions, to maintain much
closer contact with their members, so they could step in quickly at
the first sign of trouble."5 The Conservative scheme envisaged
same duty on unions to try and ensure their members adhered to
agreements. Even where trade unions were able to perform such a
task it is unlikely that they would be willing. Third, "It would
encourage management and unions to reach firm agreements on the
precise status and functions of shop stewards, who are so often the
key figures in promoting peace or unrest".6 In reality, however,
shop stewards generally derive their power from the work group they
represent rather than their union. Formalising the position of
the shop steward would not necessarily increase management control.
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Finally, "It would help to remove a major deterrent to management
taking just disciplinary action against men who break agreements or
incite others to do so. If a union were to give even passive
support to such men, it would clearly imply that it was condoning
their action. This could result in the union itself being
involved in any subsequent proceedings before the Industrial
Court."7 Trade Union fear of being held legally responsible for
the action of members would, it was felt, leave the membership
isolated. It might be thought unlikely that trade unions would
sign legally enforceable collective agreements, which would
encumber then with legal responsibilities, that would result in
their being party to a strategy that was very much aimed at
increasing managerial control. Such was the optimism of "Fair
Deal at Work", however, that it was proposed that unions should
have a right of recovery against members, in certain circumstances,
where the union had been held liable in damages for the
unconstitutional actings of those members. Moreover, it was
stated that the very existence of such a pcwer "... would tend to
make members think more carefully before being persuaded to
disregard union authority in breaking agreements by which they were
bound".8
Cases concerning collective agreements would be heard by special
Labour Courts rather than the ordinary courts. These courts would
also arbitrate where a collective agreement provided for this.
Where a trade union was sued for breach of a collective agreement
there would be a limit imposed by statute on the amount that could
be awarded. A statutory provision that establishes a rebuttable
presumption that collective agreements are legally enforceable is,
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in itself, innocuous. In listing the advantages to be gained from
legal enforcement the authors of "Fair Deal at Work" do not seem to
have found anything which would be regarded as such by the union
side. Legal enforcement was seen as helping to solve the problem
of strikes which were both unofficial and unconstitutional. The
proposals assume a unity of purpose in all this between trade union
officialdom and employers. Such a unity was unlikely to be found
and the trade union response was likely to be one of insisting on
non legally enforceable agreements.
The Donovan Report
In 1965 the government established the Donovan Commission.9 Its
terms of reference were '... to consider relations between
managements and employees and the role of trade unions and
employers' associations in promoting the interests of their members
and in accelerating the social and economic advance of the nation,
with particular reference to the law affecting the activities of
these bodies...'.10
The findings of the Donovan commission are well known and, in
particular, the identification of Britain's dual system of
industrial relations: the formal system assumes that collective
bargaining is a matter of reaching written agreements. The
informal system consists largely in tacit arrangements and
understandings, and in custom and practice. The formal and
informal systems are in conflict. The informal system undermines
the regulative effect of industry-wide agreements. Procedure
agreements fail to cope adequately with disputes arising within
factories. Nevertheless, the assumptions of the formal system
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still exert a powerful influence over men's minds and prevent the
informal system from developing into an effective and orderly
method of regulation. Factory bargaining remains informal and
fragmented, with many .... left to custom and practice.11
Donovan wished to see collective bargaining reformed and more
orderly industrial relations established. As part of this
strategy "... a statute, which might be called the Industrial
Relations Act, should lay an obligation on companies of a certain
size to register collective agreements with the Department of
Employment and Productivity (DEP) ,12 It was desired that two
objectives be achieved by this. First, it was hoped that it would
impress upon company boards that the primary responsibility for the
conduct of industrial relations lay with them. Secondly, it was
hoped that public disclosure would act as a catalyst to changes in
collective bargaining and the form and content of collective
agreements: it would "... draw attention to the aspects of
industrial relations ... which the public interest requires should
be covered wherever possible by clear and firm company and factory
agreements."13 Ihis would help achieve the aim of formalising
collective bargaining at company/plant level.
Donovan also recommended the establishment of an Industrial
Relations Commission. One of the Commission's duties would be, on
a "reference" from the DEP, to investigate and report upon cases
and problems arising out of the registration of agreements. Apart
from advising individual companies it was envisaged that the
Commission would issue model collective agreements. The
Commission's role was not seen as one of arbitrating in specific
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disputes but as one of "ensuring the ... proper functioning of the
machinery of collective bargaining ...1,14 in the long term, the
view being taken that many companies would reform their industrial
relations if they knew hew to proceed.
A company would be liable to a financial penalty if it failed to
register its agreements. On the other hand, there would be no
penalty for failure to carry out the Commission's recommendations.
In its work the Commission would operate under certain guidelines
and one might note the following:
"Industry wide procedures and agreements should be confined to
those issues which they can effectively regulate;
(4) that wherever possible, collective agreements should be
written and precise;
(5) that pay agreements should provide intelligible and coherent
pay structures;
(6) that it is desirable for agreements whenever it is possible to
link improvements in terms and conditions of employment with
improvements in methods of operation;
(7) that procedure agreements should be comprehensive in scope and
should provide for the rapid and equitable settlement of
disputes whether they refer to the interpretation of existing
or the making of new agreements;
(8) that it is desirable for each company or factory to be covered
by a single set of comprehensive agreements applying to all
the unions representing its employees; if this is
unattainable, that separate sets of agreements covering
distinct groups of employees should be accepted by all the
unions representing workers within each group. This
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principle should guide the solution to any dispute between
unions concerning recognition."15
The extent of legal intervention into collective bargaining as a
result of those proposals might be seen as minimal; the only
sanctions mooted being in respect of registration. Nevertheless,
it was being proposed that the State should direct the development
of collective bargaining in a particular direction. This might
have more far-reaching consequences than would be apparent at first
sight, so while "written and precise" agreements might be a worthy
aim per se such agreements world also be more amenable to the legal
process. It was clearly hoped that, in the absence of sanctions,
the TRC's stature would sway minds. The IRC would be Implementing
public policy and would carry added weight by virtue of its
industrial relations expertise.
The Commission discussed at great length the issue of the
enforcement of collective agreements. A majority believed that
s 4 should be repealed: "... there would seem to be no compelling
reason today why legal contracts entered into by trade unions
should be placed on a different footing from other contracts as
regards enforceability". However, the overall strategy was based
on a reform of collective bargaining and not the imposition of
legal sanctions, it being stated that "those resorting to
unconstitutional action should not be threatened with any
disadvantages imposed by law until new procedures have been put
into operation ..."16
Those procedures should be clear, comprehensive, speedy and
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effective. Once reform had taken place Donovan believed that it
would "... then be possible to distinguish the cases in which
unconstitutional strikes have been the result of inadequate
procedures from those in which strike-proneness is due to
irresponsibility or to agitation by eccentrics or subversives.
Moreover, if the majority of the workers in a factory accept the
procedure and have confidence in its effectiveness, those who defy
the procedure may be isolated from that majority", 17 legal
sanctions being seen as an effective deterrent to irresponsible
action. The making of such a distinction would obviously involve
the exercise of a value judgment.18 A radical pluralist would
obviously not be sympathetic to the Donovan approach.
Nevertheless, Donovan believed that should it become possible to
make such a distinction employers were much more likely to utilise
any legal remedies available to them.
Donovan went on to outline a scheme for selective enforcement of
procedure agreements. He envisaged this as possibly being used
once industrial relations reform had taken place and a substantial
improvement had been made in the position on unconstitutional
strikes. Even if such changes took place and the imposition of a
legal regime was thought desirable the Commission saw "... the use
of legal enforcement machinery only as an emergency device, to be
used from case to case and in exceptional situations in which it is
inescapable, and that it should remain operative only for a limited
period."19 The process would operate by the Secretary of State
applying to the Industrial Court to make an order giving legal
effect to a procedure agreement. Before applying for an order the
Secretary of State would have to be satisfied of five factors.
143
First, that the disputes procedure had been agreed between the
employer and the union/unions concerned. Donovan was obviously
unwilling to impose an "agreed" procedure on the parties. On the
other hand, it was being assumed that once the union hierarchy had
reached agreement "rank and file" dissent was no longer legitimate.
Second, the agreed procedure should provide for the "... rapid and
equitable settlement of grievances in a manner consistent with the
• 90 • •
relevant collective agreements", u the only legitimate ground for a
strike in breach of a procedure agreement being seen as the
inadequacy of the procedure. Third, in the enterprise or
establishment concerned unconstitutional strikes would have to be a
serious problem. Fourthly, the employer would have to consider
the situation sufficiently serious to be willing to enforce such
sanctions as may be put at his disposal. The Commission were very
well aware of the reluctance of employers to sue their own
workforce. Finally, the threat of enforcement by legal sanctions
would have to be expected to lead to a reduction in the number or
in the magnitude of unconstitutional stoppages in the enterprise or
establishment. While one can appreciate the reluctance to
establish a scheme of sanctions which will prove to be inoperative,
it is submitted that this particular proposal was somewhat flawed.
If the Secretary of State declines to apply the procedures to a
particular plant because he believes that the "militancy" of the
workers there will mean that the law would be ignored, then respect
for the scheme and for the law will be reduced and workers
elsewhere will be less likely to adhere.
The members of the Donovan Commission were not entirely united in
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their approach, as emerges from a number of supplementary notes
attached to the main body of the Report. Two principal factors
lie behind the existence of different proposals. First, a
minority of members believed that the law could play a more
extensive role in industrial relations. Second, one of the major
issues at the time was whether, and to what extent, trade unions
could "police" their membership. While same commentators have
detected an underlying corporatism in the report as a whole, the
minority views were clearly much more in the corporatist mould.
Let us begin by looking at the supplementary note by Lord Tangley.
He recommended that where a company failed to register a plant or
company agreement there should be power to impose a "disputes
procedure code" on the parties. All trade unions would have to
register with the IRC The IRC would have pcwer to de-register a
trade union "... for breaches of registered agreements on the part
of the union, its officers or members of such frequency or gravity
as in the opinion of the IRC justified de-registration. There
should be an appeal to the Industrial Court."21 The extent to
which trade unions would be held responsible for their members'
actions was not made clear. However, only registered unions would
be protected by the trade dispute immunities.
Shonfield also appended a note of reservation which favoured
greater legal regulation in British industrial relations. In
particular, he believed that collective agreements should be
treated like other commercial contracts and would, therefore, be
regarded as legally enforceable in the absence of evidence of an
intention to the contrary. The fact that legal enforceability
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would be treated as the norm would, Shonfield believe, encourage
trade unions to accept legal enforceability. Legal enforceability
would be likely to produce a number of practical benefits. First,
agreements which were legally enforceable would be taken more
seriously and would be more strictly observed. This, in turn,
would lead to greater acceptance by trade unions of binding
arbitration. It would also make it easier for managements to
innovate: "... the atmosphere of uncertainty generated by the
absence of precise and dependable camniitments is a factor holding
back the pace of British economic growth."22 Greater observance
would lead to employees receiving better bargains: "Their benefit
would be that a wider range of management decisions would be
subject to negotiation with the workpeople affected by them.
Management would be induced to enlarge the scope of the collective
bargain, if the reward for doing so were to allow it to plan for
more rapid change in a climate of security.23 Trade unions would
be obliged to use their "best endeavours" to try and ensure
compliance by their membership. Enforcement would be through a
Labour Court rather than the ordinary Courts.
In Place of Strife24
The Labour Government's proposals on industrial relations reform,
published in 1969, were considerably in line with the philosophy
and recommendations of the Donovan Commission. Concern was shewn
over the problem of unofficial/unconstitutional strikes but the
belief was expressed that "The best way forward will often be the
negotiation of formal comprehensive and authoritative company or
factory agreements."25 The role of law was seen as an auxiliary
one. It should also be said that the report, while in many ways
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voluntarist, was somewhat pragmatic regarding what would be
compatible with voluntarism.
In Place of Strife did not believe that moving towards a position
whereby collective agreements were legally enforceable would
improve industrial relations. Donovan's reasoning on this subject
was found to be persuasive. It was, however, recommended that
s 4(4) be repealed because there should be "... no legal impediment
to the observance of collective agreements negotiated between
employers or employers' associations and trade unions by any method
freely decided upon by the two parties".26 It was further
recommended that collective agreements could only be legally
binding where there was an express provision in the agreement.
It was believed that the State, through the medium of the
Commission on Industrial Relations (CIR), could play a part in
reforming collective agreements. The CIR was to have an
investigatory and advisory role. One of its tasks, for example,
would be to examine cases where companies or trade unions reported
failure to negotiate satisfactory agreements. The CIR's
recommendations were not to be reinforced by sanctions and the only
sanctions the CIR would have would be to enable it to obtain
information. It was felt that the existence of sanctions would
damage its ability to work with trade unions and employers.
The Government also intended establishing a register of collective
agreements. Initially, this was to be voluntary but it was
intended that it be made compulsory at a later date. Registration
would "... emphasise to managements their responsibility for the
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efficient conduct of industrial relations in their undertakings,
and will provide information which the D.E.P. and the C.I.R. will
need . .."27 It was intended that the D.E.P. would "... ascertain
where improvements are most needed and where advice will be most
helpful, and will take appropriate follow-up action".28
The most interventionist, and by far the most controversial,
proposal was in respect of the 'conciliation pause',29 the target
being the unofficial/unconstitutional strike. "The method
proposed would be to give the Secretary of State a discretionary
reserve power to secure a "conciliation pause" in unconstitutional
strikes and in strikes where, because there is no agreed procedure
or for other reasons, adequate joint discussions have not taken
place. The power would only be used when, if the strike (or lock¬
out) continued, the effects were likely to be serious". An order
would only be made once conciliation had been tried and had failed.
If a strike then went ahead "... the Secretary of State would,
after warning the two sides, be able to issue an order requiring
those involved to return to work and to desist frcm industrial
action for a period of twenty-eight days, and at the same time
requiring the employer to observe specified conditions or terms
during the pause, the conditions normally being those that existed
before the dispute. If either side failed to comply with this
order the Industrial Board at its discretion could impose financial
penalties".30 It was hoped that the pause would allow a
negotiated settlement to be reached. The proposal for a
"conciliation pause" attracted hostile union reaction and was
eventually dropped frcm Government plans. Strinati has argued
that "The main bone of contention between the government and the
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organised labour movement as represented by the T.U.C. was whether
the latter would discipline its members voluntarily or whether this
discipline was to be imposed by the State".31
The Industrial Relations Act was based on a view of the role of law
which was radically different from the Donovan/Kahn-Freund
perspective. Legal regulation and the use of legal reasoning were
seen as hallmarks of an advanced society. Thus it was stated that
"Once it is possible to interpret something at law, common sense
interpretations and agreements are reached inside the company ...
It is for those reasons that I believe we must establish a
sophisticated society inside each industry with its own series of
laws which are enforceable in the last analysis. That will cause
people inside to act with the same reasoned logic towards each
other as we are wont to use in society as citizens".32
The Act sought to encourage parties to enter into legally binding
collective agreements. To that end Section thirty-four stipulated
that every collective agreement made in writing after the
commencement of the Act, which did not contain a provision (however
expressed) stating that the agreement or part of it was intended
not to be legally enforceable, should be conclusively presumed to
be intended by the parties to it to be a legally enforceable
contract.
The government believed that benefits would flew frcm legally
enforceable collective bargains but, moreover, hoped that the
existence of the presumption would benefit collective bargaining
even where any agreement signed was not legally enforceable, the
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view being expressed that s.34 would act as an "... incentive to
the parties to make more precise and more written agreements....
It will help to engender more careful thinking about what ought to
go into the agreement, about the effects of it, and about whether
those who will have to live with it are likely to find it
acceptable. We believe that this will engender a more precise and
comprehensive approach to the making of an agreement, even though
at the end of the day the parties finally decide to put in a
contracting-out clause and it is not legally binding".33 It was
necessary to structure things so that one contracted-out of
enforceability rather than contracted-in. If the latter position
were adopted both sides of industry would be able to carry on as if
legal enforcement did not exist.
What advantages were seen as flowing frcrn a legally enforceable
agreement? In the first place, clearer and more precise and
comprehensive agreements were envisaged. Lack of clarity was seen
as a cause of industrial strife. Second, a number of substantive
benefits were predicted for both management and unions. The Prime
Minister stated that an "... employer will undoubtedly be prepared
to pay more with an enforceable agreement which gives him that
period of time in which to plan ahead and achieve results."34
Legal enforcement was a means to industrial peace though there was
no requirement that legally enforceable agreements be made for a
fixed term. It was also hoped that trade unions would see legal
enforcement as a remedy superior to industrial action. Frcan the
point of view of management, it was felt that they needed to be
able to utilise the law to achieve a more satisfactory balance of
power between management and labour. "... it seems hard when one
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party ... namely, the employer ... breaks the agreement he is
liable to suffer loss through strikes and so on, whereas when the
other party breaks or fails to observe the agreement nothing
further happens."35 The Conservative government was anxious to
suggest that trade unions would go to law as frequently as
employers, Sir Geoffrey Howe expressed the belief that "... the
availability of a clear, enforceable procedure agreement with the
remedies laid down will be as useful to them as the agreement will
be to management".
The Labour party were, of course, opposed to the proposals on legal
enforcement. Eric Heffer then the labour Front Bench spokesman on
Industrial Relations felt that agreements which were legally
enforceable would be inflexible and rigid. Second, an increase in
the number of unofficial strikes was forecast (an issue to which we
will return). It was also suggested that legal enforcement would
make dispute resolution more difficult as it would not be possible
to agree a settlement in terms which were deliberately blurred.37
One must also consider whether an agreement would necessarily be
legally enforceable even where the parties contracted-in. The
presumption in s 34 simply dealt with the intention of the parties.
There was, therefore, nothing to prevent agreements being held to
be unenforceable on other grounds. So, for example, if the
wording of an agreement was felt to be sufficiently vague a court
might hold the agreement to be void for uncertainty. S 4 of the
1871 Act was repealed, however, and that removed one bar to
enforcement.
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Where the parties wished an agreement to be legally unenforceable
that agreement had to contain a contracting-out provision. While
a specific provision was required stating that the agreement was
intended not to be legally enforceable, the use of the term
"however expressed" showed that any form of wording indicating a
wish to contract-out should suffice.
S 35 of the Act dealt with presumptions applying to voluntary joint
negotiating bodies (such as joint industrial councils). Sub¬
section three enacted an irrebuttable presumption that the parties
represented on the joint body "... intend to authorise it in
relation to matters falling within the sccpe of its functions, to
mate decisions having effect as legally enforceable contracts made
on behalf of the constituent parties". S 35(4) simply applied the
s 34 presumption to such bodies.
Whatever the various advantages and disadvantages of legal
enforceability, the Conservative government were, at root,
concerned to reform plant bargaining and control strikes which were
unconstitutional (and probably unofficial). S 36(1) provided that
it was to be an unfair industrial practice for a party to break a
legally enforceable collective agreement. More interestingly,
s 36(2) detailed further unfair industrial practices applying to
parties to collective agreements. First, s 36(2)(a) provided it
was an unfair industrial practice for a trade union not to take all
such steps as were practicable for the purpose of preventing anyone
acting, or purporting to act, on the union's behalf from taking any
action contrary to an undertaking given in the collective
agreement. Second, s 36(2) (b) declared that the union was also
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obliged to take all such reasonably practicable steps as would be
necessary to prevent their membership from breaching such an
undertaking.38 Moreover, s 36(3) provided that for the purposes
of sub-section two, action taken by a person other than the union
who gave the undertaking shall be regarded as action taken contrary
to the undertaking if it is action which, had it been taken by the
union, would have been a breach of the undertaking.
Let us look at s 36(2) (a) first. This paragraph was clearly
directed at a union's agents. The phrase "purporting to act"
would include anyone holding themselves out as having authority,
which they did not actually possess, in any particular matter.
The government believed the paragraph to be valuable because its
existence would make it unnecessary "... for the party alleging the
unfair industrial practice to prove that the person taking the
action to breach the collective agreement was in fact acting on
behalf of the other party to the agreement. That would be a
difficult thing for the plaintiff to prove, but quite easy for the
union to prove or to rebut".39
What sorts of people would be caught by the term "purporting to
act"? Would it encompass a workgroup leader calling for a strike
in breach of an agreed procedure? Assuming that the individual
concerned was not an agent of the union, could he be said to be
purporting to act on behalf of the union? This would depend on
the actual circumstances of any situation but the person concerned
would, presumably, be much more likely to be regarded as an agent
of the workforce. What would reasonably practicable steps amount
to? If a shop steward accredited by the union called for a strike
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in breach of procedure what should be done? Heaton's case may
suggest that a union would have been expected to withdraw a
steward's credentials.40
Given the background of unofficial/unconstitutional strikes
s 36(2)(b) was of considerable significance. The government
acknowledged that the law could not force large numbers of strikers
to return to work if they were unwilling to do so.41 By imposing
an obligation on the trade union, it was obviously hoped that the
union would bring sufficient pressure and influence to bear so as
to ensure industrial peace. This provision produced a great deal
of criticism, Eric Heffer warning that the "... unions could be
transformed into policemen and disciplinary bodies.
Enforceability could lead to internal conflict in the unions,
creating tension, and ultimately to break-away unofficial
bodies."42 More unofficial strikes, not less, would have been a
distinct possibility. Such a warning would have been absolutely
sound. The existence of s 36(2)(b) would be a powerful deterrent
to any union contemplating entering into legally enforceable
collective agreements.
What would reasonable practicable steps amount to? The
opposition naturally focused on a number of statements by the
Conservatives, when out of office to the effect that a union would,
on occasion, be expected to fine or expel members. As events
transpired this provision was never actually tested in the courts
and it remains open to question whether the more extreme prophecies
would have been borne out.
The NIRC had exclusive jurisdiction in litigation concerning
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collective agreements, s 129 providing that no other court could
entertain proceedings brought by a party to a collective agreement
against another party to it, where the purpose or the principal
purpose of the proceedings was to obtain a decision of the court on
the construction or effect of the collective agreement, or to
enforce the collective agreement or claim damages for a breach of
it. Adjudication was thereby removed from the ordinary courts.43
S 101 of the Act allowed any person against whom an unfair
industrial practice had been taken to complain to the industrial
court. Where the court found such an application well-founded it
was entitled, where it considered that it would be just and
equitable to do so, to grant one or more of a number of specified
remedies.44 Those remedies were essentially statutory equivalents
of interdict, declarator and damages. It was suggested that one
instance where it would not be just and equitable to grant a remedy
would be where there had been an immediate walk-out in response to
bad or dangerous conditions of work. The government placed great
confidence in the acceptance of the philosophy of the new legal
framework, it being assumed that those in the workplace would adopt
the legal norms and values. Indeed, it was predicted that the
most important remedy would be that of declarator.45 The Lord
Chancellor noted that "On the whole, when a court has laid down
what the rights of parties are, most reasonable parties tend to
accept that as the award, and abide by it. I should expect either
an employer, or a union who were parties to an enforceable
agreement, to be content with a declaration of right in the
• 46
ordinary course, without perhaps pursuing their other remedies.
Those who were sceptical of the acceptance of law doubted whether
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any employer would make use of the legislation, the fundamental
conflict being over the alleged superiority of legal rules.
In addition to litigation over unfair industrial practices the Act
provided for any party to a legally enforceable written collective
agreement to make an application to the National Industrial
Relations Court for a declaration with respect to any question
relating to any provision of the agreement. This section allowed
the parties to seek the guidance of the courts with regard to any
conflict of rights. The section did not appear to give rise to
any sanctions but was a further demonstration of the belief in the
value of legal decision-making. S 112 was, at worst, harmless and
had the potential to be useful to the parties should they desire
such assistance. Where an agreement was not enforceable at law,
the Industrial Court had no jurisdiction to rule as to its
interpretation or effect.
The passage of the legislation on collective agreements occurred in
the knowledge that the TUC had recommended to its affiliated unions
that they should include a clause in every agreement negotiated,
contracting-out of legal enforceability. The government was,
however, of the view that with the passage of time more and more
people would believe legally enforceable agreements to be
advantageous.
Despite the furore aroused by the presumption in favour of legal
enforceability contracting-out presented no difficulties. More
genuinely contentious were ss 37-43. These sections contained a
package of provisions providing for the imposition of procedures
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where there was no procedure agreement or where the agreement was
defective. The legislature obviously assumed that procedural
deficiencies were a cause, rather than a symptom, of poor
industrial relations. The government believed that such a
mandatory scheme was necessary in exceptional circumstances to
supplement the collective bargaining process. The government
claimed that ss 37-43 "... should be seen not as the antithesis or
denial of free collective bargaining, but as a means whereby
collective bargaining which has degenerated into a chronic state of
conflict can, by expert help, be given the chance to make a fresh
start on a new and sounder basis".47
The provisions could be utilised where there was no procedure
agreement, where the agreement was unsuitable for the purpose of
settling disputes or grievances promptly and fairly, or where,
despite the existence of an agreement, there was recourse to
unconstitutional industrial action. The process commenced with an
application to the NIRC by the Secretary of State, the employer, or
a trade union which was either recognised by the employer or which
was party to an existing agreement. Should an employer or trade
union make an application, the Secretary of State was obliged to
offer such advice and assistance as he considered appropriate with
a view to promoting agreement with respect to the non-existent or
defective procedure. The Secretary of State was entitled to
invoke the assistance of the CIR. S 37(5) then required the NTRC
to consider whether there were reasonable grounds for believing
that the alleged procedural defects existed and, moreover, that by
reason of those defects the development or maintenance of orderly
industrial relations had been seriously impeded or that there had
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been substantial and repeated losses of working time.48 Where
s 37(5) was satisfied the NXRC was under a duty to refer to the CXR
the question of whether the alleged procedural defects existed and,
if so, what remedy was to be recommended.
Once a reference had been made to the CIR by the NXRC the former
body was under a duty to promote and assist discussions between the
parties with a view to obtaining their agreement to new or revised
procedures which would be formulated so as to be capable of having
effect as a legally enforceable contract.49 Where the CIR was
satisfied that there was no need to continue with the reference, it
was obliged to make a report to that effect to the NIKC which, on
the application of any of the parties to the reference, had a
discretion to withdraw the reference. What if the parties agreed
to a procedure which was not legally enforceable? A government
spokesman stated that "It would then be open to the court to say:
"Does it seem that this procedure agreement is likely to fulfil the
qualifications which are necessary? Is it the type of agreement
the CIR would devise to meet the problems of this situation?" If
they felt that it was, then I should expect that that would be
accepted and that the procedure would not go any further."50 This
view of the legislation is questionable. The CIR could only seek
to terminate proceedings under s 39(4) where satisfied that the
purposes for which the reference was made would be fulfilled. The
main purpose of a reference was to recommend a remedy in accordance
with s 40. That section is framed in terms of procedures which
"would be capable of having effect as a legally enforceable
contract."51 Would an agreement which was contracted-out of s 34
suffice?
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Where the parties failed to reach an agreement which would permit
withdrawal, s 40 of the Act came into operation. That section
required the CIR to prepare a report setting out such new or
revised procedures which they believed to be required and which
would be capable of having effect as a legally enforceable
contract. The report was then to be sent to the NTRC. Within
six months either the employer or trade union involved was entitled
to apply to the NIRC for a s 41 order. The NXRC had then to
consider whether an order was necessary to secure acceptance and
observance of the recommended procedures. Should it be necessary
the NIRC had then to direct that the recommended procedure be
deemed to be a legally enforceable contract between the employer
and the trade union. It is important to note that the Secretary
of State was not entitled to apply for a s 41 order. Once a report
had been made under s 40 no fresh application under s 37 could be
made for two years.52 Where the parties to a s 41 order made a
joint application to the NIRC to have the order varied or revoked,
the NIRC was obliged to grant the application. Where only either
the employer or trade union applied for the order to be revoked,
the NIRC was obliged to revoke the order provided it was satisfied
that the order was no longer necessary for the purpose of securing
observance of the recommended procedure.
A number of features of the process contained in ss 37-41 provoke
comment. First, the legislation was, to same extent, inspired by
a belief that the public interest required that action be taken
against the "strike problem" and there are reflections of this in
ss 37-41, notably the power of the Secretary of State to initiate
proceedings and the criteria in s 37(5) (eg the requirement that
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there should have been substantial and repeated losses of working
time). Secondly, there was a tension between a desire to force
employers and unions to follow model procedures and the realisation
that, ultimately, successful industrial relations were largely a
matter for the parties. Thus we find that the Secretary of State
could not apply for a s 41 order: "... at the end of the day it is
for the parties, whether they have accepted it voluntarily or not,
to enter into this relationship and to make it work. That is the
reason for leaving the Secretary of State out ... "53 The
government also believed that the parties' agreement to a non-
legally enforceable agreement would allow the NTRC to terminate the
process despite the fact that the Act believed legally enforceable
agreements to be superior. Thirdly, the process contained same
elements that one would expect to find in auxiliary legislation.
Thus, for example, we find the involvement of the Secretary of
State in conciliation under s 37(4) and the involvement of the CIR.
Fourthly, a legally enforceable contract imposed by s 41 would be
in exactly the same position as an agreement which was legally
enforceable by virtue of s 34 and, for example, the "policing"
provisions of s 36 would apply. Fifthly, it is noteworthy that
the process involved not one but two bodies with industrial
relations expertise - the CIR and the NIRC. Why was the
additional presence of the NIRC felt necessary? It may have been
considered that the imposition of a legally enforceable contract
should ultimately rest with a judicial body. The role of the NIRC
may also represent an attempt to insulate the CIR from the "stigma"
of using sanctions, so as not to prejudice its work in other
fields. If the latter was the case, the legislature was being
particularly naive.
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The Act was predicated on a number of assumptions as to the nature
and role of law. Fundamentally one must appreciate that the
Conservatives assumed that people would automatically comply with
duties imposed by law. Nevertheless, recourse to law was
envisaged as a last, rather than a first, resort. Finally, a more
interventionist legal framework was not expected to make a great
deal of impact on industrial relations practice in the short term.
Given time, though, it was expected that industrial relations would
became much more legally orientated.
The Act in Practice
The provisions of the Act relating to collective agreements and the
imposition of procedure agreements had very little impact.54 In
their report for 1972 the CTR stated that "it has been TUC policy
to have an exclusion clause inserted in all new agreements and the
great majority of collective agreements in companies we visited
contained such provisions. In same circumstances this was the
result largely of unions complying with TUC policy but this view
was also held by non-IUC unions and in the majority of cases it
appeared to represent a genuine distaste for the introduction of
the law.1,55 S 34 may have been contracted-out of due to
opposition to the Act in general but there were also more specific
reasons.
First, there was a widely-held belief that legal enforcement would
not offer any practical benefits. Management did not believe that
the prospect of legal sanctions would increase trade union
adherence to collective bargains. Weekes et al went on to find
that managers "... did not expect procedures always to be followed
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and they believed the use of law could only make disputes more
intractable".56 There was also scepticism as to whether legal
enforceability would help solve the unconstitutional/unofficial
strike problem. The law was not expected to be able to subdue
workgroup power, even if the trade unions were enlisted to assist.
Secondly, any trade unions who might have contemplated legal
enforcement would have been deterred by s 36. Policing their own
members would be a task intrinsically repugnant to most union
hierarchies. In any event, it was most unlikely that workgroup
power could be restrained in this way. It would also be fair to
say that any attempts to do so would lead to conflict within the
union and more industrial relations problems. The government, on
the other hand, had believed that "while a heavy responsibility
lies on employers to avoid justifiable causes of disputes, the main
responsibility to ensure that constitutional procedure are not
flouted on the part of members of trade unions must rest with trade
unions themselves."57
Thus the CIR noted an "... almost universal use of exclusion
clauses ... "58 On the other nand, they came "... across same
instances of legally-binding agreements. In general these
appeared to have been the results of oversight but there have been
a limited number of intentionally legally-binding agreements.
'One other, circumstance reached our notice where although there
were no legally-enforceable agreements there had been same interest
expressed by the unions in such a possibility; this arose because




The fact remains that the very existence of the presumption meant
it could have been an important factor in collective bargaining.
Enforceability (or its absence) might have been traded against
other concessions. The CTR stated that whether legal
enforceability achieves "... importance as a factor in the
negotiations depends on whether one or other party feels strongly
that it is to their advantage to have a legally-enforceable
fin , ,
agreement." The CIR also failed to "... find any evidence that
the question had became a significant bargaining issue."61
When we move on to look at the operation of ss 37-43 we discover a
very similar picture. "... the reality was that s 37 was almost
totally disregarded. Only four applications were made, of which
three were withdrawn, and the other was dismissed by the NTRC"62
It should be said that an application would have initiated a fairly
lengthy and complicated process. More fundamentally, the parties
would have had to have believed that procedures backed by law
represented their salvation. However, where industrial relations
were so poor that the parties had been unable to negotiate a
satisfactory procedure agreement, and the defects listed in s 37(5)
existed, the imposition of an agreement complete with legal
sanctions would have been unlikely to help. As with legal
enforcement in general the solution to the problem of controlling
workgroup power remained elusive. Finally, one must recall that
while the Secretary of State could make an application under s 37,
only the union or the employer could seek a s 41 order.
In conclusion, the Act's provisions relating to collective
agreements (including procedure agreements) did not provoke change
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in the use of the law. The legislature was clearly most concerned
with industrial relations at plant level. However, where
collective bargaining was decentralised legal enforcement would be
to no avail unless other changes occurred. Thus, for example, a
move to written agreements would have been required.
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CHAPTER 6
ODLLECTTVE AGREEMENTS AND BfflPYMENT OCWmftCCS
Collective agreements will only rarely be legally enforceable
between the collective parties. On the other hand, the terms and
conditions of employment of many employees are derived, at least in
part, from those agreements. Incorporation can occur in various
ways and it is proposed to look at each of these in turn.
I. INCORPORATION
Express Incorporation
The simplest and most direct way by which collective agreements
became incorporated is for the employment contract to make express
reference to the agreement. Thus in NCB v Galley the contract
provided, inter alia, that the employee's employment should be
"regulated by such national agreement and the county wages
agreement for the time being in force ...".1 Thus a provision in
the collective agreement "that ... deputies shall work such days or
part days in each week as may reasonably be required ..." became
incorporated.2
Closely related to the medium of express incorporation is the role
played by the written statement required to be issued by the
employer giving details of terms of employment.3 The fact that
the statement may, for all or any of the particulars required to be
given, refer the employee to same other document means that the
employee will often be referred to a collective agreement.4
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The written statement has had a less than happy history. On a
number of occasions the courts have equated it with the contract
itself, or at least readily assumed that the terms contained in the
written statement were the contractual terms. Thus in Gascol
Conversions Ltd v Mercer5 the Court of Appeal appeared to assume,
without investigation, that the written document issued to the
employee was a written contract and not a written statement.
Obviously where the courts are prepared to more or less treat the
written statement as the contract the terms of collective
agreements will be readily incorporated given the practice of
referring to them in written statements.
This tendency to over-elevate the status of written statements was
seen in Hawker Siddley Power Engineering Ltd v Rump.6 There a
document, which was clearly a written statement, was treated as a
written contract. More recently, the courts and tribunals have
been more careful in distinguishing the statement from the
contract. In Robertson v British Gas Corporation7 the Court of
Appeal approved the following statement: '... in general the
status of the statutory statement is this. It provides very
strong prima facie evidence of what were the terms of the contract
between the parties. Nor are the statement of the terms finally
conclusive: at most, they place a heavy burden on the employer to
shew that the actual terms of the contract are different from those
which he has set out in the statutory statement •. Where an
employer issues an erroneous written statement he may on occasion
be estopped or personally barred from claiming that the contractual
, Q
terms were different to those set out in the statement.
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Nevertheless, the written statement will often be 'compelling
evidence' of the contractual terms and thereby function as a quasi-
express mode of incorporation. It is also interesting to note how
the issue of a statutory statement referring to a collective
agreement, which conflicts with the contractual terms, might vary
the contractual position. The variation of the original terms
might arise if the employee continues to work after receiving a
subsequent written statement and is held to have implicitly agreed
to the variation recorded or is personally barred from objecting.
The EAT in Jones v Associated Tunneling Co Ltd9 cautioned against
such variations. The Court declaring that:
If the variation relates to a matter which has immediate
practical application (e.g. the rate of pay) and the employee
continues to work without objection after effect has been given
to the variation (e.g. his pay packet has been reduced) then
obviously he may well be taken to have impliedly agreed. But
where, as in the present case, the variation has no immediate
practical effect the position is not the same.
Even if he does read the statement and can understand it, it
would be unrealistic of the law to require him to risk a
confrontation with his employer on a matter which has no
immediate practical impact on the employee. For those
reasons, as at present advised, we would not be inclined to
imply any assent to a variation from mere failure by the
employee to object to the unilateral alteration by the employer
of the terms of employment contained in a statutory statement.
Again in Robertson Ackner LT, with whose judgment Sir David Cairns
agreed, stated ' if the statutory statement did not accurately set
out the terms of the contract, then the employer would be in breach
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of his statutory obligation, and I find it difficult to accept that
a failure to comply with a statutory obligation could rebound to
the benefit of an employer and create an estoppel against the
employee from saying the employer got it wrong...".10
Finally, it may be noted that an Act of Parliament or subordinate
legislation may cause collectively agreed terms to be incorporated.
II. THE THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY CONTRACT
In Scotland the doctrine of jus quaesiturn tertio provides a further
possible basis for the incorporation of collective terms. A
number of obstacles arise. First, one must remember that as a
result of s 18 TULFA most collective agreements will be
unenforceable between the collective parties. Does it then follow
that it would be incompetent for an employee to sue on the
collective agreement? The case of love v Amalgamated Society of
Lithographic Printers11 is directly in point. There the wife of
an insane trade union member sued for certain benefits allegedly
due to her under the contract contained in the union rules. It
was objected that s 4(3) (e) of the 1871 Act was an insuperable bar
to the action (s 3 of the Act rendered certain agreements of trade
unions lawful which would have been adjudged unlawful at common law
because of the doctrine of restraint of trade; s 4 went on to
declare that such agreements were not directly enforceable in the
courts). However, •... it is plain that it was not the intention
of the statute to exclude the jurisdiction of a court in the case
of a claim made by a third party against a trade union'.12 The
court went on to allow the claim on the basis of jus quaesiturn
tertio.
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The case of Love is of interest because a third party was allowed
to enforce an agreement which was unenforceable between the two
contracting parties. One must, however, go on to ask why the
contracting parties could not sue; the answer in this case being
s 4 of the 1871 Act. On the other hand, the English Court of
Appeal have held that where a collective agreement is not a legally
enforceable contract there is no contract at all.13 Casey has
stated that: 1... if it is competent to sue as a tertius on an
agreement which cannot be a contract because statute has made it
unenforceable, may it not be possible to sue as a tertius on an
agreement which cannot be a contract because the parties have said
it is not to be legally enforceable? Are not these two situations
different in degree rather than in kind?'. It is strongly
arguable that there is a difference in kind between having a
contract on which the title to sue is restricted and having no
contract at all.14
A further issue is of relevance. It has already been mentioned
that the doctrine of 'intention to enter into legal relations' may
not be part of Scots law.15 In which case, at common law,
collective agreements may well be contracts. It has also been
argued that '... they are surely contracts which normally contain
an implied term to the effect that neither party will enforce them
against the other by legal process. It is virtually certain that
the parties would utter an emphatic 'Oh, of course', if asked by an
officious bystander whether they had contracted on this basis'.16
At common law, therefore, there may be no obstacle to the rights of
employees as tertii in collective agreements. What of the
position under s.18? Hunter has further argued that the '...
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phraseology is consistent both with the current view dominant in
England that collective agreements are not contracts because the
parties do not intend legal relations, and also with what has been
suggested above as the Scots view, that they are contracts, but
contracts which normally contain an implied term to the effect that
neither party will enforce them by legal process. The reference
to 'a legally enforceable contract' seems indeed naturally to
suggest that there are such things as contracts which are legally
• 17
unenforceable by the parties '.
A number of other questions arise: 'If collective agreements were
to be regarded as being necessarily in restraint of trade, to
decide whether a tertius could sue upon them would be a futile
exercise. It is not thought, however, that this is the law. The
true position would seem to be that though seme collective
agreements may conceivably be in restraint of trade the majority
"I Q ,
are not.' This statement of the effect of the doctrine of
restraint of trade may be erroneous.19
If collective agreements are regarded as contracts in Scots law,
even where they are not legally enforceable between the collective
parties and even where they are not in restraint of trade a number
of other difficulties remain in the path of the employee wishing to
sue as tertius. After all, 'It is an accepted rule that to bring
the doctrine into operation both contracting parties must have
intended to confer on the tertius a right to sue ... it will rarely
be the case - especially if a collective agreement is negotiated in
London on a national basis - that both contracting parties would
intend to confer on employees a right to sue as tertii in Scotland
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while their English counterparts had no such right'.20
So, as the case of Love suggests, it may well be possible in theory
for an employee to sue on a collective agreement which is
unenforceable between the two parties. Hcwever, in practice, such
an action is unlikely to succeed. One might also note that while
'... collective agreements frequently impose obligations on
employees, the doctrine of jus quaesiturn tertio does not extend to
the imposing of duties on tertii. (Though, of course, the
exigibility of rights conferred may be subject to performance of
potestative conditions.)'21
III. AGENCY
It seems clear that it would be possible for the terms of a
collective agreement to be incorporated into an individual
employment contract on the basis that in entering into the
collective bargain the trade union acted as the agent of the
employee.2113 It is equally clear that to offer the doctrine of
agency as the rationale behind incorporation would be erroneous.
The courts have not been sympathetic to arguments which treat the
union as an agent for its members.213 In 1924 in the case of
Holland v London Society of Compositors the plaintiff argued that
an agreement between two trade unions, concerning the
transferability of members '... could only be made for the benefit
of individual members, for whom the union were agents'.22
Mr Justice Lush rejected this saying that the agreement •... was
• •
made by the trade unions concerned for their cwn purposes •.
More recently in 1977 the EAT denied that membership of a union per
se created a relationship of general agency whereby the trade union
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was entitled to bargain with the employer on the member's behalf.24
The EAT went on to remark 'There is no reason at all why, in a
particular case, union representatives should not be the agents of
an employee to make a contract, or to receive a notice, or
otherwise effect a binding transaction on his behalf. But that
agency so to do does not stem from the mere fact that they are
union representatives and that he is a member of the union; it
must be supported in the particular case by the creation of some
specific agency, and that can arise only if the evidence supports
the conclusion that there was such an agency.'25
There are of course a number of sound reasons which explain why
more use has not been made of agency principles in this context.
One problem is that of contractual capacity given that a number of
employees will be under the age of 18 and lack full capacity. The
main problem, however, is the question of the authority of trade
unions to act as agents of their members. When entering into
collective agreements trade unions are normally regarded as acting
as principals not agents. Of course seme sections of collective
agreements will be intended to govern the relationship between
employer and union; others the relationship between employer and
employee. It would be possible to regard the union as acting as
principal in respect of the former situation and as agent in
respect of the latter. This still leaves the problem of terms
which are appropriate for incorporation but which the union would
wish to enforce. (For example, a term governing the rights etc of
shop stewards might be regarded as having both a collective and an
individual aspect.) Presumably, even in respect of the same
collective term, a union can be treated as simultaneously
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contracting as both principal and agent. The crux of the problem
of authority is less esoteric. Even if a union is regarded as
having the power of a general agent to bind its members in dealings
with the employer what is the position of those who have not joined
the union, those who have left the union and those who join the
union after the agreement is concluded? In the case of new
employees they will be readily assumed to have accepted employment
on the same terms as existing employees (though this does not arise
• . •
through the operation of agency law). Existing employees who
join the union subsequent to the signing of an agreement could
ratify it. (Indeed might not the fact of joining the union be taken
as implied ratification?) The biggest difficulty lies of course,
with non-members and ex-members.While collective agreements are
normally regarded as applying to the whole workforce, in relation
to the latter two groups this can hardly be on account of the
operation of the law of agency.
The most fundamental difficulty of all flows from the presumption
contained in section eighteen27 (a difficulty which does not appear
to have been discussed in the case-law or in academic writings).
This section results in most collective agreements being legally
unenforceable. 'Collective agreement' is defined to mean '... any
agreement or arrangement made by or on behalf of one or more trade
unions and one or more employers or employers' associations and
relating to one or more of the matters mentioned in section
no
, ,
29 (1)...' Where a trade union acting as the agent of its
members enters into an agreement with an employer will that
agreement be a collective agreement? At first sight, the answer
would appear to be yes; since the agreement is one made by a trade
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union. On the other hand, here the trade union is acting as agent
and not as principal and the wording '... made by or on behalf of
one or more trade unions ... • might suggest that the definition
only envisages the situation where the union is acting as
principal. At the end of the day the former interpretation would
seem to be much more in accord with the natural wording of the
section. Therefore in any case where the union acts as the
employee' s agent any ensuing agreement will be legally
unenforceable unless the agreement is in writing and contains a
provision which (however expressed) states that the parties intend
that the agreement shall be a legally enforceable contract.
At common law it is the concept of intention to enter into legal
relations which is relevant, not the statutory presumption. As a
result the common law would seem more amenable to the incorporation
of terms via the medium of agency, any search for intention would
be much less likely to yield the result that arose in Ford Motor Co
OQ .
Ltd v AEF. Indeed in that case the defence argued that "The
collective bargain is made with a twofold purpose. First, it
incorporates clauses which it is intended from the start shall
became part of the contract between the employer and the individual
employee. These terms are clear and precise; they do not operate
with legal force between the unions as such and the employers but
they do so operate as between the employer and the individual when
they are incorporated in the individual's contract of employment.
Secondly, there are other terms of the collective bargain that are
never intended at any stage to give rise to obligations between
anybody.1.30
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Whatever their current relevance it is interesting to examine some
of the cases involving agency. In Rookes v Barnard the judge at
first instance seemed prepared to base incorporation of the 'no-
, , , O-J t
strike' agreement on agency principles, Sachs J remarking 'The
representatives of AESD on that panel were authorised by their
executive to bind the trade union as a whole and the members
individually. The terms of the 1949 agreement thus became part of
the terms of each individual contract of employment ...'.32
Lord Justice Donovan, in the Court of Appeal, was not so sure;
'... if there were an issue whether the agreement was part of the
terms of their individual contracts of employment more proof would
be needed'.33
Agency though is perhaps most apposite where '... the number of
workers involved is small, the matters in dispute are personal to
them and the issues are localised to a single employer'.34 An
example of this sort of situation is provided by the facts of
Edwards v Skyways Ltd.35 There it was agreed by the trade unions
and the employer that redundant pilots who chose to claim back
their contributions to the pension fund rather than take up a paid-
up pension later on ' would be given an ex gratia payment
equivalent to the company's contribution to the pension fund'.
'It was not in dispute that the representatives of the [union] were
the duly authorised agents of the plaintiff ...'.
Arguably, in Edwards "... the judge saw the negotiated terms as a
standing offer put out by the company, which the ex-pilot then
accepted' .37 Even if one accepts this view of the case it does
not invalidate the agency approach in such cases in general.
Nevertheless one can only conclude that the various legal conundra,
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make the 'agency' solution inelegant, uncertain, and, in industrial
terms, unreal.38
A court may on occasion be prepared to regard the union as having a
certain implied authority to bind its members through the
collective bargaining process. In Mordecei v Jacob Beatus Ltd the
IT remarked that '... in these days such a matter as this [a
flexibility agreement], which is very commonly included in
agreements between management and unions, probably was within the
implied authority of the union to negotiate on behalf of their
membership. On the other hand, should an adjudicator wish not
to incorporate he may borrow the language of agency to further this
aim. The rigidity of the agency doctrine when applied in the
industrial relations context can be played on here. A possible
example of this is the case of Singh v BSC.40 The tribunal noting
that the respondents had failed to produce any documents "... which
stated specifically either that [the union] had been appointed the
sole negotiating agency for the applicant ... or that the
applicant's contract of employment could be varied without his
consent by agreement reached between the respondents and [ the
union]' .41 Resignation from the union was almost being treated as
a withdrawal of the union's authority as agent.
IV. INCORPORATION BY IMPLICATION
Incorporation can also, of course, be implied and there are a
number of theories to explain the basis of implied incorporation.
The most satisfactory is probably crystallised custom: "Ihe terms
of a collective agreement are likely to be "crystallised custom"
and as such automatically implied in the relevant contracts of
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employment ... This rule as to custom then is in practice the way
the bilateral rule-making power influences the exercise of the
unilateral rule-making power of management which is in fact
subordinated to it.' .43
It is interesting to go on to consider the tests a custom must
satisfy before incorporation can take place. In theory a custom
must be reasonable, certain and notorious.44 There are two
notable features of the test. It places a high degree of
discretion into the hands of the adjudicator while, at the same
time, proving highly deficient as a tool of analysis. The
criterion of reasonableness obviously gives the adjudicator a large
measure of discretion. The remaining criteria of notoriety and
certainty render the test a rather rigid one and mean that, if used
in practice, it would often be rather difficult to satisfy. These
criteria then would often have to be interpreted very liberally if
a custom were to be incorporated - the corollary is that the
adjudicator is granted further discretion.
In the second place, the test is of limited value as a tool of
analysis. A court considering the question of incorporation is
often confronted with distinctly complicated situations. The
question which must be asked is how helpful are the criteria in
providing solutions. An excellent illustration of the
difficulties that can arise is provided by the situation where
there are carpeting collective agreements. While there are no
doctrinal difficulties involved merely in the fact that contractual
terms are derived from more than one collective agreement problems
arise where their terms are inconsistent. Thus in Loman v
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Merseyside Transport Services the question arose as to whether the
working week was 68 hours (as stipulated in a local agreement) or
41 hours (as had been agreed in an earlier national agreement) .45
If one decides that the national agreement is prima facie capable
of satisfying the common law tests how do you cope with the
additional local agreement? One possibility is that the national
agreement is incorporated on the basis that the custom is that it
is over-ridden by local agreements to the extent that they suggest
terms to the contrary. Such a suggestion would allow both
agreements to be incorporated. A local agreement may be
incorporated by virtue of satisfying the same criteria as a
national agreements. Alternatively, the courts may regard it as
works custom: There the theoretical basis for incorporation is
less rigorous.46 (On the other hand, there may in certain cases
exist a judicial bias against giving normative effect to local
collective agreements - see p 189 below.)
In any event, should the local agreement be acted on it might
prevail after a period of time; even where the national agreement
is incorporated variation by conduct can still, of course, take
place. Ultimately, where two inconsistent agreements exist which
can be regarded as having been intended to have normative import
the adjudicator can realistically be considered to have a complete
discretion to select for incorporation whichever one he chooses.
Alternatively, he could incorporate both agreements on the basis
that where conflict arose one would prevail. In the former
situation he simply adopts the agreement which is more reasonable.
In the latter, he re-writes the agreement.
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It is worthy of mention that the court in Sager while laying down
the test of 'reasonableness, certainty and notoriety' also
acknowledged that it would be easier to incorporate works
Aft • #
customs. '... If ... the practice was imported into the
respondent's contract of employment, the respondent cannot escape
from its operation by showing that it lacks same of the essentials
of a valid custom or usage of trade ...'.46a One ground for the
term being incorporated was that there was a '... practice of
making reasonable deductions for bad work ... [which had]...
continuously prevailed at the defendant's mill from upwards of
thirty years, and that during the whole of that time all weavers
employed by the defendants have been treated alike in that
respect.46b
The foregoing discussion would indicate that even if an adjudicator
were to employ the traditional test it would often be of little
use. One might suggest that the evocation of crystallised custom
offers a convenient veil behind which one can hide the automatic
incorporation of the collective bargain. This explains the
attraction of crystallised custom but at the same time reveals its
limitations as a tool of analysis of potential sources of
contractual terms. It is also noteworthy that Kahn-Freund does
not appear to have ever addressed the concept of crystallised
custom at any length. He seems to have been content to have found
a device to bridge the gap between collective decision-making and
individual obligations.
The limitations of the common law test are again revealed when one
considers the variation of collective agreements. In MacLea v
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Essex it was held that there was 1... an agreement to employ the
plaintiff on the terms and conditions of the National Maritime
Board as they were frcm time to time revised ...' such an
engagement being found to be one '... perfectly familiar to people
in the shipping industry'.47 The main evidence in MacLea
amounting to mere assertions of this familiarity by two witnesses
from the shipping industry. In general, however, evidence of
knowledge that such a custom exists may be hard to obtain. While
management and labour may well look to the results of collective
bargaining as a source of contractual terms neither side is likely
to have given the matter any precise thought. The longer the
collective bargaining process has been in operation the more likely
it is that variations will automatically be incorporated. In
industries where the practice is less than long standing the
question will be more speculative. In such industries one might
doubt whether the knowledge of the parties would permit any custom
to be refined beyond the level of saying that there is an
expectation that the terms of the individual contracts will be
provided by collective bargaining.
Where the custom is along the lines of MacLea one might also wonder
whether there might not be scope for refusing to incorporate on the
basis of reasonableness. After all, in the MacLea situation is
there any limit to the alteration to an individual's position that
could occur as a result of an alteration of a collective agreement?
In practice, however, •... the industrial tribunals and the courts
simply do not apply to collective agreements the sorts of tests
that the general principles of the law of contract impose as the
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criteria for binding customs, and if they did, these rather
exacting requirements would be unlikely to be met in any given
case'.48 As we have seen, even if they were, it is doubtful how
helpful those tests would be. The position in practice then is
that the collectively agreed terms aire normally automatically
incorporated.
For the adherents of the 'crystallised custom' theory possibly the
real test of incorporation is to ask whether the collective
agreement was followed in practice. In the words of Kahn-Freund
'Agreements are generally acted upon, and this may be assumed, but
not necessarily. If either party can show that an agreement
(without having been formally abrogated) was widely ignored, its
terms may not qualify as custom or usage. On the other hand, they
may do so, even if the agreement is of recent origin and intended
to innovate rather than to codify provided the terms are generally
observed.'.50 Earlier in "Legal Framework" Kahn-Freund had
written that "it does not ... matter whether the worker is a member
of a union party to the agreement or whether the employer is or has
at any time been a member of a "contracting association". What
does matter is whether the terms of the agreement are in fact
applied in the industry and district. The Wages Scales and other
"Codes" it contains can easily became "crystallised" custcm".50a
Recently the Court of Appeal had regard to the behaviour of the
parties subsequent to the commencement of the contract when
determining the terms of the contract.
In a stimulating note on Burroughs Machines Ltd v Timmoney51
Freedland discusses what he believes to be the value in having
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regard to the '... practice of the contracting parties'.52 The
case concerned the resignation of a company from an employers'
federation whose collective agreements the company had followed.
What effect did the resignation have on the importation of these
terms? Freedland argues that the key question was "... whether
the parties continued to derive individual norms from that
collective agreement. There was same evidence to suggest that the
parties had continued to regard both the guaranteed week agreement
and the industrial action escape clause as operative. If that was
a true view of the evidence, the guaranteed week proviso should
have been regarded as still incorporated ...".53 Certainly in
Turiff Construction Ltd v Bryant the Court placed weight on whether
a local agreement had been put into operation.53a At any rate the
deployment of any doctrine based on custom/usage is ultimately
predicated on the existence of past practice. The theory
flounders when faced with the emergence of collective bargaining in
an industry or in a section of an industry.
While collectively agreed terms may be incorporated on the basis of
custom it is suggested that less commonly, they may be implied by-
using one of the judicial tests for implied terms in fact.54 Thus
in Robertson v British Gas Lord Justice Kerr remarked that the
contractual documents '... proceed on the basis that there will be
an incentive bonus and that its amount and the terms governing it
are to be found in an agreed collective scheme in force from time
to time' .55 Moreover '... although it looks from the documents as
though the incentive bonus scheme is merely one small part of the
total terms of the individual contracts of employment, it provides
in fact an integrated and general framework for a very large number
186
of the mutual rights and obligations of the parties. Indeed, it
becomes virtually impossible to determine what the full terms of
those individual contracts of employment are if you once take away
the agreed collective scheme for an incentive bonus as an integral
part of these contracts'.56 This is not to say that the mode of
implication was other than crystallised custom in Robertson itself
but merely to suggest that in some instances the deployment of
tests such as the 'officious bystander' may lead to incorporation.
Indeed the case suggests that where the employment contract is
partially in writing its structure may invite incorporation.
Competing Collective Agreements
One of the problems associated with incorporation is that posed by
the situation where the terms of the employment contract are
clearly derived from collective bargaining but it is unclear which
agreement one looks to. A good example of the problems involved
is shown by laman v Merseyside Transport Services Ltd, a case
concerning redundancy/ where the question which arose was whether
the working week was 68 hours or merely 41.57 A national
agreement provided for guaranteed weekly remuneration for road
haulage workers on the basis of a 41 hour week. A subsequent
local agreement made between the employer and trade union officials
provided for payment on the basis of a 68 hour week. The employers
argued that the local agreement was not intended to have
contractual effect so as to compel any employee to abide by it and
that it was in the nature of a 'gentleman's agreement'. This
argument proved successful, the tribunal holding that applications
for redundancy payments on the basis of a 68 hour week failed
because the local agreement was not contractually binding.
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Despite the fact that the managing director of the company had
stated categorically in evidence that the national agreement '...
was modified by the 1963 agreement. The company could insist on
the 68 hours work'.58 On the other hand, a former manager of the
company gave evidence and stated: "The agreement was not intended
to have contractual effect so as to compel any employee to abide by-
it. It was in the nature of a gentleman's agreement for ironing
out local difficulties and for providing an incentive for co¬
operation with the mechanics of operation the employer wished to
cq , f
adopt.' Nevertheless the High Court upheld the tribunal. Lord
Parker in delivering the judgment of the Court justified the
dubious conclusion reached by saying that 'If locally legally
binding agreements were made departing from the National
Agreements, it would undoubtedly create demands for a complete
overhaul of the National Agreement.'60
The decision can be criticised for a number of reasons. In the
first place, Plant Agreements which might lead to demands for the
'complete overhaul of national agreements are commonplace in many
industries and it is a novel view that this is a reason for
refusing them any legal effect. Indeed, such an approach may be
said to run counter to the recommendations of the Donovan Report
for an extension of plant and local bargaining'.61 Secondly, •...
the issue before the court must not be confused with the entirely
different question whether a collective agreement is intended to be
legally binding at collective level ... The question here was
whether the 1963 agreement was intended to have effect as part of
the employees' individual contracts.'.
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Several years later the 'Loman situation' arose again and this time
the task of offering a solution fell to the Court of Appeal. In
Gascol Conversions Ltd v Mercer the question arose as to the normal
working hours of an applicant for redundancy - were his hours to be
governed by a national agreement or by a subsequent local
f\~K
agreement. The court held that '... the local agreement should
[not] be regarded as varying the national agreement'.64 The court
placed same weight on the fact that at the end of the local
agreement were the words: 'The parties intend that any agreements
contained in these notes should be binding in honour only and that
they should not give rise to any legal obligation.'.65 Moreover,
they noted that "... the national agreement contains an express
provision that 'where the agreement is at variance with other
national and local working agreements, it is to take
precedence'."66 A number of points can be made about this
decision. Firstly, the Court of Appeal appears to have
perpetuated the confusion which arose in Ioman as to the separate
issues of legal status between the collective parties and any
decision to incorporate the terms of a collective bargain into the
individual contract. Secondly, the Court placed store on the
'preference' clause in the national agreement; this begs the very
question at stake. Until the Court has ascertained which
collective agreement is to govern the relationship such clauses are
obviously irrelevant. It is also of interest to note that in
choosing to give normative effect to the national bargain the Court
made no mention of the various techniques for incorporation.
Finally, by looking to the formal system of collective bargaining
the court declined to give normative effect to the working
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practices of the industry. Were there any policy reasons for the
rather illogical attraction to the preference clause in the
national agreement? Possibly it stems from judicial distaste for
lack of order in industrial relations which then finds expression
in preferential treatment of the rules emanating from the formal
institutions. After all in Turiff Construction Ltd v Bryant a
local site agreement was regarded as being on the basis •... of co-
operation and not as a natter of contract'.
An interesting recent case is that of Donelan v Kerrby Construction
Ltd68 This again concerned a redundancy payment and the question
arose whether a site bonus should be included in the week's pay for
the purpose of calculating redundancy. The applicant was an
employee of a plant-hire company and latterly was working on a
construction site. On that site the main contractor had an
agreement with the ADEW, the union to which the employee belonged,
that the site bonus would be paid to everyone working on the site:
the employers were sub-contractors and not parties to that
agreement. The employers paid the site bonus and recovered the
amounts paid from the main contractors. The EAT held that 'The
obvious term to imply in such a case is that so long as a site
bonus is payable by the main contractor the sub-contractor will pay
his employee the amount of the site bonus appropriate to that
employee.'.69 This decision has led one commentator to conclude
that "... this is not untypical of the recent decisions of the EAT
in which there is quite a tendency to hold that the contract of
employment must be so construed as to embody the firm reasonable de
facto expectations of the employee, and a further tendency to treat
the result of collective bargaining as the prima facie guide to
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those firm and reasonable expectations.
To what extent does the decision place weight on the collective
bargaining process? At first glance the EAT appeared to take a
much broader view of the situation than the IT who had felt that
since the sub-contractor was not a party to the relevant collective
bargain he was not under a duty to observe its terms. On the
other hand, what would have happened if the main contractor had
decided to step paying the site bonus? The EAT upheld the IT's
view that if that happened there could be no possible claim by the
employee against his employers for the amount of the site bonus. 71
But what would the position be if the main contractor had stopped
paying in breach of the collective agreement? If the employer is
not obliged to pay in that situation you are giving very little
normative import to the collective bargain. Indeed even if the
collective is terminated by mutual agreement between the parties
why should it be assumed that the employees necessarily lose the
right to the site bonus. (See below, p 209.)
To what extent does the approach in Donelan reveal a different
approach to that in Ionian and Gascol? Davies and Freedland regard
the former two cases as being evidence of a judicial distinction
between voluntary and obligatory arrangements.72 A distinction
which they believe to have been developed by the Courts in relation
to collective agreements and particularly to agreements for over¬
time work. •... the courts tend to treat only centralised and
formal bargaining as creating such obligations. They tend to
rationalise more localised and informal bargaining as a mere
exchange of assurance of goodwill between employers and
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employees.' On this basis Freedland believes that had the
Divisional Court in 1968 or the Court of Appeal in the mid-7O's
been faced with the facts that arose in Donelan 'They would have
been most likely to have taken a narrower approach to the contract
of employment, and to have held that the sub-contractor was paying
the site bonus either simply as a matter of choice and convenience,
or at best as agent for the head contractor, but not under a
contractual obligation to his own employees.'.74
On this basis Donelan may well represent a new departure. On the
other hand, the fact situation in Donelan was materially different
to either Gascol or Loman, in the latter two cases the adjudicator
was faced with competing collective agreements offering
inconsistent terms. In Donelon the Court did not discuss the
matter in terms of incorporation of collective terms. Rather the
discussion was really about implied terms in general and not any
specialities relating to incorporation from collective agreements.
The courts may be less likely to regard local agreements as being
voluntary but there is no guarantee as to hew the Courts would jump
if faced with conflicting national and local agreements.75
The easiest solution to the problem is demonstrated by Barrett v
NCB.76 There the contract of employment expressly incorporated
the collective agreement. Clause 3 of the agreement provided that
the Union through its area or local representatives could enter
into arrangements with the employer to provide for, inter alia,
regular working of additional shifts.
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Appropriateness of Terms of Incorporation
It is, of course, the case that where an employee1 s contractual
rights and duties emanate from a collective agreement not all the
terms of the collective contract will be incorporated. The
question of appropriateness of terms for incorporation has posed a
77
number of problems.''
One problem is caused when it is necessary to decide which terms
are present to regulate the relations between the collective
parties. Camden Exhibition and Display Ltd v Lynott is a case in
. 7ft •
point.There a rule of the working rule agreement provided that
'overtime required to ensure the due and proper performance of
contracts shall not be subject to restriction, but may be worked by
mutual agreement and direct arrangement between the employer and
the operatives concerned'.79 It was not disputed that, in general,
the terms of employment were derived from the agreement but was the
rule quoted above appropriate for inclusion? Lord Denning stated
that 'I think it is clear that the unions agreed that when overtime
was necessary to ensure the proper performance of contracts, the
unions would not impose a restriction on overtime, and would not
authorise their stewards, or anyone on their behalf, to impose a
t • • ftfi • • . .
restriction on overtime. The more interesting question remained
to be answered. Lord Denning was of the view that the agreement
imposed an individual obligation and found that '... this working
rule means that the men will not, officially or unofficially,
impose a collective embargo on overtime when it is required to
81
ensure the due and proper performance of contracts.'.
A number of criticisms of this interpretation can be made. Even
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if the clause is to have an individual counterpart, the element of
"... mutual agreement and direct arrangement ...' does not
disappear and overtime for the individual employee must presumably
be voluntary. Moreover, if it was voluntary on both sides one or
more employees would be entitled to refuse to do it. How then
does one distinguish a collective embargo from a number of
individual refusals? It is respectfully submitted that it is
difficult to regard the interpretation as being other than
artificial and unfeasible in operation.
The decision in Camden Exhibitions Ltd to extend an obligation
between collective parties so as to have normative effect at the
individual level can be regarded as a failure to appreciate that
the function of collective agreements is not only to regulate the
individual employment relationship but also to regulate the
relations of management and union. In the words of Kahn-Freund
•This view of the dual effect of collective agreements is now
widely accepted. It is generally accepted in most continental
countries but surprisingly this elementary distinction is still
sometimes ignored by English courts ... •.82 On the other hand it
has been objected that ' [W]hen the issue at both 'levels' concerns
the form, content, enforcement and interpretation of the same
collective agreement, it is hardly surprising that the Courts
occasionally forget to invoke the aid of this artificial conception
and arrive at the wrong result.'.
Davies and Freedland take the view that 'whereas the normative
parts of collective agreements are usually capable of incorporation
into individual contracts, the procedural parts are in principle
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collective in nature and incapable of incorporation into individual
contracts unless the court undertakes deliberately to devise an
individual version of the collective obligation'.84 In testing
the validity of this proposition it will be helpful to look at the
experience of the CAC and the Industrial Court who have both been
faced with the question of incorporation.
In their administration of s 8 of the Terms and Conditions of
Employment Act 1959 and ss 11-16 of the Employment Protection Act
1975 the aforementioned bodies were confronted with the issue of
incorporation. Understandably both bodies took the view that it
would be wrong '... to impose recognition of a particular union as
an obligation, on an employer in a contract of employment',85
It might be thought that the question of incorporation of
procedural clauses would depend very much on the nature of the
clause in question. In Award No 3059 it was stated that a
collective disputes procedure was not suitable for incorporation.
Similarly in Award 3225 the court did not •... consider that
provisions ... whereby disputes are to be dealt with in accordance
with the constitution of the NJC are properly to be regarded as
terms or conditions of employment ...'
Nevertheless same procedural clauses were held to have relevance at
the individual level and clauses which resembled an individual
grievance procedure would be likely to be of a type appropriate for
incorporation. In Award 3227 it was held that the recognised
terms and conditions included provision for hearing of grading
appeals by a Provisional Council and by the NJC. Moreover the
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employer was not observing the recognised terms and conditions by
not implementing a particular grading award. Redundancy
procedures which are more than simple negotiating procedure may
well be suitable for incorporation. Thus in Award 3225 a
procedure was regarded as suitable for incorporation whereby the
question of who was to be declared redundant was to be determined
after consultation with the employee representatives and that
regard was to be paid to the general principle of 'first in, last
out'. A similar view would be taken of disciplinary and dismissal
procedures. So '... what is truly a term or condition of
employment ... [does not cease] ... to be properly so described
because it lays down procedures or 'machinery' for determining an
employee' s rights in relation to the term or condition'. 87 In
3225 an agreement which provided that '... the employer's
regulations shall not be altered without prior consultation with
the British Air Line Pilots Association ,..'88 was regarded as a
term or condition of employment. A related issue arises in
connection with individual representation. In Award 3059 the
Industrial Court did not regard a collectively agreed term
concerning the appointment and function of shop stewards as a term
and condition of employment.
The study of Industrial Court/CAC awards reveals that individual
grievance procedure will be appropriate for incorporation. It is
often less than easy to adjudge a procedure as being individual
rather than collective.
Union representatives, particularly shop stewards, often provide
substantial assistance to individual employees over workplace
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affairs; the rights of such representatives often flowing from
collective agreements. Would an individual counterpart of such a
right be incorporated into the employment contract? Should the
right be regarded as belonging solely to the collective sphere?
It is instructive to examine a number of cases which arose under
section five of the Industrial Relations Act.
A number of cases arose concerning individuals who alleged that
they were suffering unjustifiable discrimination because another
union was being more favourably treated by the employer than their
own. In CEGB v Coleman it was held that the fact that only
members of the recognised union were eligible for election to the
works committee did not amount to discrimination (within the terms
, , QQ ,
of s 5) against members of another union.3 The NXRC holding that
the sub-section contemplated discrimination by an employer against
a worker as an individual in the context of his contract of
employment, rather than discrimination between different groups of
workers. Quite consistently the court went on to say that '...
shop stewards and other local union representatives will be
accorded the facilities usually accorded to holders of their
offices, ... [these] are benefits which are enjoyed by the worker
. t . . • QO
qua union representative and not qua individual'.3U The court' s
view as to what was an individual matter and what was collective
flcwing frcm their understanding of the structure of the Act. As
Kidner saw it; '... while the statute protected the employee's
rights as an individual, it would do nothing to harm the collective
bargaining procedures either agreed to voluntarily or set up under
Part III of the Act'.91 The House of Lords took a different
approach and held in Post Office v Crouch that to deny a non-
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recognised union organisational facilities was to breach the duty-
imposed by section 5, Lord Reid declaring that "... discrimination
against a man's trade union generally affects him personally'.93
Their Lordships, therefore, placed the emphasis on the Act's aim of
protecting individuals as opposed to the promotion of collective
bargaining.
Howie v GEC Power Engineering Ltd is also of relevance.94 There
it was stated that '... to have two sets of grievance procedure,
one which allows an employee to be represented by his union and the
other which does not, is on the face of it to discriminate unfairly
against those denied union representation ... Under their procedure
the employers deny this advantage to all members of UKAPE. What
value will attach to the right given to the employee to join a
union of his choice if that union is denied the right to speak on
his behalf'?95 The NIKC rejected the view that the employee had
no genuine individual grievance and that his application for a
salary review was merely a manoeuvre to secure bargaining rights
for UKAPE. 'The tribunal has fallen into the error of equating
negotiating rights with the right to represent and negotiate on
behalf of a member in an individual grievance. They are quite
separate functions."96 Nevertheless the collective and individual
spheres overlap; what of the situation where a group of employees
wish to process claims? A further difficult situation was pointed
to by Craig:97 "This would be where the employee, represented as
having an individual grievance, is one of a large number of
employees who are either on the same terms and conditions of
employment, or amongst whom there is a strict wage differential.
The employer may then be placed in a dilemma; under the principle
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propounded in the Howie case, the employer must concede
representation concerning such an individual grievance, even though
this may have automatic repercussions in respect of other employees
either because the determination of the individual claim
necessarily affects a group of employees on the same terms and
conditions, or by prompting strong claims by others to an analogous
hearing in order to preserve the differential. Once again the
question would arise as to whether the claim was really in respect
of an individual grievance, with similar difficulties; if there
are two other employees with the same wage structure as the person
seeking to be heard does this prevent it being an individual
grievance, merely by the necessary effect it will have on their
wage structures too? If the answer is in the negative would it
make any difference if the number were ten or fifty?"98
The question which remains is what should be the employee's right
to representation. A question which evidently has perplexed the
CAC. In Award 78/399 it was felt that an obligation whereby an
employee was entitled to be represented by a shop steward with
general representational rights could not be '... considered part
of the "terms and conditions of employment" as that phrase is
normally construed'However, in Award 78/629 representation by
stewards was regarded as a matter of individual rights. Moreover,
in Award 77/27 the committee awarded that '... members of ASTMS
shall have the right to be represented by ASTMS in individual
matters of discipline or grievance which have not been resolved
within stages 1 and 2 of the Company's grievance procedure'.100
When a shop steward is denied facilities which he is entitled to
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under a collective agreement should an employee within his
constituency be able to sue? The source of the present difficulty
is that such a matter straddles both the collective and the
individual spheres. Arguably such general organisational rights
are primarily collective matters. In such a case to allow an
employee to sue might be thought to circumvent the statutory
presumption contained in s 18 TULRA 1974. This can be contrasted
with the position where a grievance procedure grants an individual
the right to be represented by a shop steward. There the greater
element of individual right in the clause would point in favour of
incorporation. As Doyle has argued: 'The right of an individual
employee to union representation in grievance and disciplinary
procedures is often contractual in nature and clearly capable of
individuation'.1 The artificiality of such distinctions cannot be
denied. For example, the denial of facilities to stewards may
well restrict their ability to pursue individual grievances.
Ultimately, however, this artificiality can but be accepted.
The case of City and Hackney Health Authority v NUFE is of
interest.2 There a provision of the Whitley Council agreement for
hospital ancillary staff provided that 'full-time union officers
shall be permitted to visit the workplace in the performance of
their trade union duties and for the purpose of seeing that the
council's agreements are observed ...'.3 Lord Justice Oliver
stated that '... there is at least an arguable case for saying that
the existence and maintenance of trade union facilities at a
hospital is a condition of service which can be treated as
incorporated ...'.4 However, in deciding what was the precise
nature of the individual contractual right it is pertinent to
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inquire whether an employee who was a shop steward would have any
more extensive rights than an ordinary employee? For example,
would a shop steward have a contractual right to enter the
employer's premises to carry out his trade union duties? The
Court of Appeal appeared reluctant to countenance the holding of
more extensive rights by shop stewards. It being argued by the
employer that 1... the only provisions which could give rise to any
contractual rights are those which are clear and affect the
position of an employee as an employee and not as a trade union
representative'.5 Lord Justice Oliver remarking that '... I
think there may be something in that, although I do not think the
contrary is totally unarguable'.6
Collective Disputes Procedures
In the recent case of Todd v Daily Telegraph the High Court refused
to incorporate a disputes procedure which •... dealt with the
relationship between the union and ... [the employer] ... which was
outside the ambit of the employer/employee relationship, and
therefore inappropriate for incorporation in ... [the]
individual contract of employment. Moreover, there was a separate
clause ... deeding specifically with dismissal.'7
Again in NCB v NUM the distinction was drawn between 1... terms of
a collective agreement which are of their nature apt to became
enforceable terms of an individual's contract of employment and
terms which are of their nature inapt to became enforceable by
individuals. Terms of collective agreements fixing rates of pay,
or hours of work, would obviously fall into the first category.
Terms which deal with the procedure to be followed by an employer
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before dismissing an employee also would fall into the first
category. But conciliation agreements setting up machinery
designed to resolve by discussions between employers'
representatives and union representatives, or by arbitral
proceedings, questions arising within the industry fall in the
second category.'8 Scott J went on to state that 'A collective
agreement between an employer and a union providing machinery for
collective bargaining and for resolving industrial disputes may be
of very great importance to each and every worker in the industry.
But it is not likely to be an agreement intended to be legally
enforceable as between employer and union, and it is almost
inconceivable to my mind that it could have been intended to became
legally enforceable at the suit of an individual worker. In the
procedures laid down by the 1946 Scheme, for instance no part is
played by any individual mineworker. The machinery is designed to
be invoked and operated either by the NCB or by the NUM with the
co-operation of the other. It simply does not lend itself at all
to enforceability at the suit of an individual mineworker.'9 The
identification of collective disputes procedures is made a trifle
difficult by certain characteristics of the British industrial
relations system. In particular by the preference for general
procedures: 'Procedures are multi-purpose. Such distinctions as
that between a "judicial" approach to a dismissed, and the approach
to an economic dispute "are rarely made either in the main
procedure agreements between the parties or in subsidiary
agreements at lower levels. The tendency is to regard procedures
as all-purpose agreements to be used flexibly as particular
situations arise and as common sense seems to dictate".'10 Thus
in Tadd the procedure concerned was used to handle both 'industrial
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disputes' and individual disputes. Indeed, the instant dispute
was arguably'... a mixed case where industrial issues were involved
-i By examining different
as well as an individual claim '.
procedures contained in collective agreements might it be possible
to identify discrete types?
(a) General Procedures
Such procedures might be regarded as the archetypal collective
procedure and, therefore, not suitable for incorporation.
While such procedures are able to, and do, process individual
grievances they are framed purely in terms of collective
parties and no mention is made of the individual employee.
The manifestly collective nature of such provisions is
reinforced when the same agreement contains, in addition, a
disciplinary/dismissal procedure. When a procedural
agreement lists its functions this can help denote its purely
collective nature. For example •... the committees ... will
not negotiate ... on discipline, redundancy or voluntary
severance principles'.
(b) Combined Procedures
Same procedures make it clear that they are to cover both
group disputes and individual disputes. An agreement might
state that it is to apply to "... all disputes and grievances
concerning an employee, or group of employees". Indeed it may
continue 'Any issue shall be raised first by the employee
directly concerned with his supervisor, who shall attempt to
settle it'. The collective nature of the procedure is
emphasised in various ways; for example, it may contain a
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status quo clause. Is there scope for individuation, to a
greater or lesser extent, of such procedures? While * [I]n
linguistic terms any collective obligation is capable of
individuation, over-readiness to do so is likely to lead to
the perpetration of the sort of errors seen in Camden. One
might take the view that where a grievance procedure is
primarily collective no individuation should take place.'12
Such an approach may well be too restrictive. Arguably, for
example, an employee should have a contractual right to union
representation. On occasion, where a procedure has a number
of stages the procedure will commence at a later stage where
an issue concerns a group of employees. In such a case it
may be easier to hold that individual rights/obligations exist
in the earlier stages.
An added difficulty is posed by agreements which contain both
a 'combined procedure' and a separate disciplinary procedure.
The disciplinary procedure may in certain circumstances be
integrated with the combined procedure: for example, 'the
Appeal Procedure shall follow normal disputes Procedures
described in item 4.00 but beginning at stage 3'.
Integration might invoke a greater degree of individuation.
Indeed the Industrial Relations Code of Practice states that
'individual grievances and collective disputes are often dealt
with through the same procedure. Where there are separate
procedures they should be linked so that an issue can, if
necessary, pass from one to the other, since a grievance may
• *1 ^
develop into a dispute.
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(c) Disciplinary/Dismissal Procedures
Such procedures are a clear source of individual rights and
duties. An example of the type of clause in question is
provided by the case of Murray v British Rail (though whether
in that case the source of the clause was a collective
agreement is not clear from the report).14 There 'the
contract provided for the domestic disciplinary procedure, he
was a party to the contract, and it was his job to participate
in it and see that it operated properly'.15
Similarly the nature of grievance procedures might suggest
that they should be incorporated. A collective agreement may
contain both individual and collective grievance procedures,
in such a case it would seem plain that the individual
procedure will be suitable for incorporation.
Difficult questions are posed by the actual individual
rights/duties which flow from such procedural agreements. While
it may be easy to infer that a reference in an agreement to an
individual's right to representation by a steward should be
contractual more fundamental problems exist. What, if any, are
the duties which should lie on the individual? One obvious
possibility is that a collective term should be held to imply that
an individual should not take part in a strike before he has
exhausted procedure. S 18(4) would prevent the incorporation of
such an obligation; moreover, it would prevent the incorporation
of '... any term from which such an obligation was inferred'.
What if a collective agreement provided that adherence to procedure
would entitle employees to a bonus payment? Another possibility
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emerges from Baron v Sunderland Corporation (see below).16
The difficulties suggested by the preceding paragraph might be a
barrier to incorporation. The position is likely to be eased
where one is dealing with individual procedures in collective
bargains. Such procedures are arguably intended for individuation
and this intention might be thought to overwhelm doubts as to the
precise content of the individual obligation. Thus Wedderburn &
Davies comment that 'where ... [collectively agreed] ... terms set
up a procedure to be followed in individual dismissals there would
seem to be little reason for denying them incorporation into
individual employment contracts1.17 The question then becomes
one of translation, subject to any statutory provisions such as
s 18(4).
The distinction between procedural and substantive clauses is an
important one. It can, however, be too readily assumed that
procedural clauses are not capable of individuation. The question
of incorporation turns very much on a scrutiny of the clause in
question. Baron v Sunderland Corporation furnishes an interesting
• • 1 ft •
example of the issues that can arise.0 The question arose
whether a provision in the relevant collective agreement relating
to arbitration was incorporated into the individual contract of
employment and whether it constituted a valid submission to
arbitration. The provision established a joint cammittee of
reference who were to determine "any questions relating to ...
interpretation ...".19 On the facts, it was held that the clause
was in any event not an arbitration clause: the court pointing out
that it was em essential ingredient of an arbitration clause that
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it conferred bilateral rights of reference of any dispute arising
between the parties to an independent arbitrator. It might
however, be thought that this type of clause could impose
obligations at both the collective and individual levels. The
employee in dispute would be obliged to exhaust the grievance
procedure before resorting to other remedies, for example, raising
a court action. In the instant case the actual arbitration clause
stated "... any question relating to the interpretation of the
provisions of this report brought forward by a local education
authority acting through the authorities "panel or by any
association of teachers acting through the teachers1 panel or by-
consent of the chairman of the Burnham Committee" shall be
considered ... and determined by the joint committee' .20 So in
this case an individual could not activate the procedure without
the consent of the Chairman of the Committee. However, if the
individual had had the capacity to activate proceedings there would
seem to be a stronger case for imposing an individual obligation.
If this had been the position it would be much easier to hold that
the clause was concerned with the'mutual rights and obligations of
employers and employees' and not purely with '... the mutual rights
and obligations of the parties to the ... collective bargain'.21
It remains to be considered what benefit an individual might gain
from the transformation of a procedural clause contained in a
collective agreement into an individual contractual obligation.
Curing the life of the employment relationship the value of such
rights is, in practice, contingent on the employer's willingness to
respect them. Such willingness may flow simply from respect for
obligations voluntarily entered into or, possibly more
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realistically, by virtue of the social and economic power of the
trade union. While in theory an employee can seek remedies for
breach of contract, this cannot be generally regarded as a
practical option.
Should questions as to termination of the relationship arise, a
complaint of unfair dismissal may be lodged. 'As a general rule,
an employer will not satisfy a tribunal that he acted reasonably in
taking a decision to dismiss unless the procedure he adopted in
reaching that decision was itself a reasonable procedure in the
circumstances.'22 The tribunal will already be obliged to take
account of the ACAS Code of Practice but an employee's contract may
afford him greater protection. In any event, the contractual
position will still be of relevance. In Bailey v BP Oil Kent
Refinery Ltd. a collectively agreed disciplinary procedure (which
appears to have been incorporated into the individual contract)
provided that 'the company will inform the appropriate full-time
official as soon as possible of any case in which dismissed, or
downgrading is contemplated'.23 The Court of Appeal stated that
'in most cases, if not all, a failure to comply with such an
agreement would be a factor to be taken into account; but the
weight to be given to it would depend upon the circumstances'.24
Collective Obligations
It should be made clear that in collective agreements a number of
substantive norms are inappropriate for incorporation since they
exist solely to govern the relationship of the collective parties.
At one time it would probably have been accepted that the rights of
trade union officials to facilities provided by the employer fall
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within this category. The case of City and Hackney Health
Authority (see above) demonstrates that this is now more
questionable.25 This illustrates once more the overlap between
individual and collective rights. It also shows the difficulty of
translating a collectively agreed term which is to have normative
effect at the individual level into the employment contract (see
below). Other types of clause also present difficulties.
Professor Lord Wedderburn states that '... it is not easy to
incorporate into any individual worker's contract the ... [clause]
... "the proportion borne by the aggregate number of boys to the
aggregate number of men [in certain departments] shall not exceed
one boy to every four (or fractional part of four) men"'.26 At
first sight the clause would seem to relate to the terms and
conditions on which individual employees work. The difficulty
stems from the fact that the wording of the clause in no way
suggests what the equivalent individual contractual right would be.
Thus the wording of a clause might indicate that it was not
intended for incorporation.
More controversial is the case of British Leyland UK Ltd v
MoQuilken.27 There a redundancy agreement was held by the EAT to
be inappropriate for incorporation on the grounds that the "...
agreement was a long-term plan, dealing with policy rather than the
• • • i PR •
rights of the individual employees". The key clause provided
that the '... employees ... would be interviewed by a member of the
personnel department with the object of establishing a list of
employees who wished to take up the option of (a) retraining or (b)
redundancy'.29 It would seem that it would not have been
difficult to have held that the employee had a contractual right to
elect for either retraining or redundancy.
209
What is Incorporated?
When a contractual term is derived from a collective bargain what
is the subsequent relationship between the two agreements? The
individual terms will not be affected by any change in the
currency, etc. of the collective bargain; these terms will only
alter as a result of the normal rules of variation of contract.
Thus in Morris v CH Bailey Ltd it was stated that 'it is true that
terms of those agreements were incorporated into the contract of
service, but they remained ... in that contract whether or not the
agreements between the union and the association continued'.30
This view of the position was confirmed by the Court of Appeal in
Robertson v British Gas Corporation.31 There the employment
contract provided for an incentive bonus to be paid, "... its
amount and the terms governing it are to be found in an agreed
collective scheme in force from time to time".32 Subsequently the
employer gave notice of withdrawal from the collective agreement
and the question arose as to the affect on the individual contract.
The Court rejected the view that •... the contracts of the
individual workmen can be varied by same unilateral variation or
abrogation or withdrawal from the collective agreement by either
side'.33 Should the collective agreement terminate the terms of
the individual contract '... unless expressly varied between the
individual and the employer, will remain as they were by reference
to the last agreed collective agreement incorporated into the
individual contracts'.34 It can, therefore, be seen that it is
not the collective agreement which is incorporated but merely the
appropriate terms contained therein.
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Translation
Where a court has formed the view that a term is in principle
capable of incorporation it will then have to formulate the wording
of the individual clause. It is erroneous to incorporate the
collective clause word for word into the employment contract.
Instead the court should look to the purpose of the clause and
devise appropriate wording. This was the approach adopted by the
Inner House of the Court of Session in Burroughs Machines Ltd v
Timmoney35 a difficulty arose as to the precise wording of
a contractual term relating to guarantee payments derived from a
collective agreement. The collective agreement was made between
the union and an employers1 association; the company subsequently-
resigning from the association. The effect of this was stated in
categorical terms by the court: "There is no doubt that the act of
the company in resigning from the Federation had and could have no
effect whatever upon the contract of employment between the
respondent and the company".36 The difficulty flowed from the
fact that a proviso to the collective agreement provided that
guarantee payments would not be made "in the event of dislocation
of production in a federated establishment as a result of an
industrial dispute in that or any other federated establishment".37
The EAT had incorporated this proviso word for word so that only
dislocation in a federated establishment could bring the proviso
into operation. The EAT consequently holding that since the "...
appellants were no longer a 1 federated establishment1 ... the
exception could not apply".38 On appeal this interpretation was
rejected: "... the employer offered and the employee accepted
employment on certain interdependent terms and conditions. The
'guaranteed week' provision in favour of the employee was clearly
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and explicitly conditioned by acceptance by the employee of the ...
[proviso] ...".39
Before assessing the validity of the approach of the Inner House it
is interesting to make two observations as to the affect of the
appeal. In the first place, the EAT had regarded their own
decision as anomalous "... and probably contrary to what the
parties themselves intended but having regard to the wording used
in this particular agreement we feel that it is incorporable'.40
As the appellants successfully argued: "... it cannot be supposed
that the parties intended that, for example, the accident of the
dissolution of the Federation should have the effect of disabling
the Company from enacting the practice of the guarantee . ..'.41
Secondly, only employees who had served a qualifying period were
entitled to a guarantee payment. A result of the EAT's
construction of the agreement was that qualification was only open
to those who had been employed while the company was a member of
the federation. It had been submitted that '... it would be an
absurd situation if part of the hourly paid workforce enjoyed the
benefit of the guarantee virile the remainder did not ...".42 The
EAT could only comment that 'it may be that such a situation would
be a potential source of industrial strife but giving the words
their natural meaning they lead to this conclusion' .43
The Inner House accordingly looked at the term in issue and asked,
would incorporation serve a plausible purpose? While a more
creative approach is to be welcomed its successful operation
necessitates a genuine appreciation of the dynamic nature of the
employment relationship. Obviously a knowledge of the realities
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of industrial relations is of similar importance. It must be
stressed, however, that the Court unlike both the EAT and the IT
did not persist "in a narrow literal interpretation despite a
fundamental change in circumstances which was crucially relevant to
the process whereby the guaranteed week was built into the
individual contracts".44
By way of a footnote it is interesting to note that the same
collective agreement became the subject of discussion in Bond v
Car Ltd45 Mr. Justice Pain commented: "It seems to me to be
plain that the 1974 agreement was intended to suspend the guarantee
only where no work was available for a particular employee. I do
not think it was intended to give an employer a general right of
lay-off wherever he could point to seme dislocation of production
by reason of an industrial dispute in a federated establishment".46
It must be pointed out that the interpretation accepted by Pain, J
does not appear to have been put before the Inner House in
Burroughs. Nevertheless a comparison of the two decisions
illustrates the difficulties involved in the interpretation of
collective agreements.
"No Strike" Clauses and Statutory Intervention
S 18(4) TUURA 1974 prevents the incorporation of "no-strike"
clauses contained in collective agreements into individual
employment contract unless certain conditions are fulfilled.47
The sub-section applies to '... any terms of a collective agreement
... which prohibit or restrict the right of workers to engage in a
strike or other industrial action, or have the effect of
prohibiting or restricting that right ...'. By restrictions on
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the rights of workers to take industrial action the legislature
presumably has in mind provisions such as those which forbid
'hostile action' before procedure is exhausted.
The provision applies to agreements made before and after the
commencement of s 18. Moreover, s 18(5) excludes the possibility
of contracting out of s 18. Incorporation will not take place
unless the agreement (a) is in writing; and
(b) contains a provision expressly stating that those terms shall
or may be incorporated in such a contract; and
(c) is reasonably accessible at his place of work to the worker to
whom it applies and is available for him to consult during
working hours; and
(d) is one where each trade union which is a party to the
agreement is an independent trade union; and unless the
contract with the worker expressly or impliedly incorporates
those terms in the contract.
These conditions are fairly stringent and should exclude any
'accidental' incorporation of 'no-strike' clauses. At the same
time it would seem that the conditions will have the effect of
clearly disclosing the existence of individual 'no-strike' clauses.
On the other hand, incorporation into the individual contract need
only be implied and it might be felt any 'disclosure' -type
philosophy would be better furthered by insisting on an express
term. One can also note the stipulation concerning the
independence of the trade union involved; the need for worker
representatives to be able to bargain at arm's length over this
type of matter is obvious.
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In practice incorporation of such clauses is likely to be rather
rare. Should such a clause be incorporated, however, it is
arguable that any strike which complies with it would not be in
breach of contract.
Curiously s 18(4) appears to have been overlooked by the Outer
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House of the Court of Session in Partington v NALGO* Tins case
centred round a clause in a collective agreement which dealt with
the procedures to be followed before the taking of industrial
action. The clause stated: "... in the event of industrial action
being taken, the trade unions and employers will have prior
discussions about the necessary cover and arrangements to ensure
safety or to deal with emergencies and will reach agreement,
whenever possible, on the identity of those employees who are
required to provide such cover. It is therefore agreed that the
trade unions will grant special dispensation to any members so
• • i 4Q
identified". The Court held that the clause had been incor¬
porated into the employment contract and that, as a result, the
employee was bound to obey the instruction of Scottish Gas to
return to work. S 18(4) apart the clause would still seem inappro¬
priate for incorporation. First, the wording of the clause would
clearly seem to suggest that the intention was to affect solely the
relationship of the collective parties. Secondly, the import of the
clause is to impose duties on the management and union as to con¬
sultation and to impose a duty on the union to grant dispensation
in specified circumstances. It is difficult to see hew such collec¬
tive duties can be extended to the individual level. For example,
the duty and power to grant dispensation is exclusive to the trade
union and it is very hard to envisage an individual counterpart.
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THE LEGAL IMPCRT OF OOLLECnVE AGREEMENTS
Following the repeal of the Industrial Relations Act Parliament
passed a new provision to cover the position of collective
agreements. S 18 of TUIRA 1974 creates a conclusive presumption
that collective agreements1 are not intended by the parties to be
legally enforceable unless a number of specified conditions are
fulfilled. These conditions are that the agreement is in writing,
and contains a provision which (however expressed) states that the
parties intend that the agreement shall be a legally enforceable
contract. Hew explicit must that intention be? It seems clear
that it would not be legitimate to infer an intention from the
nature of the agreement or its wording in general. 'S 18 evinces
... an intention on the part of the legislature that questions as
to the legal enforceability of a collective agreement should no
longer depend on argument about the inferences to be drawn from the
contents of the collective agreement or from the matrix of the
collective agreement.,la The section was intended to avoid
argument 'as to the inferences that could legitimately be drawn
frcm the language used in collective agreements, and to the
industrial relations functions of collective agreements'.2 There
must be a provision which expresses that intention. On the other
hand, the use of the term 'however expressed' shows that any form
of wording indicating a desire for legal enforcement would suffice.
'Unless a collective agreement contains a statement in terms that
show, at least, that he parties have directed their minds to the
question of legal enforceability and have decided in favour of
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legal enforceability, there is ... no sufficient statement of
intention for the purposes of s 18.13 If the conditions are
satisfied the agreement is conclusively presumed to have been
intended by the parties to be a legally enforceable contract.
There may, however, be other reasons which prevent the agreement
from amounting to a contract.
S 18(3) allows the parties to restrict legal enforcement to
specified parts of the agreement. In such a case the remainder of
the agreement is then conclusively presumed not to have been
intended to be legally enforceable. However, in interpreting the
legally enforceable part, the courts can have regard to the rest of
the agreement. Collective Agreement is defined by s 30(1) to mean
'any agreement or arrangement made by or on behalf of one or more
trade union and one or more employee or employers' association and
relating to one or more of the matters mentioned in s 29(1) of
TUIRA. (Though if the agreement relates to one or more of the
matters mentioned it is irrelevant that it also relates to other
matters.)
S 18 only applies to agreements made before 1 December 1971 or
after the commencement of the section (16.9.74). This leaves the
question of the status of agreements entered into between those
dates. S 23(3) TU1RA 1974 provides that where any right,
obligation or liability has been accrued or incurred under any
provision of the 1971 Act before the repeal of that provision by
this Act takes effect, but no proceedings have been commenced in
any court or tribunal to enforce that right, obligation or
liability, no proceedings to enforce it (directly or indirectly by
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whatever means) shall be commenced in any court or tribunal after
that repeal takes effect. It would appear then that of agreements
entered into between 1 December 1971 and 15.9.74 only those which
were legally enforceable at common law would remain so enforceable.
Since it is very rare for a collective agreement to be directly
legally enforceable between the collective parties it is clear that
the main way in which collective agreements achieve legal effect is
through incorporation in the individual employment contract.4
Nevertheless, the courts may give same legal effect to collective
agreements in other contexts.
Motive and the Golden Formula
To gain the protection of the golden formula industrial action must
be taken for a proper purpose. Prior to s 18(1) (c) of the
Employment Act 1982 the dispute had only to be "connected with" one
of the matters listed in s 29(1) TUIPA 1974. S 18(1) (c)
substitutes the formula "relates wholly or mainly to" and this
requires the courts to ascertain the real reason for the dispute.
In the words of the Court of Appeal, "it is necessary to consider
not merely the occasion which caused the dispute to break out but
also the reason why there was a dispute".5 Before the House of
lords decision in NWL v Woods6 the Court of Appeal adopted a
restrictive approach to the "connected with" formula and various
factors were taken as evidence of extraneous motives. It seems
possible that such approaches might be brought back into play.
In Star Sea Transport Corporation of Monrovia v Slater7 '.. .the ITF
had made a demand which was virtually impossible for the owners to
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fulfil1.8 The unreasonableness of this demand was regarded as
going towards the presence of an ulterior motive. In PBDS v
Filkins9 the fact that the strike was unofficial was regarded as
indicating extraneous motive: '. .the defendant is not acting in
furtherance of a trade dispute but in order to demonstrate that the
London Branch and its ... officials are not to be trifled with or
flouted'.10 Ewing has argued that 'The great danger which these
developments open up is the possibility of the courts taking the
view in the normal run of cases that unofficial and
unconstitutional action is beyond the role of the immunity. If as
in Associated Newspaper Group Ltd v Wade it was contrary to
principle to by-pass statutory disputes procedures, is it not open
to the courts to infer the existence of the ulterior motive from a
failure to use procedures agreed by the parties?1,11
The only case since 1982 which sheds any light on this area is
Mercury Conmunications Ltd v Scott-Garner.12 There the court
appeared to regard the job security agreement as sufficient to
safeguard the interests of the employees and any demands beyond
this as unreasonable. However, the case did not furnish any
evidence as to the judicial approach when collectively agreed
procedures are not followed. As a result whether, and to what
extent, a failure to adhere to procedure would be regarded as
evidence of ulterior motive remains problematic.
It should be noted that Ewing went on to argue that •... motive
limitation may not simply control the purposes of the industrial
action. What the Court of Appeal appeared to be embarking upon in
cases such as Wade and Filkins was the creation of a body of
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principle which would also have made the immunity contingent upon
the application of proper procedures".13 And in Filkins Lord
Denning did state "that officers of a trade union may take
themselves outside their statutory immunity if they make demands
which are wholly extortionate or utterly unreasonable or quite
impossible to fulfil".14 Such statements, which suggest that an
unreasonable demand may per se constitute an improper motive, go
beyond most of the dicta. So while an unreasonable demand may be
evidence of an ulterior motive, it would still be necessary to
demonstrate what the extraneous motive is.
Dismissal
In Bailey v BP Oil (Kent Refinery) Ltd, which was an unfair
dismissal case, the Court of Appeal stated that a failure to comply
with a collectively agreed disciplinary procedure •... would be a
factor to be taken into account,- but the weight to be given to it
would depend upon the circumstances'.15 The relevance of a breach
of a collective agreement in unfair dismissal proceedings came to
the fore in Kent County Council v Gilham.16 There the terms and
conditions of employment were fixed by national agreement. The
council terminated the existing employment contracts and offered
new contracts which were not in accordance with the national
agreement. The industrial tribunal held that the employees had
been unfairly dismissed; •... a reasonable local authority would
• . . . . 17 -
not have dismissed ... in the circumstances of this case'. In
restoring the IT's decision the Court of Appeal clearly regarded
the breach of the collective agreement as being of considerable
significance. Lord Justice Dillon stating that "it is of obvious
importance, in the fields of employment law and of industrial
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relations, that national agreements negotiated between employers
and trade unions as to wages and conditions of employment should
not be breached unilaterally by an employer".18 Again Lord
Justice Griffiths felt it was "... legitimate for the tribunal to
ask itself whether in the circumstances a reasonable employer would
defer a decision to breach a national agreement until there had
been time for the matter to be considered at a national level".19
The Kent County Council case indicates that it may be more
difficult to show that a dismissal is reasonable where a breach of
a collective agreement is involved. On the other hand, the
tribunal in Gilham had been referred to two unreported tribunal
decisions, which, on very similar facts, had gone the other way.
Given that the question of reasonableness is a question of fact, an
appellate body would probably have refused to interfere with those
decisions.
R v Hertfordshire CC is also of interest.20 The facts were
broadly similar to Gilham but the remedy sought was different,
judicial review was pursued on the basis that no reasonable
authority could have adopted the course of action which was in fact
adopted. It was submitted that the local authority's action
involved '... a departure from a nationally agreed structure of
collective agreements which have for years governed the wages and
conditions of service of most local authority employees. One of
the principal purposes of this structure has been to do justice
between different groups of these employees. Such a departure in
relation to one group only is manifestly unfair and, as such,
unreasonable'.21 The local authority had, however, taken into
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consideration the value of preserving the national agreement and it
was not possible to say that no reasonable authority could have
adopted the decision that was actually reached.
Trade Union Discipline
Partington v NAH30, has already been discussed in the context of
s 18(4) .22 (See above p 212.) It will be recalled that the case
centred on a clause in a collective agreement which dealt with the
procedures to be followed before the taking of industrial action.
The pursuers had been expelled from NALGO after they had reported
for work, despite having been instructed to strike. It was found
that, as a result of the terms of para 10 of the collective
agreement, employees were contractually bound to obey an
instruction by the employer to return to work. Rule 12(a) of the
union rule book provided that: '... A member who disregards any
regulation issued by the Branch or is guilty of conduct which, in
the opinion of the Executive Committee, renders him unfit for
membership shall be liable to expulsion.' The court held that
this power of expulsion must be read subject to para 10 of the
collective agreement. As a result the union was not entitled to
expel the pursuers.
The collective agreement was presumably not legally enforceable
between the collective parties. Appropriate terms, and those in
the opinion of the court included para 10, were incorporated into
the employment contracts. The court gave the collective bargain
added normative effect by treating it as a constraint on the union
rule-book.
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It appears clear, on the authority of Porter v NOT, that unions can
discipline members who refuse to take part in industrial action
because it would involve a breach of the employment contract.23
New Porter is not referred to in the judgment in Partington and it
may be it was not cited. This allows for the possibility that the
judge in Partington was not aware of the rule emanating from Porter
and may have taken a contrary view of the position.
Alternatively, if Partington is to be reconciled with Porter, it
must be on the basis that unions cannot discipline members who
refuse to take part in industrial action which would involve breach
of a collective agreement. Indeed in Porter Lord Denning stated,
obiter, that, 1... if there was a breach by the union of the
collective agreement a man would have a defence to a charge against
him'.23a
More recently in Lonqley v NOT it was sought to expel the plaintiff
on the basis of Rule 18 which allowed for expulsion where '... a
member has been guilty of conduct which is detrimental to the
interests of the union ...1.24 This followed a refusal to obey a
strike call. It was submitted that the instruction to strike •...
was ultra vires the NEC, on the ground that rule 15(b) provides
that every chapel is responsible, amongst other things, for
'ensuring that union agreements are observed'.... [it was]...
submitted that the instruction breached the disputes procedures
prescribed by clause 12 of the house agreement between TNL and The
Times chapel ... Accordingly ... the instructions required ... the
members of the chapel to act contrary to their responsibilities
under Rule 15(b)'.25 lord Justice Norse accepted that, if this
submission was correct, it would decide the case in favour of the
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plaintiffs. However, he was '... by no means certain that it is
correct'. Moreover, in contrast to the philosophy in Partington,
'... it seems ... that rule 18 (a) may entitle the NEC in certain
circumstances effectively to override the requirements of rule
15 (b) '.27 In any event Parliament has intervened by virtue of s 3
of the 1988 Employment Act.
Interim Interdicts
A relatively recent Scottish case suggests that the courts may,
through the process of granting interim interdicts, be attempting
to offer same indirect enforcement of collective agreements. In
Ihestos Shipping Co v Kurmiowen a trade dispute arose over pay,
• • PR • •
overtime and manning levels. Subsequent to a sit-in the
employers were granted a interim interdict. In deciding that the
balance of convenience lay in favour of the petitioners the court
placed some store on the fact that the employees had an alternative
remedy. It was suggested, judicially, that the employees ought to
raise "... an action for payment ... based either on the contracts
PQ • • .
themselves or on breach of them."" The decision would infer that
failure to exhaust (or commence) legal remedies would count against
one when it came to the granting of interdict. The question that
then arises is whether the courts would view with disfavour a
failure to exhaust non-legal remedies (eg collectively agreed
disputes procedures). The prospect emerges of the courts giving
indirect enforcement to procedure agreements.
In same cases there may be a choice of remedies. The union may
utilise agreed procedures or the employees may sue for breach of
contract. If the union has exhausted the agreed procedure what
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significance, in weighing up the balance of convenience, would the
court place on a failure to use legal remedies? The orthodox view
of labour lawyers has been that collective bargaining carries its
own autonomous sanctions. So where a court is weighing up the
balance of convenience in a case where a union has taken industrial
action, following the exhaustion of agreed procedures, then the
failure to use legal remedies should be ignored. Indeed, an
exhaustion of domestic remedies should be viewed as an element in
the union's favour.
Economic Delict - Defences
A legally unenforceable contract may not be a contract at all but,
nevertheless, the courts still give it seme weight in a number of
contexts. They are perhaps inspired by the maxim 'pacta sunt
servanda'. One area where a breach of a collective agreement might
also be thought relevant is .the matter of the defence of
justification to the economic delict of inducing breach of
contract.
'That there is a defence of sufficient justification is clear from
the authorities ..., but there is not a good deal of authority on
the question as to what is sufficient.' Moreover, it has
recently been stated that the *... plea of justification nowadays
is a flexible one and should not be regarded as confined to narrow
straitjackets'.31 In the days when the statutory immunities
provided an adequate shield against the operation of the common law
the issue was one of little practical importance but in present
circumstances the matter emerges as one of considerable interest.
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If an employer were to break a collective agreement would a trade
union be justified in inducing breach of contract?32 It is very
difficult to find any general principle to explain the law on
justification. In a recent New Zealand case it was said that 'The
only general principle ... is that advancement of one' s own
interests, even with the highest and most altruistic motives, will
not suffice, it must involve action taken as a duty' or 'exercise
of an equal or superior right in themselves'.33 So "...
defendants are justified in protecting their existing contracts,
property interests, and financial interests. Contractual
privilege, for example, arises where the contract breaker had made
two inconsistent contracts, and either the first was made with the
defendant, or the defendant had no knowledge of the plaintiff's
contract when he contracted.'34 Two difficulties arise for trade
unions. First, collective agreements will normally not be a
contract at all. Second, a union may wish to induce breach of an
employment contract though that contract is independent of the
collective agreement.
The first point is illustrated by the following example. A
collective agreement provides that the employer shall only use sub¬
contractors who employ union-only labour. If the employer
breaches this agreement and enters into an inconsistent contract
with a sub-contractor and the trade union persuades either the sub¬
contractor or the employer to break the contract would it be
possible to make out the defence of justification? The two
agreements are inconsistent but the prior one is not a contract.
It may be doubted whether acting to protect such a prior agreement
is to exercise '... an equal or ... superior right'. Non-
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contractual agreements will perhaps not be viewed as being on the
same plane as legally enforceable ones. It is submitted,
however, that there are policy arguments which would allow the lack
of enforceability of a collective agreement to be ignored. (See
belcw p 235, as to the legislative intention that collective
agreements be adhered to.)
The second difficulty is amply illustrated by the case of Smithies
v National Association of Operative Plasterers.35 There the union
believed that the employer's federation was intending to evade a
settlement of a dispute in accordance with a national agreement.
This was held not to constitute a sufficient cause to justify the
trade union in procuring the breach by the employees of their
employment contracts. It was said that '... it might be a
justification ... if the union had done no more than induce
Forrester to breach a contract with Smithies having regard to the
provisions of the national agreement, ought never to have made both
Forrester ... [But the union contention is rather: ] "We are
entitled to induce Forrester to break his contract with you because
you had broken ycur contract, as contained in the national
• • • •
agreement, with us"... This contention cannot be contained'.
Two points may be noted. First, the court in Smithies appear to
have assumed that the collective agreement they were dealing with
was a contract. Normally, the problems discussed above in
connection with non-contractual agreements will apply. Second,
certain terms of collective agreements will be purely collective in
nature and will be not legally enforceable through the medium of
the employment contract.
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The New Zealand case of Pete's Towing Services Ltd. indicates that
a wider view of the justification defence may now be taken in
labour disputes.37 There the trade union was found to be
justified in inducing breach of a commercial contract of the
plaintiff on account of the plaintiff's breach of industrial law
which was threatening good industrial relations. Grunfeld
believes that the result of the case is that '... A distinction
must be drawn between economic disputes and disputes of principle.
As to the former, the pursuit of 'legitimate interests' or, in
Speight J's phrase, "justifiable self-interest" would be ... be
barred as a defence by ... SWMF ... But a dispute of principle, for
example, about recognition, or bona fide compliance with an agreed
disputes procedure, or about tolerating a breakaway union, stands
on a different footing in industrial relations and remains open to
a plea of justification at common law ...'38
In any event one might argue that the position of collective
agreements vis-a-vis employment contracts would allow an expansion
on policy grounds, of the inconsistent contracts rule. It has
been suggested that the only safe guide to the limits of the
doctrine of justification is the dictum of Romer LJ in the Court of
Appeal in Glamorgan Coal Co Ltd v South Wales Miners' Federation
which as states:
'I will only add that, in analysing or considering the
circumstances, I think that regard might be had to the
nature of the contract; the position of the parties to
the contract; the grounds for the breach; the means
employed to procure the breach; the relation of the
person procuring the breach to the person who breaks the
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contract; and I think also to the object of the person
in procuring the breach.'
While Smithies treats a collective agreement as constituting a
separate agreement from an employment contract it is suggested that
the nature of these agreements invites a different approach.
Despite being conceptually distinct the two devices are, in
practice, inextricably linked and act together to provide a labour
code for the workplace. It therefore becomes artificial to
suggest that an employer's breach in one sphere will not permit the
visitation of sanctions in the other. Moreover, there are two
policy arguments which reinforce the foregoing argument.
First, the contract of employment denotes a relationship of
subordination: 'The individual employee or worker ... has
normally no social power, because it is only in the most
exceptional cases that, as an individual, he has any bargaining
power at all.'40 Since an employee's power flows from trade
unionism it is crucial that trade unions be able to preserve the
sanctity of the terms of collective agreements.41 On the other
hand, arguments based on inequality of bargaining pcwer have been
rejected as a basis of justification in Camden Norminess Ltd. v
Forrey: 'It is a dangerous proposition that inequality in wealth
justifies a course otherwise actionable'.42 However, there are
'... signs that ... the courts might be more willing to pay
attention to various forms of economic pressure in modern
times'.43
Secondly, and closely related to the foregoing is the question of
self-help. Camden indicates that the law does not look kindly on
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• self-help'.44 However, while collective agreements will
generally not be legally enforceable the legislature must also have
desired a widespread and strong pressure of compliance with
collective agreements and since such a degree of adhesion was
unlikely in the absence of sanctions it must have been intended
that the parties resort to peaceful 'self-help'. Indeed a more
'realistic' view of potential remedies may now be legitimate.45
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CHAPTER 8
THE VARIATION OF COLLECTIVELy AGREED TBM5
The terms and conditions of work of many employees are derived at
least in part, from collective agreements. The collective terms
may be incorporated expressly into the individual employment
contract. Incorporation can also, of course, be implied: 'The
terms of a collective agreement are likely to be 'crystallised
custom' and as such automatically implied in the relevant contracts
of employment ... •.1 One important issue which arises is the
extent to which changes in the terms of collective agreements will
bind individual employees. In Robertson v British Gas Corporation
Lord Justice Kerr stated that '... when the terms of the collective
agreement were varied by consent between the two sides, then the
new terms clearly became incorporated into the individual contracts
of employment'.2 A number of dicta support this notion that
contracts of employment are automatically varied as a result of
agreed changes in collective agreements.3 Automatic variation
though must be dependant on the existence of an express or implied
term providing for it. When it does occur the question arises as
to whether there are any limitations on the employee's obligation
to accept a variation in its terms and conditions.
Some assistance can be found in the various statutory provisions
concerning unlawful discrimination. Individual equal pay or sex
discrimination claims may be possible.4 Furthermore, where a
trade union negotiates a collective agreement a dissatisfied member
may have a remedy against the trade union by virtue of either the
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Sex Discrimination Act or the Race Relations Act. S 12(3) of the
former Act stipulates that 'it is unlawful for ... [a trade union]
... in the case of a woman who is a member of the organisation, to
discriminate against her - (a) in the way it affords her access to
any benefits, facilities or services, or by refusing or
deliberately emitting to afford her access to them, ..., or (c) by
subjecting her to any other detriment1. A similar provision is
contained in s 11 of the Race Relations Act.
What of other forms of discrimination? While at present statutory
protection only exists in respect of discrimination on the grounds
of race and sex it is possible to envisage discrimination taking
place on other grounds. A union negotiating with a company in
respect of different grades of workers may win concessions in
favour of one grade only at the expense of disadvantaging another.
What, for example, if the consideration for benefiting one grade
was to impose an obligation to perform an unlimited amount of
compulsory overtime on another?
A different hypothetical example is furnished by Clarke and Powell
v Eley (IMI Kynoch Ltd).5 "Ihere 311 a^reed redundancy selection
procedure which provided that part-time workers would be dismissed
first was held to amount to unlawful discrimination within the
terms of the Sex Discrimination Act. One might, however,
discriminate against part-time workers for reasons other than race
or sex and this might, in certain circumstances, be regarded as
unfair.
If a collective agreement leads to a change in the terms and
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conditions of an individual employee there may be a remedy,
therefore, by virtue of UK discrimination law. In other situations
what is the position of an individual employee who believes that a
collectively agreed variation unreasonably discriminates against
him?
Unfair Dismissal and Collective Re-negotiation
Where a collective agreement is varied by the collective parties
the individual contract may be automatically varied. Whether this
result will occur depends simply on the actual terms of the
individual contract. Whatever the contractual position the law of
unfair dismissed, loams large. An employee who refused to accept
re-negotiated terms may be dismissed or may in fact resign and
claim to have been constructively dismissed. Such a dismissal may
well amount to "... some other substantial reason ..." and hence be
a potentially fair reason for the dismissal. Thus in Tavery v
F & F Robinson it was held that "an employer can rely 'on same
other substantial reason' to justify the dismissal of an employee
who is not prepared to abide by the terms and conditions generally
prevailing for that category of employee ... it would be impossible
if special terms had to be negotiated for each individual employee
at the place of work".6
Even where the employer makes out a potentially fair reason
the decision to dismiss must be reasonable in the circumstances.
Where a change in terms and conditions has been arrived at as a
result of negotiation between a trade union and the employer it
will be easier to shew that any subsequent dismissal of a
dissenting employee was reasonable. Thus in Sycamore v Myer & Co
Ltd7 the tribunal found that there had been "... protracted and
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high level negotiations between the respondents and the appropriate
trade union". They went on to "... take into account when
considering what is reasonable and what is not that the terms were
freely negotiated by the union on his behalf as a member and that
all the other workers accepted them".8
So even where a variation of a collective agreement does not
automatically affect an individual's employment contract the change
might be protected by the law of unfair dismissal. The rationale
behind this position is contained in the following statement:
"Where employers negotiate a detailed agreement with a recognised
union, they are entitled to assume that all employees who are
members of the union know of, and are bound by, its provisions.
There could be no stability in industrial relations if this were
Q , ....
not so". The desire to promote automatic variation is therefore
strong.
If an employee refuses to accept a change in his contractual terms
might the substance of the change led to a subsequent dismissal
being unreasonable. In Evans v Elemeta Holdings Ltd the
management of the Company issued new contracts to all employees
which would have significantly altered the obligations of the
complainant.10 "In our view it is simply not a possible view to
have reached, after analysis, to say that Mr. Evans was
unreasonable in refusing to accept a contract which imposed upon
him an unlimited obligation to work over-time, he being a man whose
work under his existing contract did not have to ... do any over¬
time" .11 It deserves to be mentioned that Evans was not a case
involving any change in a collective agreement but was simply a
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case of an enployer trying unilaterally to vary the employment
terms of his workforce.
This case has been criticised on the basis that it is inappropriate
to concentrate on the reasonableness of the employee1 s attitude.
One should pose the question whether the employers were acting
reasonably in dismissing the employee for his refusal to enter into
the new contract. Nevertheless it is still the case that the
impact on the employee remains in issue. The EAT in Chubb Fire
Security Ltd v Harper recognised this in holding that "... the
industrial tribunal should have considered whether (the employer)
was acting reasonably in deciding that the advantages to them of
implementing the proposed re-organisation outweighed any
disadvantage which they should have contemplated ... (the employee)
.. .might suffer".12 This conveniently leads us to a consideration
of the duty of co-operation in employment contracts.
The Duty of Co-operation
Given that the law of unfair dismissal will normally favour the
employer when he tries to impose changes in employment contracts
following the variation of a collective agreement is the position
any different where an employee alleges that the collectively
agreed changes unreasonably discriminate against him. What of the
employer's duty not to "... act in a way that, judged reasonably
• • 1 1 t
and sensibly, destroys mutual trust and confidence".-' So in
PC Gardner Ltd v Beresford it was stated that it was reasonable in
most circumstances to infer a term to the effect that "... an
employer will not treat his employee arbitrarily, capriciously or
inequitably in matters of remuneration".14
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The logical end-point of this developing aspect of an employer's
duties would be to hold that an employer was under an implied duty
to treat his employees reasonably. While the case-law has yet to
go this far, and some recent decisions expressly deny the existence
of such a term, "what the courts have been doing is to widen
considerably the implied contractual terms under the contract of
employment so as to find that many forms of unreasonable conduct ..
constitute a breach of contract".15 What of the position though
when an employer seeks to change terms and conditions of employment
following the variation of a collective agreement? To what extent
will the existence of the duty of co-operation aid an employee in
trying to shew that any subsequent dismissal is unreasonable?
Situation 1
There is no contractual term allowing for automatic variation.
The employer attempts to impose the change in terms precipitating
the resignation of the employee who claims to have been
constructively dismissed. If the change in terms amounts to a
material breach of contract that should suffice to show dismissal
but will the dismissal have been reasonable? The employer will
allege that the desirability of uniform adhesion to the
collectively agreed terms amounts to scone other substantial reason.
If the union has behaved "... arbitrarily, capriciously, or
inequitably ..." in respect of the negotiation of the variation
with regard to an individual or a group of individuals what effect
will this have?
On the one hand, by implementing the terms of a collective
agreement an employer will often be unaware of any arbitrary,
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capricious or inequitable treatment by a trade union. It would
place an added and, indeed perhaps on occasion, impossible burden
on negotiations if an employer had to attempt to ensure that the
union had fairly represented its members before signing an
agreement. After all, it is inherent in the nature of trade
unionism and collective bargaining that a union will have to
concede claims made on behalf of one section of its memberships in
order to benefit another section(s) or indeed the union as a whole.
Even if an employer is aware of, say, the inequitable treatment of
a particular individual it may be impracticable to restore his
position through the negotiations. Further, adhesion to jointly
negotiated terms might be thought to be an important ingredient of
stable industrial relations.
On the other, one might argue that where contractual terms are the
product of joint negotiation there is no reason why an employee
should be in a worse position than when an employer sets
contractual terms unilaterally. Given that the combined effect of
contract law and the law of unfair dismissal is that variation of a
collective agreement will generally result in the automatic
variation of the individual employment contracts and that given
that there has been no real development of a duty on trade unions
of fair representation, there is a need to protect individual
employees.16 Employers benefit in a number of ways from
collective bargaining and it would not seem unreasonable that, in
return, individuals be safeguarded against discrimination.
Where employment contracts are broken as a result of changes in
collective agreements it will normally be difficult to show that
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any dismissal was unfair. In this situation, in addition to the
breach of contract, there is the element of discrimination.
Accordingly, in the situation outlined above, the breach of the
duty of co-operation might result in any dismissal being held to be
unreasonable.
Situation 2
As in situation 1 except that the employee does not resign but is
dismissed. The employer alleges that the desirability of uniform
adhesion to the collectively agreed terms amounts to "seme other
substantial reason". The employee alleges that even if that is
true the dismissal is unfair due to the element of inequitable
treatment. The sole difference between the two situations is that
one involves constructive dismissal and the other involves
dismissal by the employer. It is submitted that the result in
either situation should be the same.
Situation 3
An employer may submit that there is a custom that terms and
conditions of employment are determined by collective bargaining.
It is important to remember that "A custom or usage can only be
incorporated into a contract if there is nothing in the express or
necessarily implied terms to prevent such inclusion ...1,17 Prima
facie there is no inconsistency between the implied duty of mutual
trust and confidence and a custom whereby employment contracts are
automatically varied as a result of changes in collective
agreements. (On the other hand, might it be unreasonable to
incorporate such a custom which creates an"... apparently open-
ended camrmitment of the employee to accept new negotiated
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terms"?)18 What, though, if a particular variation negotiated by
the union capriciously, etc, discriminates against an individual?
Would there be any breach of the duty of co-operation? The
difficulty flows from the continuing nature of the employment
relationship and the consequence that the terms of the bargain are
not static; any inconsistency may emerge at a subsequent date.
One possibility, to deal with the special nature of the employment
relationship, is to extend the rule that "... a custom may not be
proved if it would be inconsistent with ... an implied term". One
could say that particular applications of a custom could not stand
in the face of the implied duty of co-operation.
In cases of constructive dismissal it would be essential to show
that the operation of such a custom was subject to the implied duty
of co-operation. In the absence of such an implied duty an
employee would not be able to point to a repudiation of the
employment contract and hence any resignation would not amount to a
dismissal.
On the other hand, were the employer to dismiss the employee the
situation would be basically the same as situation 2.
Situation 4
What if the contract expressly stipulates that the terms of the
contract are to be as laid down in a collective agreement as varied
from time to time? Would it be open to the courts, in the absence
of express words to the contrary, to hold that any express term as
to variation was subject to the implication that it would not
encompass variations which unjustifiably discriminated against
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employees? The difficulty is that "where the employer retains a
prerogative power on traditional contract principles he cannot be
in breach of the contract to exercise that power as he wishes,
however arbitrarily or unreasonably that exercise may be ...".19
On the other hand, "Potentially the implications of ... (Gardner
90 • ...
Ltd v Beresford ) ... are of considerable significance, for the
decision suggests that even the exercise of clear and explicit
prerogative powers can constitute a repudiation of the contract if
they are employed in a discriminatory or victimising manner. It
is but a short step to argue that the employer is under a duty not
to exercise his prerogative powers in a long employment
relationship ...".21 Should the employer be under such a duty the
possibility of a constructive dismissal situation will arise if he
breaks it. Bristol Garage is an analogous case concerning through
an implied term in fact rather than in law.22 There "although
there was a term in the respondent's contract of employment as a
forecourt attendant imposing a liability on her for a proportion of
any cash shortages arising whilst she was on duty, it was necessary
to imply a term limiting the expressed absolute liability so as to
exclude losses caused by dishonesty.1,23 In any event any
dismissed, by the employer in the face of an employee's refused, to
abide by new contractual terms might be held to be unreasonable.
Redundancy Dismissals
S 59 enacts that it will be automatically unfair to select an
employee for dismissal in contravention of an agreed procedure
relating to redundancy, in the absence of special reasons
justifying a departure frcm the procedure. One consequence has
been that where employees are selected for redundancy and the
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agreed procedure is followed it will be difficult to show that the
dismissal was unfair.24 This is despite the fact that it is open
to an applicant to seek to argue that the procedure is inherently-
unfair and hence that the dismissal is unreasonable by virtue of
s 57.25 Should an employer select an employee for redundancy in
breach of procedure, prima facie, the dismissal would be
automatically unfair. If the procedure unreasonably discriminated
against an employee would that amount to a special reason
justifying a departure from the procedure?
A Duty of Fair Representation
Such a duty is borne by trade unions in the U.S.A. and involves
'... the active and yet even-handed upholding of a worker's
interests by a trade union vis-a-vis an employer in the course of
collective bargaining or consultation or in the profession of an
individual grievance or dispute involving the worker.26 We have
already noted that s.12 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 and s.ll
of the Race Relations Act 1976 obliges unions to avoid sex or race
discrimination in the provision of facilities or services.
Hitherto, the UK judiciary have not shewn any inclination to imply
such a duty into the contract of membership. Elias et al, have
expressed the view that "it is possible that the duty to act fairly
as expounded in Breen (v Amalgamated Engineering Union) would be
applied to circumscribe union officials' actions which were
capricious, vindictive or deliberately discriminating towards an
• 97
individual member".
Were such a duty of fair representation to exist its operation
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would pose a number of difficult questions. In the context of the
negotiation and administration of collective bargains the duty
essentially involves controlling the discretion of trade unions.
One might question whether the courts would be the body best
equipped to perform the necessary balancing of individual and
collective interests and, indeed, balancing competing collective
interests. It would seem valuable, however, to examine more
closely the US experience in this field. The DFR was created by
the Supreme Court in the case of Steele.28 There the Railway
Labor Act granted the relevant trade union (the Brotherhood)
exclusive bargaining rights; an application was then brought by a
negro employee who along with all other negroes was ineligible to
join the union but who was required to accept that the union
bargain on his behalf. A new collective agreement was entered
into which benefited white employees at the expense of the black
employees. In holding for the petitioner the US Supreme Court
placed considerable store on the fact that black employees were not
members of the brotherhood or eligible for membership. The Court
felt the corollary of this was that the union's authority to act
derived not from the employees' action or consent but wholly from
the RLA. The union was thereby under a duty '... to represent
non-union or miinority union members ... without hostile
• • • • • « • . . OQ
discrimination, fairly, impartially and in good faith'. On the
other hand, discrimination per se was not regarded as being
illegitimate; certain distinctions would justify differential
treatment.30
A fascinating feature of the DER is the tension between the
protection of individual/minority interests and the danger of
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excessive interference in trade union internal affairs. One may-
begin by considering the procedural restraints that the courts have
sought to place on a union's bargaining practices. It was
suggested in Steele itself that, on occasion, the DFR would require
the union '... to consider requests of non-union members of the
craft and expressions of their views with respect to collective
bargaining with the employer and to give them notice of and
opportunity for hearing upon its proposed action'.31 In Warehouse
Union, Local 860 v NIRB the union failed to advise its membership
of prior threats of job loses if wage increases demanded during
negotiations were granted. The failure to warn was said to amount
to '... an arbitrary action and constituted a breach of duty'.32
In Branch 6000, National Association of letter Carriers v NLRB non¬
union members were denied a vote in a ballot to determine terms and
conditions of employment.33 It was held that '... the vote based
on the individual preferences of the union members, without any
consideration of the interests of the non-union employees ...'
constituted a breach of the DFR.34
If a DFR were to be introduced in the UK there must, at least, be a
possibility that same procedural requirements would be placed on
trade unions in bargaining. At a general level one might suggest
that this would be likely to prove costly, time consuming and,
probably in addition, lead to a loss of flexibility. At present
trade unions refer back collective agreements to their membership
before signing in a large number of cases. This is done to a much
greater extent than would be suggested by a perusal of union rule-
books.35 Perhaps what is most striking is the wide variety of
practices both within and between unions. An injection of
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legalism might lead to an unhealthy rigidity. It will be recalled
that the hallmark of the IRA's intervention into trade union
internal affairs was a lack of understanding of the differing
requirements of different trade unions.36
One might also speculate as to what any procedural restrictions
might entail. This to a large extent might depend on whether a UK
DFR flowed from a general duty of fairness or from a specific and
detailed legal code. If the former position were to be adopted
trade unions would be at the mercy of the adjudicating body though
greater flexibility would exist to meet differing circumstances.
Utilising the latter option might result in a number of positions
ranging, for example, from a duty to inform members to a duty to
ballot.
A number of US commentators place same importance on a procedural
standard being part of the DFR. This appears to flow from the
view that the imposition of procedural restraints results in an
acceptable compromise between preserving trade union autonomy and
protection of minority interests. It would, for example, be said
that simply by being forced to take account of conflicting
interests a trade union is more likely to reach a fair decision.
However, there may be an inherent flaw in reliance on a procedure-
orientated DFR since it can be argued that procedural restraints do
not necessarily lead to a fair resolution of any conflict of
interest. If a DFR is to have any real effect it may on occasion
have to interfere with the substance of a trade union decision.
The danger then being that trade union autonomy will be restricted
to too great an extent.
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In the US the DER has most commonly been seen as involving the
striking down of union actions based on impermissible motives.
Steele requiring unions to act 1... with hostile discrimination,
fairly, impartially and in good faith'. A number of issues arise
from this motive based approach. First, identifying categories of
improper motives is by no means an easy task. There would
probably be a general consensus that discriminating against an
individual/group on the grounds of sex or race is improper. Again
acting out of personal malice would be improper. Beyond this it
becomes more difficult to denote any other general categories.
One U.S. court has offered the view that "The phrase "duty of fair
representation" is a legal term of art incapable of precise
definition ... There is no code that explicitly prescribes the
standards that govern unions in representing their members in
processing grievances. Whether a union breach is duty of fair
representation depends upon the facts of each case ... But
pronouncements made from time to time by the supreme court,
articulating the somewhat hazy contours of the union's obligations,
do furnish a measure of guidance. •.
If the difficulty in identifying general categories of improper
purpose is viewed as a barrier restricting the operation of the DPI*
one must also consider the very nature of collective bargaining.
The demise of individual bargaining means that most employees will
be in a stronger bargaining position and this should be reflected
in their employment terms.38 On the other hand, while same
employees may be disadvantaged this is regarded as an inevitable
and acceptable consequence. The view is sometimes then taken,
though this need not follow, that collective decisions should
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generally be based on the vote of a simple majority. Proponents
of this view will envisage a limited role for the DFR. Conflicts
of interest become much more of an internal trade union affair.
It has been said that •... the rule of the majority is the only
solution, for all a union can hope to do is serve the best
interests of the greater number of its members ...'.
As the case of Steele itself recognises certain differences between
members will permit a trade union to discriminate between then when
bargaining with an employer. The examples of relevant grounds for
a differential treatment given in Steele were '... differences in
seniority, the type of work performed, the competence and skill
with which it is performed ...'40 Differential treatment which is
based on factors which are regarded as irrelevant to a union's role
in collective bargaining may be held to constitute a breach of the
DFR. The criteria which indicate whether any variation is based
on relevant grounds tend not to be explicit. Apparently a
relatively low number of DFR cases have been decided on the basis
of relevancy and such cases probably tend to turn on their own
facts. According to Finkin whether a distinction is permissible
•... turns upon a consideration of industrial practice, the
expectations of the employee community, and the moral standards of
the larger community' .41 The use of 'relevancy' might be viewed
as an attempt to expand the categories of impermissible motives.
By seeking to define proper industrial motives the courts seek to
exclude actions otherwise motivated. A recent illustration is
provided by Conrad v Delta Air Lines where the collective agreement
provided that the right, stated in the agreement, not to be
dismissed without investigation and hearing, is not enjoyed by
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probationary pilots.42 Such differentiation was held to be
acceptable: "The rationality of an employer's having greater
freedom to discharge during a probationary or testing period seems
obvious. It is not the type of hostile discrimination against a
group of employees which would lie beyond the proper scope of a
collective bargaining agreement.'.43 Moreover, the US case law
acknowledges that the very nature of bargaining demands that trade
unions be given a substantial measure of discretion. So, for
example, 'Compromises on a temporary basis, with a view to long
range advantages are natural incidents of negotiations.,44
One striking feature of the development of the US case law is the
trend towards greater intervention. Steele required unions to act
1... without hostile discrimination, fairly, impartially and in
good faith'. Two subsequent cases were to treat this as involving
a somewhat narrow standard. Thus Huffman held that 'a wide range
of reasonableness must be allowed a statutory bargaining
representative in serving the writ it represents, subject always to
complete good faith and honesty of purpose in the exercise of its
discretion'.45 This approach was followed in Humphrey where the
petitioner failed since there was '... no substantial evidence of
, , , % %
fraud, deceitful action or dishonest conduct'. The decision of
the Supreme Court in 1967 in Vaca v Sipes saw a move to greater
intervention.47 Vaca regarded the DFR as tripartite: '... a
statutory obligation to serve the interests of all members without
hostility or discrimination toward any, to exercise its discretion
with complete good faith and honesty and to avoid arbitrary
conduct' ,48 The key point is the attack on arbitrary conduct;
Vaca '... imposes an affirmative obligation to give seme reason for
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the Union's actions'. Once reasons must be given judicial
scrutiny becomes easier and union autonomy in decision-making is
more likely to be restricted.
The desire for greater intervention has led to calls that unions
adhere to a process of rational decision-making. Clark has stated
that '... instead of reviewing the union's choice of alternatives
for reasonableness or fairness, the courts should review the
union's decision-making process. If the union gave fair
consideration to the complaining employees' interests and based its
decision on rational factors, the court should not interfere.
Otherwise, the union has failed to represent all the employees, and
the injured workers should have same relief'.50 To a certain
extent requiring rational decision-making merely re-imposes
traditional requirements in a new form. Thus seme courts might
simply look to a union's motives or to the procedures followed in
any assessment of rationality.51 However, the potential exists
for a review of the substance of the union's reasoning. In Branch
6000 it was held that the DFR required that the interests of all
employees be ascertained and taken into account. The views of the
minority could be rejected, however, so long as there was a
rational argument for doing so. Ihe approach in Branch 6000 might
suggest that the US courts will require a union decision to lie
within a band of reasonableness.52 One is then not far away from
a position whereby the courts would decide what decision they would
have made in the circumstances rather than what a responsible union
would have decided. Certainly one might, at least, argue that
'... there must be a substantive component to the seemingly
procedural requirement that the union 'adhere to rational decision
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making processes1.53
One factor which does not seem to have received much attention in
the US literature is the question of employer bargaining power and
the extent to which this restricts a trade union's ability to
strike the bargain it desires. Harper and Lupu suggest that '...
whenever a union defends a DFR claim by asserting that it agreed
co sacrifice same employees' interests simply because of employer
bargaining power, rather than on a basis of principle the union
would have embraced in the absence of employer pressure, tribunals
should carefully review the credibility of the union's
assertion*.54 Hcwever, in many cases it would be extremely
difficult to allot responsibility between an employer and a union
for the creation of discriminatory terms.
It is clear that US experience suggests no easy solutions when it
comes to testing whether a trade union's bargaining practices
fairly resolve competing interests. The DFR functions best when
it strikes dcwn trade union actions which flew from certain
specified improper motives (eg racial discrimination). Beyond
this seme courts look to certain procedural requirements as a way
of promoting fair representation. Such requirements in no way
guarantee a result which is fair in substance but nevertheless a
union may be put to a great deal of expense and inconvenience.
Moreover, the DFR, as developed by the US courts, fail to offer
clear guidelines to unions. Finally, the development of the
doctrine seems to have been marked by an increasingly
interventionist approach. An alternative to placing a duty of fair
representation on trade unions would be to place same duty on the
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employer. While it might seem that the trade union is the obvious
body to proceed against the position is more complicated. it is
interesting to consider Donovan's recommendations in the
situation"... where an employer dismisses an existing employee who
refuses to joint a trade union following the introduction of the
closed shop". The Commission expressed the view that "... the
employee should be able to succeed against the employer so long as
he can show that he has reasonable grounds for refusing to join the
union. It is the responsibility of the employer in conducting a
closed shop agreement to bear in mind the interests of existing
employees who are not in the union and ensure that they are
adequately safeguarded ... It might be argued that this is unjust,
since it is the union, not the employer, which stands to gain from
an insistence on an employee's being in the union, but the decision
to dismiss is the employer's taken ultimately because he considers
it to the advantage of his business.'55 Similarly, one might
argue that an employer who wishes to regulate employment terms by
means of collective bargaining should be prepared to compensate
employees who suffer damage because of discrimination.
Such a duty would be aimed at protecting an employee against a
change in his contractual terms, resulting from a collective
bargain, which unreasonably discriminated against him. Where the
breach of duty was a minor one a claim for damages might be




Collective bargaining is a major source of employment terms for
many workers. Contract law and the law of unfair dismissal will
often combine to effectively bind the employee to any collectively
agreed variations. Some protection is already offered by the
Equal Pay Act etc. Discrimination may take place on other
grounds, however, and it deserves to be considered to what extent
the implied duty of co-operation might assist the employee. More
fundamentally it is worth discussing whether same equivalent of the
US duty of fair legislation should exist and whether such a duty
might be borne by the union or the employer.
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In this chapter it is proposed to discuss a number of issues
connected with the solving of disputes concerning collective
agreements. It is suggested that a convenient starting point
would be to consider the difficulties which the adjudication of
collective agreements is said to present. First, a number of
problems are produced by virtue of the fact that the collective
parties are, on occasion, so anxious to came to an agreement that
the wording of particular clauses intentionally does not resolve
actual disputes. Ihus where agreement on a particular matter is
proving elusive the parties may draft a clause which is
sufficiently ambiguous as to postpone the resolution of the issue
to a subsequent date. Again one party may suspect that the
wording of a clause is inadequate but declines to seek
clarification due to fear that the issue would be resolved in
favour of the other side. Should a change in the balance of power
of the bargaining parties subsequently take place the issue may be
brought up. Second, as is often pointed out, a collective bargain
regulates a continuing relationship. One consequence is that it
is impossible to anticipate every circumstance that may arise. As
a result certain matters may not be provided for at all, in other
cases, it may be questionable whether a particular clause was meant
to govern a situation which has arisen. Third, the form of the
agreement must be considered. Unwritten understandings may exist
in addition to any written agreement. It will also be asserted
that written agreements can only be understood when any custom and
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practice is taken into account. Again 'Though the subject matter
is complex and the provisions intricate, the language must
nevertheless be directed to laymen whose occupation is not
interpretation ...'1 Fourth, the magnitude of the role performed
by collective bargains has to be remembered. They govern the
working relations of many people and cover a wide range of often
complex matters. Fifth, the nature of the particular industry
concerned must also be taken into account. Thus in same
industries the rate of technological change is very rapid. This
can result in the need for frequent revision of agreements. It
can also result in particular difficulties from applying existing
provisions to changed circumstances. A further difficulty is
discussed by Cox: 'In the case of a statute the best guide to ...
meaning is its policy or purpose. Behind the words there usually
lies a general aim, an objective, which embodies specific meanings,
half-understood, half-inarticulated; and by these one may judge
specific cases ... Many questions of interpretation can be handled
in this fashion under collective bargaining agreements. The most
ambiguous phrase may be directed to a practical problem, and it is
an obvious mistake to read the words without attention to the
problem ... Unfortunately, many of the most important questions of
interpretation are not soluble by reference to the fundamental
purposes of the collective agreement - at least not in the sense in
which that term is usually understood. The difficulty arises from
the fact that management and labour often have conflicting aims and
obj ectives, and the interpretation put upon the contract may depend
upon which abjective is chosen as the major premise'.2
Disagreement as to purpose must also be a common feature of
contracts of many types.
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Appropriate Forum
An issue which raises a large measure of difficulty is the question
of who should arbitrate or adjudicate on conflicts of right arising
out of collective agreements. The traditional courts are often
portrayed as a body not best suited to handling labour disputes.
This view arises because of the perceived characteristics of the
traditional courts and rival bodies. It is proposed to continue
discussion by reviewing those characteristics and then to consider
the approach adopted in a number of cases.
Industrial Relations Expertise
When the courts become involved in Labour Law adjudication their
decisions are often criticised for failure to take sufficient
account of the exigencies of industrial relations. It must,
however, be remembered that the industrial relations knowledge of
other bodies will vary. Thus the wing members of an industrial
tribunal will both have knowledge of the practice in their
respective trades/industries. However, neither may have any
particular knowledge of the trade which is relevant to the case
before them.3 Again in the United States where there is an on¬
going debate as to the respective merits of permanent and temporary
arbitrators, one advantage of the former is that he •... becomes
familiar with the provisions of the parties' agreement. He comes
to know the day-to-day relationships of the parties, their
circumstances, their personalities, and their customary
practices'.4 Moreover, it has been agreed that 'The most
successful arbitration is that which set a smooth course for future
operations. Thorough knowledge of the past relationship of the
parties is an invaluable aid to one who would pursue this end.'5
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One may note that Marsh has gone as far as saying that 'if an issue
involves the application or interpretation of an existing
agreement, only the parties at the level at which the agreement was
made can logically say how it should be applied or interpreted. •
It should be said though that, even in the absence of any knowledge
of a particular trade or industry, certain bodies will have much
greater general experience of industrial relations problems.
Approaches to Interpretation
Whether one is interpreting a statute or a contract there will
always be differing views as to the most apposite approach to
interpretation. Put crudely, there will be a tension between
'creative' and 'literal' approaches. Cox has written "The
tendency to be literal is often enhanced by lack of familiarity
with the subject-matter. Judges - and sometimes lawyer-arbitrators
- are tempted to take refuge in the literal meaning of language
when they fail to understand the industrial problem ... *7
Nevertheless, there are constraints on those adopting a creative
approach and one might also query as to how often a difference in
approach leads to a different result. One instance where a
creative approach is said to be beneficial is where a situation
arises which was not foreseen during negotiations and for which the
collective agreement makes no provision or inadequate provision.
On seme occasions a 'creative' adjudicator would feel able to
extend the agreement to resolve the difficulty; on other occasions
he would not. The perceived proper limits of creativity are
extremely nebulous. Shulman has expressed the view that in
matters of labour arbitration "The effect on efficiency,
267
productivity and cost are important factors to be considered. So
are also the effect on the attitudes and interests of the
employees... Practicality of the interpretation in its day-to-day
applications is a related value1.8 It must be said that
irrespective of who is adjudicating there will inevitably be great
reluctance to adopt the role of an arbitrator in an 'interest'
dispute.
Issue of Opinions
Arbitrators may prefer not to give reasons for their decisions.
This was the practice of the Industrial court and was defended in
the following manner: '1. The award is intended to put an end to
the dispute and not to prolong and exacerbate the difference.
This, it is feared, would be the result if the parties were given
the reasons for the award to argue over. 2. The effect of giving
reasons would be to build up a body of case law which might lead to
a more rigid treatment of disputes. 3. Sometimes the members of
the Court came to the same conclusion for different reasons, and
the authority of the award would be lessened if this were
revealed.'9
In response to the third point, one might suggest that the view
expressed is unduly negative. In any event, since the above
statement was issued we have witnessed the advent of unfair
dismissal. It is seldom suggested that the possibility of
majority decisions in that area of law has weakened the authority
of industrial tribunals. The second point is, in substance, an
attack on any extension of the judicial doctrine of stare decisis.
However, prior awards can be used in a much more flexible way (see
below). Finally, it is argued that issuing opinions can '...
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prolong and exacerbate the difference'. However, equally it might
be suggested that issuing an award unaccompanied by reasons might
be a cause of further strife. It is interesting to note that the
CAC now issues '... an indication of the considerations which led
to the award'.10 This perhaps indicates that the style of
'judgment' is what is important. Any award which seeks to
attribute blame is undesirable.
The question of whether an opinion should be issued is obviously
closely related to the much more important issue of the status of
previous decisions. One's view as to the latter issue will carry
in its sway the former.
Precedent
The British courts are generally regarded as following a rather
rigid doctrine of precedent. This approach might be thought to be
unsuited in the industrial relations context. Both management and
labour might seek a flexible approach whereby previous
interpretations of collective agreements could be disregarded where
their utility had been lost. An initial point to make would be
that the treatment of precedent by certain traditional courts
outwith the UK is markedly different. Secondly, reference to past
decisions can be valuable without there being any question of the
adoption of a rigid version of stare decisis. Indeed, where
industrial relations are involved previous awards are likely to
serve as mere guidance. There can be considerable variation in
the approach adapted by different bodies/individuals. For
example, one American arbitrator has stated that he would not
follcw a previous award in any one of the following circumstances:
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(1) The previous decision clearly was an instance of bad judgment;
(2) the decision was made without the benefit of same important
relevant facts or considerations; or (3) new conditions have
arisen questioning the reasonableness of the continued application
of the decision."11
Reference to previous decisions can have a number of benefits.
When the parties seek to interpret a particular provision they can
be guided by any earlier interpretations. Moreover, a measure of
consistency is probably expected by all parties involved. Even
where there is no previous decision directly in point earlier
decisions may suggest useful approaches to problems.
Rules of Evidence
It is obvious that bodies other than the traditional courts will
not apply the strict judicial rules of evidence. Nevertheless,
every adjudicator will obviously impose same rules of evidence.
Arbitrators in the United State have regard to a very detailed body
of rules in respect of this matter. Thus the hearsay and parole
evidence rules may be retained, albeit in a simplified form.
Implication of Terms
In the construction of any document the use of the doctrine of
implied terms can be very important. This might be thought to be
particularly so when the source of the contractual term sought to
be implied is custom and practice. Custom and practice is
generally regarded as being of great significance in the industrial
relations context. Nevertheless, its existence poses difficulties
for adjudicators. Often there is widely conflicting evidence as
270
to what was in fact done in the past. "Ascertaining the facts with
respect to an alleged practice is a difficult task ... But even
after the facts are ascertained, what is their significance? When
do they add up to a practice? And what practice?"13 Once again
the task involved is often thought to be best done by a body other
than the traditional courts. The arguments involved are very
similar to those involved when approaches to interpretation and
knowledge of industrial relations are discussed.
In the US many arbitrators adopt the view that "In the absence of a
written agreement, 'past practice', to be binding on both parties
must be (1) unequivocal? (2) clearly enunciated and acted upon;
(3) readily ascertainable over a reasonable period of time as a
fixed, and established practice accepted by both parties".14
This is a fairly rigorous test and again illustrates that the
approach of bodies outwith the traditional courts is often not too
dissimilar. The fact that collective agreements are a major
source of the terms of individual employment contracts means that,
in practice, the courts and tribunals frequently deal with such
agreements. It is important, therefore, to consider the
experience of the courts and tribunals in this area: for two
reasons:- firstly, to examine the appropriateness of these bodies
as adjudicators and, secondly, to see what difficulties collective
agreements have caused. In 1978 nearly 80% of full-time manual
male workers were affected by collective agreements.15 That
considered, it is surprising that cases where a question concerning
a collective agreement is at issue are relatively infrequent. Of
course, a number of cases concern the theoretical basis for
incorporating collective terms into the individual contracts.
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Such cases, though, shed no light on any difficulties involved in
the enforcement of collective agreements, nor indeed on the actual
application of collectively derived contractual terms. On the
other hand, problems such as the vagueness of language, said to be
inherent in the enforcement of collective agreements, have not been
the cause of much argument.16 This is not to suggest that
collective agreements never pose problems. In Scott v Formica
17 , , ,
Ltd the IT commented that "the evidence of this agreement ... is
extremely sketchy ... neither the employer nor the union could say
exactly when the agreement was reached nor did anyone expound its
exact terms". It is said that interpreting collective agreements
would be "... a major headache". Moreover, "this would also apply
to the interpretation of collectively agreed terms incorporated in
"I Q
.....
contracts of employment". Reported cases involving difficulties
of interpretation of collectively derived terms do not appear to be
common. One such case was Turriff Construction Ltd v Bryant19 -
where the question was whether a site agreement should be
interpreted so as to require compulsory overtime. The question
was a difficult one - the wording was inadequate, inconsistent,
unclear, and in places aspirational. The style of the agreement,
therefore, gave the court a wide measure of discretion - and in
holding overtime was not compulsory they were able to follow a
trend whereby "the tribunals and courts have leaned heavily in
favour of saying that local overtime arrangements to "co-operation,
not contract"".20 In a later case21 the court was troubled by
like difficulties. They reached the somewhat surprising decision
that overtime was not obligatory though it had been agreed "...
that the employers have the right to decide when overtime is
necessary" and in the event of disputes "the overtime required
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shall be proceeded with" while the dispute is processed.22 So
where difficulties of interpretation do present themselves they
would appear to permit a highly discretionary role by the
adjudicator.
When faced with such difficulties what can be said of the approach
of the adjudicatory body? On occasion the IT has shown itself
prepared to reject a literal interpretation in favour of a
"sensible construction" which took account of the needs of the firm
- a last in, first out, redundancy procedure was held to be applied
by reference to types of employment.23 In another case the
mobility clause of the relevant Working Rule Agreement provided
that '... at the discretion of the employer, an operative may be
transferred at any time during the period of his employment from
one job to another.24 The tribunal in McCulloch v Moore held that
this clause meant only transfer to same other accessible job in the
locality.
In another case, the Working Rule Agreement provided that '... the
employer shall have the right to transfer to any site within daily
travelling distance of where the operative is living' ,25 The
tribunal sought to give a 1... sensible and intelligible
• 0f\ • t
construction• to the rules. A term was implied, based on the
reference to 'daily travelling distance•, 'that the distance is to
be such a distance from the operative' s heme as he can reasonably
be expected to travel backwards and forwards each day'.27 What
would be reasonable in the circumstances of the case? The
tribunal found a solution by looking to related provisions in the
working rule agreement.
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It is not every style of interpretation which allows for the
expression of the workforces interests. In GEC Machines Ltd v
• 9ft t • • • •
Gilford^0 the EAT set aside the first instance decision to look "to
the spirit of the agreement" and limit the employer's discretion
under a redundancy scheme though more recently, in Bond v CAV Ltd29
the High Court held that a lay-off agreement "was intended to
suspend (guaranteed employment) only where no work was available
for a particular employee. It was not intended to give an
employer a general right of lay off wherever he could point to same
dislocation of production by reason of an industrial dispute".30
The collective agreement stated that: "In the event of dislocation
of production in a federated establishment as a result of an
industrial dispute ... the operation of the period of the guarantee
shall be automatically suspended".31 The agreement was,
therefore, not interpreted literally but was construed as being
subject to the aforementioned indication.
At the end of the day interpretation has not been "a major
headache".32 Indeed, of late the EAT has positively encouraged
resort to collective agreements as a source of employment terms.33
Successful adjudication of collective agreements is dependent not
just on the industrial relations knowledge of the adjudicator but
also on the ideology of that adjudicator. British leyland UK Ltd
v McQuilken illustrates the difficulty.34 There a redundancy
agreement was held by the EAT to be inappropriate for incorporation
on the grounds that the "... agreement was a long-term plan,
dealing with policy rather than the rights of the individual
employees".35 I would suggest that this is no justification for
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denying the agreement normative effect at individual level. It is
merely a device to re-write the bargain to increase managerial
prerogative. The decision demonstrates very much a "unitary" view
of the employment relationship.
Cadoux v Central Regional Council provides a further
• • •
illustration. There the employment was '... subject to the
conditions of service laid down by the National Joint Council for
local Authorities Administrative Professional, Technical and
Clerical Services ... and as supplemented by the authorities ' rules
and as amended from time to time1.37 It was held that the "...
words 'as supplemented by the authorities' rules' in the contract
of employment ... are sufficient to incorporate ... the whole of
the provisions in the rules ...".38 One of the rules provided for
a non-contributory life assurance scheme. The employers
subsequently unilaterally withdrew the scheme. Despite the
holding that the rules were incorporated it was held that the
employers were contractually entitled to do this. This seems
surprising. Having treated the scheme as contractual a variation
of the rights given would presumably require consent. Attention
was drawn to the following term of the rule: 'Any future changes
in the terms will be entered in these documents or otherwise
recorded for you to refer to within one month of the change'.39
Lord Ross went on to state that 'No machinery for making changes is
provided and, ... the inference must be that the ... [employers] ...
can make such changes as they like provided that they enter them
into those documents ... [etc.] ...'.40 It is respectfully
submitted that this inference does not follow and that there is
nothing to suggest that the normal contractual rule, whereby
variation of terms requires mutual consent, does not apply. One
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is left feeling that the criticism levelled at McQuilken could be
applied to Cadoux.
In Cuff v Taylor Woodrow Construction Ltd41 a working rule
agreement contained the following statement: 'it is the intention
of the management to continue the present arrangement of working
alternative Saturdays but it must clearly be understood that the
management reserve the right to vary from this agreement where
special circumstances apply*.42 The tribunal concluded that this
was •... clearly a statement not of any agreement reached between
parties but is no more than a statement of the unilateral intention
of the management' .43 One might hazard the view that the tribunal
were too ready to conclude that the statement had no contractual
force. The use of the word 'agreement', set against a background
of a working rule agreement intended to furnish individual
contractual terms, might be thought to go towards the view that the
statement was contractual. Management would then be able to vary
the agreement only where special circumstances existed.
Admittedly the use of the term ' special circumstances • would
arguably make the obligation too vague to be enforceable: on the
other hand, one wonders what approach the CAC might have taken (see
below p 279 et seq).
A further issue concerned with adjudication is the industrial
relations expertise of the decision-makers, a common criticism of
the courts being that they lack knowledge and understanding of the
practice of industrial relations. Thus on a number of occasions
the courts have confused the question of the legal status of
collective agreements between the collective parties with the
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question of incorporation into the individual contract of
employment. In Laman44 the issue turned on the relationship
between a national and a local agreement. The court denied
normative effect to the local agreement because it was "adopted as
a gentleman's agreement". This dubious conclusion was justified by
the assertion that "if locally legally binding agreements were made
departing from The National Agreement, it would undoubtedly create
demands for a complete overhaul of The National Agreement".45
This statement demonstrates a complete ignorance of the collective
bargaining process - the developments in Britain's dual system of
industrial relations were decidedly outwith judicial knowledge.46
The recent decision of the EAT in Marley V Forward Trust Group must
also be considered.47 There an employment contract incorporated
the terms of a collective agreement; clause 11 of that agreement
stated "This agreement is binding in honour only and it is not
intended to give rise to any legal obligation". At first
instance, the industrial tribunal had held that, although the terms
and conditions of the collective agreement were incorporated, the
incorporated terms were legally unenforceable because of clause 11.
This is extraordinary. The IT had expressed the view "... that
clause 11 was incorporated in this agreement in order to enable the
employees and the union to respectively retain flexible positions
in the event of potential or actual redundancies". ° The EAT
rightly regarding this proposition as being somewhat unlikely
believed that clause 11 "... stems almost certainly, historically,
frcm the TULRA 1974 or probably the IRA 1971 when the unions were
. ... . 49
anxious not to find themselves in litigation m court".
However, the EAT upheld the IT despite the fact that "... it can be
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nothing but bad for industrial relations in so far as it relates to
an individual agreement they should be bound in honour and not by
law then, in honour, they have not honoured the agreement ...".50
The foregoing reveals a situation where the IT and the EAT,
specialist bodies in the Labour Law field, made the sort of
fundamental error which, had it been made by the traditional
courts, would have been regarded as evidence of the latter•s
unsuitability in this field. It was, in fact, left to the Court
of Appeal to overturn those decisions.51
Similar difficulties of expertise arise when one looks at the
question of appropriateness of terms for incorporation into the
individual employment contract. The approach of the courts has,
on occasion, demonstrated a failure to understand the realities of
collective bargaining. One example of this is the case of Camden
Exhibition and Display Limited v Lynott52 (see above, p 192).
Of course the approach of the courts can make allowance for the
realities of industrial relations practice. In Burroughs Machines
Ltd v Timoney 53 the Court of Session was called upon to translate
the terms of a collective agreement into the individual contract.
It will be recalled that the Court looked at the term in issue and
asked, "would incorporation serve a plausible purpose?" The
literalist approach of the IT and EAT was rejected.
Despite the normative import of collective agreements difficulties
of interpretation are conspicuous by their absence. Custom and
practice is also a source of terms of the employment contract. It
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is also said to be an obstacle to enforcement of collective
agreements. Cases where questions concerning custom and practice
have arisen have not, on the whole, posed great difficulties.54
On occasion, though, evidential problems have been pointed to.55
In theory a custom will not be incorporated unless it is
"reasonable, certain and notorious".56 In fact, "the industrial
tribunals and the courts siirply do not in practice apply the sort
of tests that the general principles of the law of contract impose
as the criteria for binding customs".57 This flexible approach
might be thought to augur well for the handling of collective
agreements and related practices though this flexibility means that
the tribunals or the courts can often play a very creative role.
Thus in one case where the employer claimed that payment of an
allowance was discretionary the tribunal said "it would require
very clear evidence to establish (such) a custom and practice".58
Varying the evidential requirements can therefore be a means of
giving the court a discretion as to establishing the terms of the
contract.
The court's role in determining the existence and the content of
custom and practice means that it is used to dealing with issues
which, by their very nature, must be similar to those encountered
in the enforcement of collective agreements. The fact that the
tribunals and courts do not appear to have been overwhelmed by the
difficulties is of interest. A word of caution should be sounded.
Despite the importance of workgroup initiative in the creation of
custom and practice59 the extent to which the courts would
accommodate rules which "are the product of management error and
worker power" might be questioned. Moreover, since the "custom and
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practice status of some practices only arises when they are
challenged, questioned or broken" this is obviously liable to be
crucial. This prompts mention of Express and Star v Bundey61.
There it was said that
"It was not custom and practice within the strict legal meaning of
those words that the applicants only handled NGA approved material.
It was loose custom maybe but the evidence of management which is
accepted is that it has never been formally accepted. It has in
the main been tolerated for a quiet life. It has been tolerated
not only in this company but within the newspaper industry and
there is no doubt that the applicants had reasonable expectations
and hopes that it could continue. However it was a lawful order of
management which the men refused to obey."62
Mention might also be made of the recent House of Lords decision in
Hughes v OHSS63. The case centred on s.64 of the EPCA 1978. In
Hughes while the contractual retiring age was 60, employees had a
reasonable expectation of retiring at 65. The practice of a
retiral age of 65 was regarded by the court as being non¬
contractual. Nevertheless, for the purposes of s 64, it would have
been perfectly possible to regard the inducement of expectation as
imposing an obligation on the employer. Instead of which the House
of Lords held that a change in retiral policy by the employer
nullified any existing expectations.
CAC Experience of Collective Agreements
It might be tempting to conclude from an examination of the
experience of the courts and tribunals that the technical
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difficulties encountered in adjudicating on disputes involving
collective agreement are not as great as one might have thought.
It would seem salutary though to look at the experience of the CAC
in this area - given that "almost all the work of the CAC involves
determining issues against the background of formal or informal
collective agreements".64 In operating the legal provisions
relating to the extension of recognised terms and conditions the
CAC dealt with many cases under Sch 11 Pt 1, 2(a)65 alone. While
the function of the CAC was not directly to enforce the "recognised
terms and conditions" the awards are stil of relevance since it is
necessary to determine what the terms and conditions of an
agreement are before you can say whether an employer is observing
them. It is proposed, therefore, to examine the aforementioned
awards to see what light they cast on the difficulties in
adjudicating on collective agreements.
Problems of Interpretation
As the CAC has pointed out66 "in deciding what constitutes
recognised terms of employment" their function will often be "to
interpret the meaning of the collective agreement". In the awards
scrutinised difficulties of interpretation were far from being
• • • • •
predominant Uns is to same extent surprising since one might
have expected that one line of defence to an application to be a
disputed point of interpretation, for example, that the recognised
terms and conditions differed from the position alleged in the
claim. It is difficult to knew what conclusions can be safely
drawn from this. It may be that collective agreements are not so
incomprehensible as is sometimes suggested - though, of course, one
would expect industry agreements to be a good deal clearer than
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domestic ones. On the other hand, it deserves to be stressed that
the CAC is on record as stating that the "interpretation of
...agreements ... is often far from easy".
Problems of Interpretation
It is valuable to go on to consider the approach of the CAC when
faced with questions of interpretation. In one case, the Committee
rejected the restrictive interpretation advanced by the employer
since "collective agreements are rarely drafted with the care
lavished on Acts of Parliament and are not intended to be construed
so strictly".69 The CAC seemed disinclined to regard its awards as
precedents, stressing that it was "in duty bound to look at each
case on its merits and it is rarely true that the circumstances of
• 70
one case are precisely the same as another". An example of a
case requiring interpretation is Award 78/618.71 There an
agreement provided for a shorter working week for office as opposed
to factory staff but there was no indication as to which employees
were to work office or factory hours. Did the agreement require
jobs to be allocated under each group? No - the CAC having regard
to the practice in industry said "it would be for the parties to
negotiate its precise application to the range of jobs involved".
Let us new look at the Committee's approach to particular areas of
difficulty.
Change of Circumstances
Since change in circumstances can be rapid in industry a rigid
application of the terms of collective agreements would often be
out of step with good industrial relations practice. Indeed the
CAC has drawn attention to the fact that "disputes often arise from
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over-precise wording, where unthinking application to new
circumstances gives one side or the other an unexpected and plainly
unfair advantage".72 Award 79/20 concerned a claim in respect of
employees who came within the literal terms of an allowance scheme.
Certain grades were excluded from the scheme but it appeared to
apply to all other employees. However, for reasons which were not
clear it was not originally envisaged that the applicant grades
would prima facie came within the terms of the scheme. The
approach of the CAC appears to have been to look to the aim of the
scheme. Since the purpose of the scheme was not to compensate
grades of the applicant type they were held not to be entitled to
the allowance.
In cases of doubt, looking to the substantive aim of the parties
might be thought to have its merits. Regrettably, in a subsequent
case the CAC declined to give an expansive interpretation to the
collective terms and so allowed an anomaly to stand in the pay
structure which had arisen as a result of changes in work
• 7^ . . .
practices, so the extent of the CAC's willingness to interpret
collective agreements flexibly in the light of changed
circumstances must be questioned.
Intention to create normative effect
The wording of collective agreements has often weighed against
their enforceability - in the Ford Motor Co case the fact that the
wording was "composed largely of optimistic aspirations" was taken
as one indication of the lack of intent to create legal
relations.7^ How then has the CAC dealt with provisions whose
wording seems aspirational? An interesting example is provided by
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Award No 3. There the collective agreement read that a " (bonus)
agreement should stand, but should any company be in serious
economic difficulty, the problems should be taken up with the local
trade union who would consider the situation". The company stated
that it interpreted this to mean that any company in serious
financial difficulty was excused payment of bonus. The CAC had no
difficulty in rejecting this - effectively severing the element of
bargain from the penumbra of goodwill.
Another question is the issue of whether"recammendations" in
national agreements could be held to bind the employer. The
Committee's predecessor "in general adopted a flexible approach to
this, and accepted that this form of words, common in many
agreements made by employer's associations, was binding".75 The
Committee has shewed signs of following a similar approach.76
Custom and Practice
The CAC has pointed out that "virtually all agreements are subject
to the nuances of prior understandings and subsequent custom and
practice".77 To a certain extent the problem is one of the
approach taken by the adjudicatory body - there is a "fear that
the interpretation of an agreement as if it were a body of clear
and precise terms, self-contained and to be understood in the light
of the categories of contract interpretation, would distance its
spirit".78 More specifically, difficulties stem from the obscurity
of custom and practice and the fact custom and practices can be
"inseparably intertwined with rules that happen to find their way
into formulated collective agreements, even where they themselves
have not been so formulated".79 The CAC awards examined do not
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indicate that custom and practice proved to be a major difficulty
for the Committee. Admittedly, custom and practice is less likely
to be of importance in the case of industry wide agreements. On
the other hand, such questions still arise and the CAC seem ready
to take account of it, so the CAC appeared to be willing to
interpret collective agreements in the light of custom and practice
and to incorporate terms from such practice. Thus in award 78/615
the CAC refused to find the employer in breach of Sch 11 in not
paying "increased wage rates from the date specified in the
national agreement" in view of the "normal industrial practice for
each individual company" to implement the award from the next
domestic review date. It might be thought that this was not so
much a case of interpretation as a case of the written term being
waived in face of the practice. In award 78/307 the collective
agreement was silent on whether there should be a minimum level of
bonus but provision was made for local negotiation. In view of
"the prevailing practice to make such payments" and the fact "that
the assumption that such payments will be made appeared to be a
powerful influence on the way in which commercial tenders are
calculated and commercial contracts awarded" the Committee thought
"it right ... that the provisions of a bonus or lieu bonus payment
be regarded as a minimum term in this particular employment
context". On the other hand, while no rigid formula such as
"reasonable, certain and notorious" was deployed, a common works
practice might not constitute custcm and practice - so a rule of
thumb might be rejected.80 In Award 78/691 the lack of normative
import accorded to the practice led the CAC to conclude that
despite the absence of a specific wage rate in The National
Agreement "a band of payments was possible". Lack of specific
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evidence could lead to the disavowal of the alleged custom81 - eg
in Award 372, (though the fact that the collective agreement was
quite clear on this point weighed against its modification by-
reference to custom/practice). Once satisfied as to the existence
of the term the CAC displayed creativity in ascribing it content.
So in 78/307, while "it was not possible to determine with
precision the minimum level of bonus", the Committee derived an
actual bonus figure by looking at a related collective agreement.
Intelligibility
The lack of clarity of collective agreements was on occasion
commented on - as the CAC, in Award 145, euphemistically put it
"the agreement is not drafted so as to be beyond argument".82
Indeed, there the CAC contented itself with finding that the claim
was well founded and ordering observance of the agreement. The
Committee expressly left it to the parties to achieve application
of the agreement and suggested that difficulties of interpretation
could be left to the industry's joint arbitration committee.83
Moreover, the awards revealed agreements containing complex pay
OA , ,
structures and so on where the intricacy of the agreement was the
problem rather than any linguistic difficulty.
Application
Another area where the C.A.C. has had to consider the normative
impact of collective agreements is in considering the application
of grading agreements. A number of cases85 involve highly
technical questions as to whether a worker is being accorded a
grading status appropriate to the functions he performs. This
results in the Committee both applying its industrial relations
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expertise and adding to it. Further difficulties arise should the
company grading structure be completely out of line with the
structure outlined in the National Agreement.86
One interesting feature of the Committee's work is their practice
of delegating the actual detailed implementation of the award to
the parties. The Committee "... seeks to associate the parties as
far as possible with the actual construction of the solution".87
Two reasons might be offered for this. Firstly, it speaks of a
desire both to capitalise on the industrial relations knowledge and
expertise of the parties and gain a solution most apposite to the
requirements of the particular situation. Secondly, "the joint
administration of labour-management relations is a means for
verifying the goodwill of the parties, for establishing working
relationships between them, and, in other words, for building
industrial peace on the basis of mutual understanding and co-
operation".00 As the CAC pointed out, if they can state their
award in general terms and the parties can jointly agree on the
details, "it augurs well for future industrial relations in the
QQ , , , ,
company". All in all it speaks of a belief in the values of
self-administration and voluntarism.
So in a number of cases having decided that the claim was well
founded in principle the Committee has adjourned proceedings to
give the parties (or, indeed, the NJC) an opportunity of agreeing
the content of the award.90 This enabled, say, national
• • 91
provisions to be properly adapted to suit local circumstances.
Such a process proved particularly useful when detailed, and often
difficult, questions of bringing domestic pay structures into line
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with national agreements arose. Indeed, on one occasion,
"simple acceptance of the application of s 8 would destroy the
recently agreed wages structure in each of the societies".93
However, an "alternative solution appears possible" - the amount of
money by which the current salaries fell below the entitlement
under the National Agreement was calculated and allocated within
the current employment structure. In other cases, rather than
adjourn the CAC would simply leave the detailed application of the
award to the parties to settle by subsequent negotiation.94
This feature of the Committee' s work demonstrates the flexibility
of its approach and its caranitment to finding solutions in accord
with the realities of industrial relations. The CAC showed its
desire for problem-solving in other ways. Thus on one occasion,
while obliged to hold for the employer, it suggested an alternative
solution which it hoped the parties would adept instead of the
award.95 In Award No 78/520 application of para 2(a) of Sch 11
"would have completely destroyed the present society grading
structure". The Committee got round this by encouraging the
parties to hold further negotiations and present a joint submission
based upon claims under para 2(b) of Sch 11. This resulted in a
"realistic compromise in a very difficult and complex situation".96
It might be suggested that the experience of the CAC shows that,
virile adjudication on disputes involving collective agreements
would pose difficulties - those difficulties would not be of the
order sometimes mooted. Difficulties of informality, vagueness,
etc., should be less than overwhelming. When one turns to examine
actual collective agreements other problems emerge. looking to
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the clauses which regulate the relationship of the collective
parties' one finds that statements of obligations, whose language
is decidedly "open-texture", pose problems. What of an obligation
to "... actively discourage any industrial action until all stages
of the agreed procedure have been exhausted". What of a
'recognition' "that when necessary there will need to be a flexible
interpretation of this (agreement) to meet the various problems
which may arise". Likewise, "staff representatives will ... use
their best endeavours to promote good relations between the company
and its employees". It is obvious that the degree of creativity
required in adjudicating in the face of flexible and general terms
could easily convert adjudication into arbitration.
Another difficulty is posed by the fact that the obligations of
each side will be regarded as a whole. What then of statements of
goodwill, etc, whose nature rendered enforcement very difficult,
even though adhesion to them may well be regarded as a pre¬
condition of observance of the rest of the agreement? Eg, "the
unions agree ... that they support the full utilisation of working
hours with particular reference to starting and finishing times".
How could an adjudicator deal with this? There would appear to be
basically two lines of approach. On the one hand, one could simply
sever the aspirational parts on the basis that they were so
uncertain. It may be doubted whether this would always be
conducive to good industrial relations. On the other hand, if
notions of "good faith" were to be looked to a much more
interventionist approach might be adopted. If so the adjudicator
might still decide in favour of one side or another by severing
aspirational aspects of the agreement but might modify his
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subsequent award or make it conditional. Alternatively, an
adjudicator could decide what would be required by the party in
breach to satisfy the aspirational pre-condition. If this had not
been done he would be in breach of contract. This would involve
the development of a great deal of industrial relations
jurisprudence. It would also place a great deal of power into the
hands of the adjudicator.
Similar problems exist when one encounters what one might term
"agreements to agree". For example, "the number of
representatives to be recognised will be reasonable and shall be
agreed at each location between management and the appropriate
full-time officers ...". Thus there may be a requirement for
detailed subordinate rule-making within same general framework.
In the absence of agreement one could not regard a dispute as one
as to rights. However, it would often be a dispute as to
interests within limited bounds. The only solution might be for
the adjudicatory body to make an agreement for the parties. One
can only conclude that such difficulties again show the futility of
measures to compel legal enforcement.
Conclusions
Assessing the respective merits of different forums for
adjudication is far from easy and can be very much impressionistic.
The area is also surrounded by a number of assumptions, same of
which are somewhat lacking in foundation. Thus it is often taken
for granted that the traditional courts are 'accident-prone1 in
Labour law cases. Yet in Marley v Forward Trust Group97 it was
the tribunals who were guilty of heresy. Again in Burroughs
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Machines v Timoney98 it was the Court of Session who were prepared
to take a creative interpretation.
When Donovan reported Britain had no law of unfair dismissal and
the redundancy legislation was in its infancy. Since then the
tribunals and courts have dealt with a huge number of cases
involving employment contracts. As a result, a large number of
disputes could have arisen over the meaning, etc., of terms derived
from collective agreements. As we have seen, if such a situation
has occurred, it is not reflected in the reported case-law. While
adjudication in cases involving collective agreements undoubtedly
brings its own particular difficulties, so does the adjudication of
contracts of other types.
Is it possible to express any concrete opinion as to the most
appropriate body to adjudicate? It is suggested that the question
be best looked at under a number of headings. First, industrial
relations expertise. The composition of both the CAC and the
tribunals is obviously designed to reflect this. Nevertheless, as
we have seen, knowledge of the background in specific cases may be
lacking. However, given this expertise, over time these bodies are
less likely to give decisions out of accord with the requisites of
industrial relations than the traditional courts. Second, style
of interpretation. The CAC has stated that: "The aim is to
encourage the approach by way of problem solving rather than by
emphasising the aspects of conflict and verdict. Above all, there
is a commitment to the principles of sound industrial relations and
workable solutions. Whenever, in interpretation of fact or
application of rules, the committee finds it is left with
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uncertainty or discretion, it is determined to exercise that
discretion within this overriding commitment.1,99 Given that
circumstances may well have changed since an agreement was
concluded an adjudicator's approach to interpretation can be of
considerable importance. The courts and tribunals are, of course,
capable of creativity. On the other hand, there will be occasions
when the CAC feels circumscribed by the wording of the agreement.
Nevertheless, scrutiny of the CAC awards reveals a very broad and
creative approach. Above all, one finds a commitment to the search
for 'workable solutions'. One way in which this is demonstrated is
the CAC's practice of, on occasion, delegating the detailed
implementation of the award to the parties. The CAC's publicly
declared policy is also relevant. The express avowals of a
'problem-solving' approach are another factor tending to suggest
that the CAC is more likely to adhere to this approach than the
court or tribunals.
What then is required of the adjudicator? Enforcing the peace
obligation would require the distinction to be made between
conflicts of rights and conflicts of interest. I have already
argued that the question will often be not whether one can make the
distinction but whether one should. An adjudicator will require an
extensive, sound knowledge of the practice of industrial relations.
Successful interpretation and application of "rights" requires a
broad and realistic approach. The "literal" approach must be
rejected in favour of looking "to the real substance of the matters
in dispute". A creative role is called for - in particular, to be
able to deal flexibly with a situation where a change of
292
circumstances has occurred. In such a situation the continuing
relationship of the parties demands the broadest of approaches.
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CHAPTER 10
THE LEGAL STAKES OF 00I1ECITVE AGREEMENTS
IN THE UNlTfcl) STATES
Historical Development
In the US the common law as to the legal status of collective
agreements depended on the approach adopted by the State Courts.
Same State Courts regarded collective agreements as binding in
honour only. While the position developed that most courts
regarded such agreements as contracts a number of legal problems
remained. Agreements made might be regarded as contravening the
rules on restraint of trade. A trade union party to the agreement
may well have been an unincorporated association. More fundamental
questions arose from consideration of whether collective agreements
merited special treatment in the general laws of contracts. Thus
one US Court equated a collective agreement to an employment
contract and refused to grant an order for specific performance.1
While such an approach was unusual Rice concluded that "... the
agreement itself is certainly more than a mere "gentlemen's
agreement" and, if not a true contract, it has at least come to
receive specific performance and enforcement in courts of equity."
He continued "... there is no reported decision giving damages for
breach of such an agreement, except as it forms a term of an
individual contract of employment.. ."2
Lincoln Mills
The Supreme Court held in 1941 that the purpose of the Wagner Act
was "to compel employers to bargain collectively with their
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employees to the end that an employment contract, binding on both
parties should be made."3 However, "varying state laws of
contract and procedure ... made it highly impracticable if not
impossible to secure judicial enforcement of promises in collective
bargaining agreements."4 S 301 of the Taft Hartley Act facilitated
the legal enforcement of collective agreements and is of
considerable interest.
S 301 states:
"(a) Suits for violation of contracts between an employer
and a labor organization representing employees in an
industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter,
or between any such labor organizations, may be brought
in any district court of the United States having
jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the
amount in controversy or without regard to the
citizenship of the parties."
"(b) Any labor organization which represents employees in
an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter
and any employer whose activities affect commerce as
defined in this chapter shall be bound by the acts of its
agents. Any such labor organization may sue or be sued
as an entity and in behalf of the employees whom it
represents in the courts of the United States. Any
money judgment against a labour organisation in a
district court of the United States shall be enforceable
only against the organization as an entity and against
its assets, and shall not be enforceable against any
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individual member or his assets.1
While the section' s enactment represented a move towards more
extensive legal regulation of collective bargaining judicial
interpretation of it was to show considerable regard for
voluntarist principles.
One may begin by asking why was s.301 enacted? The US legislature
believed that the purpose of an employer in signing a collective
agreement was to ensure industrial peace for the duration of that
agreement. Promoting legal enforceability was seen as a logical
development and a means of securing a greater degree of adhesion to
agreements, whereas failure to enforce by specific performance an
employer's premise to arbitrate would leave unions with no
alternative other than resorting to industrial action. Indeed, it
was stated that "The improvement that would result in the stability
of industrial relations is, of course, obvious".5 It was argued
that were agreements to be legally enforceable unions would no
longer be willing to agree to "no-strike" clauses. This argument
was rejected; particular regard being paid to the experience of a
number of States where same form of legal enforcement already
existed.
In the seminal case of Lincoln Mills the Supreme Court gave an
influential interpretation of s 301. There the collective
agreement provided for grievances to be dealt with under an agreed
procedure and barred industrial action until that procedure had
been exhausted. The agreement provided for arbitration, at the
option of either party, where negotiations had otherwise failed.
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In a dispute over work loads the employer refused to go to
arbitration. The Supreme Court granted specific performance of
the arbitration provisions of the collective agreement. In
holding that the District Court had jurisdiction the Supreme Court
held that '...s.301(a) is more than jurisdictional - it authorizes
federal courts to fashion a body of federal law for the enforcement
of these collective bargaining agreements and includes within that
federal law specific performance of promises to arbitrate
grievances under collective bargaining agreements'7
The court believed that the intention of the legislature was to
promote legally binding collective bargains which also included a
'no-strike' clause. It was felt that a union agreed not to strike
in consideration for a right to arbitration. Fairness would
therefore demand specific performance. More than that, it was
felt that by granting unions a legal remedy they would turn to law
rather than industrial action. Industrial peace would thereby be
promoted. Whereas failure to enforce by specific performance an
employer's promise to arbitrate would leave unions with no
alternative other than resorting to industrial action.8
The court also had to consider whether the Norris-La Guardia Act
prohibited the issue of an injunction. It was acknowledged that a
literal reading of the Act might bring the Lincoln Mills dispute
within it. However, this interpretation was not followed due to
the '... congressional policy in favour of the enforcement of
• 9
agreements to arbitrate grievance disputes...'
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Individual Enforcement
By virtue of s 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act a union
representing the majority of employees in a bargaining unit has
exclusive authority to negotiate with the employer. The Act does
not grant the same authority when it comes to the processing of
grievances. However, "... unions assert under most collective
agreements the exclusive power to process and settle grievances and
to carry cases to arbitration".10 Where such agreements exist an
individual's right to have a grievance processed is restricted.
"The employee can sue the employer for breach of his rights under
the collective agreement only after first shewing that the union
has acted unfairly in refusing to process his grievance to
arbitration; and the employee can sue the union for refusing to
process his grievance only upon showing that the union has acted
unfairly."11
The courts have resisted any temptation to accord individuals
anything more than a residual role in legal enforcement, a
collectivist stance being adopted which entrusts the interests of
labour very much into the hands of trade unions. While this
approach is not without its critics the policy justifications for
it have been set out in the US periodical literature. First, a
number of rights pertain to the union rather than to individual
employees. Various organisational rights can be placed in this
category, though seme rights, eg those of shop stewards, straddle
the collective/individual divide and classification might be
problematic.12 Second, in respect of seme obligations relating to
working conditions the union was the most appropriate plaintiff:
"Many of the employer's contract obligations benefit the generality
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of employees or sizeable groups without creating identifiable
individual interests. The clearest illustrations are promises not
to introduce new shifts or change the starting hours without
consulting the union. Promises intended to preserve work
opportunities belong in the same category so long as there is no
violation; even after violation, it may be impossible to show
damage to any particular worker."13 Third, and more interestingly,
adjudication through typical grievance procedures was viewed as a
continuation of collective bargaining. The nature of collective
bargaining meant that the wording of agreements might well be
ambiguous; sometimes deliberately so in order to promote a quick
settlement. While an individual grievance might occasion
proceedings, the process initiated is really part and parcel of
collective bargaining. Feller also has an important contribution
to make at this juncture: "The specification of a rule in a
collective agreement is always subject to the hazard that its
application in unforeseen circumstances or its interpretation in
unforeseen ways will bring unintended consequences. That hazard
is limited to the extent that the parties themselves control the
procedure in which disputed questions of interpretation and
application are determined and the remedies which can be provided
... The existence of the very rules upon which many individual
claims are based is itself dependant upon the absence of an
individual right to obtain adjudication of claims of their
violation in a forum foreign to the system."14 In so far as
adjudication coincides with collective bargaining it would seem
reasonable for the union to control the adjudication process.
Fourthly, and related to the previous point, the adjudication of an
individual case may have important repercussions for the rest of
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the workforce. For example, the resolution of an individual
grievance may produce an interpretation of a collective agreement
which will benefit one section of the workforce and disadvantage
another. The operation of job evaluation schemes is also in
point. In such circumstances one can argue that it is valuable
that a trade union should decide whether the grievance should be
processed and, if so, in what fashion. Thus a union may suggest
an interpretation which deals in a reasonable fashion with the
actual claimant's grievance but, ailso, take account of the
collective interest. In addition, a union operated "filtering"
process would cut down on frivolous claims. Fifthly, placing the
processing of grievances in the hands of one union deals with some
of the problems caused by multi-unionism. Allowing rival unions
to present grievances might lead to the presentation of "... all
manners of grievances, regardless of their merit, in an effort to
squeeze the last drop of competitive advantage out of each
grievance and to use the settlement even of the most trivial
grievances as a vehicle to build up their own prestige ... The
settlement of grievances could become the source of friction and
competition and a means for creating and perpetuating employee
dissatisfaction instead of a method of eliminating it."14a
The US courts have, therefore, restricted the rights of individuals
to have grievances processed. This is despite the fact that the
proviso to s 9(a) reads as follows: "... any individual employee or
a group of employees shall have the right at anytime to present
grievances to their employer and to have such grievances adjusted,
without the intervention of the bargaining representative, as long
as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of a
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collective agreement then in effect."
In Vaca v Sipes the plaintiff, who had been dismissed, brought an
action against the union because they refused to take his grievance
to arbitration under the collectively agreed procedure.15 The
Supreme Court held that the plaintiff did not have an absolute
right to have his grievance taken to arbitration. Individuals
were to be protected by the duty of fair representation. In Vaca
the action failed because the plaintiff could not prove arbitrary
conduct or bad faith on the part of the union. It was not
sufficient for the plaintiff to show that the employer had
wrongfully dismissed him. Ihe Supreme Court advanced a number of
particular reasons for restricting the rights of the individual.
The Court was influenced by the belief that the union performed a
valuable role in filtering out frivolous claims. Moreover, "If the
individual employee could compel arbitration of his grievance
regardless of its merit, the settlement machinery provided by the
contract would be substantially undermined, thus destroying the
employer's confidence in the union's authority and returning the
individual grievant to the vagaries of independent and unsystematic
negotiation".16
Following the decision in Lincoln Mills many feared that judicial
intervention would increase. A number of cases on "arbitrability"
provided evidence of the courts' policy.17 By virtue of s 301 it
falls upon the Courts to decide whether a party has breached a
contractual duty to arbitrate. In United Steelworkers of America
v American Manufacturing Co a union sought to carpel arbitration of
a grievance of one of their members.18 The Court of Appeals for
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the Sixth Circuit refused the application on the basis that the
grievance was frivolous and not subject to arbitration. The
collective agreement provided for arbitration of all disputes as to
the meaning, interpretation and application of the provisions of
the agreement. The Supreme Court, in allowing the Union's appeal,
allotted a restrictive role to the judiciary: "The function of the
court is very limited when the parties have agreed to submit all
questions of contract interpretation to the arbitrator. It is
confined to ascertaining whether the party seeking arbitration is
making a claim which on its face is governed by the contract.
Whether the moving party is right or wrong is a question of
contract interpretation for the arbitrator.1,19 The Supreme Court
citing an academic article by Cox to the effect that "The objection
that equity will not order a party to do a useless act is
outweighed by the cathartic value of arbitrating even a frivolous
grievance and by the dangers of excessive judicial interference".20
Were the courts to adopt a more active role there would be a danger
of becoming involved in the merits of the dispute whilst ostensibly
ascertaining if the dispute was arbitrable.
Why the reluctance to intervene? The starting point must be the
Supreme Court's perception that Federal policy was in favour of
promoting collective bargaining as a means of achieving stable
industrial relations. Moreover, arbitration was regarded as being
a major component of this policy. The nature of collective
bargaining and collective agreements meant that dispute solving
mechanisms were of great importance. Collective bargaining seeks
to regulate complex industrial activities/relations, often
involving many people, on a continuing basis. Difficulties may
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arise; for example, an agreement may be found to be incomplete.
The Supreme Court believed that "Arbitration is the means of
solving the unforeseeable by moulding a system of private law for
all the problems that may arise and to provide for their solution
in a way which will generally accord with the variant needs and
desires of the parties. The processing of disputes through the
grievance machinery is actually a vehicle by which meaning and
content are given to the collective bargaining agreement".21 It
was recognised that the dynamic nature of industrial relations
imposes special demands on an adjudicator or arbitrator.
The Supreme Court was not only anxious to endorse arbitration in
general but to support the particular arbitration process agreed
upon by the parties. Collective agreements were regarded as
contracts sui generis. Collective bargaining was set against "...
the common law of a particular industry or of a particular plant
and collective agreements must be interpreted and applied in that
light".22 "The labor arbitrator is usually chosen because of the
parties' confidence in his knowledge of the common law of the shop
and their trust in his personal judgment to bring to bear
considerations which are not expressed in the contract as criteria
for judgment ... The ablest judge cannot be expected to bring the
same experience and competence to bear upon the determination of a
grievance, because he cannot be similarly informed".23 This
position was reinforced by s 203 (d) of the Labor Management
Relations Act 1947, which provides that final adjustment by a
method agreed upon by the parties is the desirable method for
settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application or
interpretation of a collective agreement.
308
Such are the policy considerations in favour of judicial restraint
that in "hard" cases concerning arbitrability a court should order
arbitration to go ahead. A useful illustration of judicial policy
is provided by the Supreme Court case of Wiley.24 The case
demonstrates both a desire to preserve the autonomy of the
arbitrator from judicial interference and a desire to protect the
institutions of collective bargaining from a re-assertion of
managerial prerogative. The case raised two issues. First, did a
collective agreement providing for arbitration survive a merger?
The Court held that the answer to this question depended on the
circumstances involved; for example, a "... lack of any
substantial continuity of identity in the business enterprise
before and after a change ...1,25 might prevent survival. However,
the Court was anxious that mergers should not be allowed to thwart
the public policy of promoting collective bargaining and private
arbitration.
The second issue raised concerned "procedural arbitrability". The
employer had argued that "... the question whether "procedural"
conditions to arbitration have been met must be decided by the
court and not the arbitrator". This argument was rejected.
"Once it is determined ... that the parties are obligated to submit
the subject matter of a dispute to arbitration, "procedural"
questions which grow out of the dispute and bear on its final
disposition should be left to the arbitrator."27 The Court was




Another test of judicial restraint is the way in which the US
courts deal with applications for judicial review of arbitrators'
• • 9ft • • •
decisions. A dictum from the trilogy has proved influential:
an arbitrator "... may of course look for guidance frcm many
sources, yet his award is legitimate only so long as it draws its
essence from the collective bargaining agreement. When the
arbitrator's words manifest an infidelity to this obligation,
courts have no choice but to refuse enforcement of the award."29
On the whole, the US Courts have been reluctant to hold that an
award does not draw "... its essence ..." from the collective
agreement. It is only where"... the reasoning is so palpably
faulty that no judge or judges, could ever conceivably have made
such a ruling then the Court can strike dcwn the award."30 A
judgment of Judge Feiberg, though he was in a minority, has met
with subsequent approval.31 "... the arbitrator looked to the
prior practice, the conduct of the negotiation for the new contract
and the agreement reached at the bargaining table to reach his
conclusion... From all of this, I conclude that the arbitrator's
award "draws its essence frcm the collective bargaining agreement"
... Once that test is met, the inquiry ends".32
"No strike" clauses
In the years following Lincoln Mills33 a major issue for the US
Courts was hew the Norris-Law Guardia Act was to be reconciled with
attempts to legally enforce no strike clauses in collective
agreements. In Sinclair Refining Co v Atkinson 34 an employer
sought an injunction following a number of strikes which, it was
alleged, each "... grew out of a grievance which could have been
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submitted to arbitration under the contract, and therefore fell
squarely within the unions' promises not to strike."35 It was
held that the case involved a "labour dispute" within the meaning
of the Norris-La Guardia Act and that no injunction could be
granted. In Boys Markets v Retail Clerks Union36 the Supreme
Court overturned this decision. This was despite the fact that
the Supreme Court in Sinclair had expressed the view that "... the
language of the specific provisions of the Act is so broad and
inclusive that it leaves not the slightest opening for reading in
any exceptions beyond those clearly written into it by Congress
itself".37 The Court in Boys Market held that the literal terms
of the Norris-La Guardia Act had to be reconciled with subsequent
legislation. The Court also took into account the perceived policy
of promoting industrial peace through arbitration. Resort to
arbitration, not self-help, was encouraged. Should the courts
fail to enjoin strikes in breach of collectively agreed disputes
procedures, they would merely encourage arbitration to be
circumvented. Moreover, "... a no strike obligation, express or
implied, is the quid pro quo for an undertaking by the employer to
submit grievance disputes to the process of arbitration ... Any
incentive for employers to enter into such an arrangement is
necessarily dissipated if the principal and most expeditious method
by which the no-strike obligation can be enforced is eliminated".38
The reversed of Sinclair can be seen as a step towards greater
legalisation of the collective bargaining process. The Courts are
seeking to direct collective bargaining in a particular direction;
conflict is to be channelled and hopefully resolved through the
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arbitral process. So in Boys Market legal remedies were tailored
to support this. Self-help in the form of industrial action is
regarded as out-dated.
Further legalisation occurred with the decision in Gateway Coal Co
v Minworkers.40 The employer sought to enjoin a strike though the
collective agreement did not contain a "no-strike" clause. The
dispute was, however, arbitrable under the agreed arbitration
clause. A no-strike clause was implied and an injunction
granted. The court declared "It would be unusual, but certainly
permissible, for the parties to agree to a broad mandatory
arbitration provision yet expressly negate any implied no-strike
obligation ... Absent an explicit expression of such an intention,
however, the agreement to arbitrate and the duty not to strike
should be construed as having coterminous application."41
Conclusions
Following a rather brief excursus through the US legislation and
case law on collective agreements a number of conclusions might be
expressed. In general, one might say that the post-war period in
the US witnessed changes which facilitated the legal enforcement of
collective agreements. Moreover, the Supreme Court developed a
policy on enforcement which was to prove to be crucial.
While there was a tendency towards greater legal regulation the
courts declined to promote the individual interest. Thus the role
of the individual in enforcement was highly restricted. This may
seem somewhat surprising to the British labour lawyer who might
regard judicial intervention as being synonymous with
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individualism. A second notable feature was that while judicial
policy supported legal enforcement42 the judiciary displayed
considerable restraint and respected the autonomy of the parties'
dispute-resolution procedures. The "Steelworkers Trilogy"
demonstrated that the Courts would distance themselves from the
merits of disputes and allow private arbitration to take its
course. At the same time it must be said that there have been
occasions when the courts have been more interventionist.43 A
third feature was that once an area becomes legally regulated the
extent of regulation tends to increase. Thus we noted the
reversal of the Supreme Court decision in Sinclair by the case of
Boys Markets. Finally, an increase in legal regulation may lead
to a number of uneasy tensions. For example, despite the general
tendency towards restraint, there appears to be a tension between
more extensive legal regulation and respect for private dispute
settlement. In the years since the steelworkers' trilogy the US
courts have became involved in the merits of cases on a number of
occasions, under the guise of consideration of arbitrability.44
Difficult decisions as to approach may also emerge. Thus while
Boys Market45 allows for the enforcement of "no-strike" clauses,
this can only occur where the strike is about a matter subject to
mandatory arbitration. This leads to the following dilemma. In
deciding whether to grant an injunction a court must decide whether
the dispute is arbitrable and risk going against the steelworkers
trilogy, or presume arbitrarily and risk issuing injunctions which
cure unwarranted. The case of Gateway46 seems to suggest that the
courts will adept the former option.47
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A Canadian Excursus
A leading Canadian text states that 'Disputes over the meaning of
the collective agreement are generally not justiciable in common
law courts. In all Canadian jurisdictions, parties to a
collective agreement are either compelled or permitted to submit
their disputes over the application, interpretation or alleged
• t . > • /Q
violation of a collective agreement to arbitration'.
The legislative scheme in Canada is clearly very similar to the
• 4.Q • * . •
United States. in both countries industrial action is regarded
as an inefficient and outmoded method of resolving industrial
disputes; private arbitration is the preferred method of dispute
resolution. Thus the Canadian Supreme Court has stated that
'courts must, in examining awards of arbitrators, particularly in
the field of labour relations, do so in the awareness of the role
of the arbitrator. Usually he is a technician of considerable
expertise in a highly specialised field ... The State speaking
through the statute requires that his decision be final and
binding. The whole atmosphere of the industrial-commercial arena
requires that such differences be quickly and fairly settled by
this summary procedure designed as it is to be economical of time
and expense.'50 Thus legislative policy demands considerable
judicial restraint when it comes to judicial review.
It is clear, however, that the Canadian courts have been much
slower than their US counterparts to act on the legislative policy.
It is less clear whether this is because they have failed to
perceive it or whether they have simply been reluctant to act upon
it. Thus common law nations of freedom of contract have been
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deployed to undermine arbitral authority. For example, in the
Union Carbide case the courts allowed the collective agreement to
reduce the role of arbitration.51 Again the Supreme Court stated
in Port Arthur 'An arbitration board of this type under
consideration has no inherent powers of review similar to those of
the courts. Its only powers are those conferred upon it by the
collective agreement and these are currently defined in some
detail. It has no inherent power to amend, modify or ignore the
collective agreement'.52 In the UK we are all too familiar with
legislative schemes being undermined by judicial doctrines derived
from the common law.53
The slew response of the Canadian courts to the requirements of
legislative policy was strongly criticised in an 1971 article.
"The Canadian courts have adopted a position that is antithetical
to the steelworkers trilogy. Little if any deference is accorded
to grievance arbitration. Furthermore, there is no indication
that the Canadian courts appreciate the institutional
considerations involved. The Canadian cases ... seldom consider
the American decisions.,54
A difference of approach between the Ontario Court of Appeal and
the Supreme Court as regards judicial review of arbitration awards
emerged in Port Arthur Shipbuilding Co v Arthurs •55 In that case
the arbitrator found that the employees had committed the acts of
misconduct alleged but decided that a lesser penalty than dismissal
should be imposed. The collective agreement provided that 'The
Union recognises the management's authority to manage the affairs
of the company to direct its working forces, including the right to
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hire, transfer, promote, demote, suspend and discharge for proper
cause any employee...'56 In the Court of Appeal it was stated
that "The collective agreement leaves the extent of discipline (be
it as light as a warning or as heavy as discharge) at large under
the formula of "proper cause". By this I mean that there are no
fixed consequences for specified types of misconduct'.57 This
interpretation would appear to have a lot to commend it. The
Supreme Court held that there was an error of law on the face of
the record. It was held that "The task of an arbitration board
called upon to arbitrate a "grievance over ... discharge" under
these circumstances is to determine whether there was proper cause
and having found that the employees did absent themselves to work
elsewhere it is bound to decide that proper cause existed. In
substituting periods of suspension for dismissed the board exceeds
its power and assumes the function of management and determines,
not whether there was proper cause, but whether management, having
proper cause, should have exercised its power of dismissal.'58
Whilst this more managerialist interpretation is not implausible
one must doubt whether a US court would have regarded the
arbitrator's interpretation as being so unreasonable as to be
impermissible.
A number of comments must be made. First, the Canadian courts
distinguish between statutory and consensual arbitration. In the
case of the latter the courts are a good deal more reluctant to
intervene.59 Second, the Canadian courts have became, with the
passage of time, less interventionist. In 1983 the Supreme Court
adopted the following dictum as to the scope of review: •.. .was the
Board's interpretation so patently unreasonable that its
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construction cannot be rationally supported by the relevant
legislation and demands intervention by the court upon review?'60
It has also been judicially stated that '... the law of review has
evolved, even in the absence of a privative clause, to a point of
recognition of the purpose of contractually-rooted statutory
arbitration: namely, the speedy, inexpensive and certain
settlement of differences without interruption of the work of the
parties".61
The 1979 case of Hertis v NB Electric Power Commission62 was very
similar to Port Arthur. Admittedly the statutory provisions and
the collective agreement involved were somewhat different.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court appeared to be acting upon a
different philosophy: 'There is a very good policy reason for
judicial restraint in fettering adjudicators in the exercise of
remedial powers. The whole purpose in establishing a system of
grievance adjudication under the Act is to secure prompt, final and
binding settlement of disputes arising out of interpretation or
application of the collective agreement, or disciplinary action
taken by the employer, all to the end that industrial peace may be
maintained.'63 In the Newfoundland Association of Public
Employees case the Supreme Court suggested that the decision in
Port Arthur might require reconsideration.64
On the other hand, a somewhat different approach to that in Port
Arthur had been taken in the earlier Supreme Court case of Imbleov
v Taskin et al.65 The case concerned judicial review of an
arbitral award concerning a complaint that a union had violated a
no-strike clause. The arbitrator had upheld the complaint and
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awarded damages. It was submitted that the collective agreement
gave no express power to award damages and that the arbitrator had
erred in construing the agreement as giving such a power. The
agreement expressly precluded the arbitrator from altering any of
the provisions of the agreement or from giving any decision
inconsistent therewith. In upholding the decision of the
arbitrator the Supreme Court appeared to take a purposive view of
the labour legislation. Given that industrial conflict was ruled
out it was felt that it was important that the remedy of damages
should be available.
It appears that the Canadian courts are more willing to adopt an
interventionist stance over the issue of procedural arbitrability.
• • f\f\ «
In Union Carbide00 the grievance procedure provided that as a
condition of submitting a dispute to arbitration the union had to
give ten days written notice to the company. It was held that the
arbitrator had no jurisdiction where claims were submitted late in
time. It was said that 'once the board found that the grievance
was out of time, this should have been the end of the matter'.67
A decision to the contrary would have been a breach of the clause
of the collective agreement which stipulated that the arbitrator
should '... not in any way amend, modify or change any of the
provisions of this agreement ...'.68
It should be noted that s 34(1) of the Labour Relations Act
provides that 'Every collective agreement shall provide for the
final and binding settlement by arbitration, without stoppage of
work, of all differences between the parties arising from the
interpretation, application, administration or alleged violation of
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the agreement, including any questions as to whether a matter is
arbitrable'. Having regard to this provision the Ontario Court of
Appeal had held that the union was entitled to succeed. After
all, it might be thought that the parties could not contract-out of
s 34(1). The Supreme Court rejected any such line of argument
without any great deliberation. Beatty has cogently argued that
'In return for surrendering the right to strike, labour was
compensated with the right to arbitrate all questions arising
during the life of the agreement that arose out of that
agreement... If fundamental complaints of either party over their
respective rights and obligations in the agreement are not
peacefully resolved, an attitude will develop that one must effect
a resolution by industrial coercion regardless of its legality.
The policy of industrial peace in section 36 can only be effected
if section 37 is given a full and unyielding interpretation,
denying the parties the opportunity to circumvent, limit, restrict
or subordinate the mechanism contained therein.'69
The position would appear to be different in respect of substantive
arbitrability. In Re Ontario Hydro and Employees' Union70 the
question arose whether an arbitrator had jurisdiction to hear and
determine a grievance of a probationary employee notwithstanding a
term in the collective agreement barring the resort to arbitration
on behalf of a probationary employee. It was held that such a
term in a collective agreement was void as being contrary to the
Labour legislation. The Ontario Court of Appeal noted that to
decide otherwise would undermine the legislative policy of
insisting that all rights disputes go to arbitration. Thus once a
matter was collectively agreed it was not possible to exclude a
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dispute over that matter from arbitration.71 On the other hand,
' this ... does not mean that the parties cannot agree to a basis of
arbitral review that would render the result of arbitration a
foregone conclusion. This was not done here, but the parties
might have agreed, for example, that probationary employees may be
discharged on the sole discretion of the employer. This would
make a discharge almost impossible to overturn',72
An important issue arises over the individual's right of access to
arbitration. 'The general rule is that, regardless of whether a
grievance may be an individual grievance, it is the union that has
the right to take the grievance to arbitration. Individual
employees are not permitted to take their grievances to arbitration
on their own even where they are prepared to assume the costs of
the process. It is only possible for employees to have access to
arbitration in their own right where the language of the
arbitration provision in the collective agreement expressly so
provides. language to this effect is not commonly found in
Canadian collective agreements, and the usual situation is that the
trade union has the exclusive right to bring employee grievances to
arbitration.'73 In General Motors v Brunet74 the Supreme Court
took into account s.88 of the labour Code which states that 'Every
grievance shall be admitted to arbitration in the manner provided
in the collective agreement if it so provides and the parties abide
by it; otherwise it shall be referred to an arbitration officer
chosen by the parties or, failing agreement, appointed by the
Minister'. The labour Code defines grievance as meaning any
disagreement respecting the interpretation or application of a
collective agreement. Under the collective agreement in Brunet
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the union had the sole right to decide if employee's grievances
should go to arbitration. Clearly in the event of a dispute as to
the interpretation or application of a collective agreement an
individual employee had no right to initiate arbitration. In
addition, an employee cannot circumvent the arbitration provisions
by raising a dispute with an employer over the application or
interpretation of a collective agreement in the courts.75
The Supreme Court has seen fit to impose natural justice type
requirements on the operation of arbitration procedures by unions.
In Hoogendoorn v Greening Metal Products a dispute arose when an
employee, Hoogendoorn, refused to pay a compulsory check-off.76
The union and the company agreed to submit the dispute to
arbitration and the union contended that the company was in breach
of the collective agreement. The Supreme Court held that the sole
aim of the arbitration proceedings was the securing of
Hoogendoorn's dismissal. The court went on to find that 'It
cannot be said that Hoogendoorn was being represented by the union
in the arbitration proceeding. The union actively took a position
completely adverse to Hoogendoorn. It wanted him dismissed. '77
It was held that breach of the requirements of natural justice
vitiated the proceedings and, in particular, that Hoogendoorn had a
right to be heard in his own right given that the union was
adopting a position adverse to his.
The decision attracted considerable criticism in certain quarters.
After all collective decision-making requires that a union must be
allowed to judge which competing interest to pursue. There may,
of course, be scope for a residual duty such as the duty of fair
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representation. However, the decision to invoke the arbitral
process and the presentation of the grievance are matters for the
union. Giving individuals the right to be heard will involve
added burdens in terms of time and expense. The problem would be
accentuated when a number of individuals were involved and, indeed,
it may often be unclear just how many individuals should be allowed
to attend. The minority in the Supreme Court believed that the
majority view conflicted with the legislative scheme: 'The scheme
of the labour Relations Act, RSO 1960 c 202, is to provide for a
bargaining agent which is given power to conclude an agreement with
an employer, on behalf of the employees of that employer, which
agreement becomes binding upon all employees... No individual
employee is entitled as of right to be present during bargaining or
at the conclusion of such an agreement. To require that notice
and the right to be present be given to each employee on any
occasion when a provision in a collective agreement having general
application to all employees was being interpreted would be to
destroy the principle of the bargaining agent and to vitiate the
purpose of the Act.,78
One commentator went as far as to say that '... the foundation of
the collective bargaining regime - the exclusive authority of the
union to represent employees in the bargaining unit - would be
destroyed, if at arbitration the affected employee (s), (and
presumably the griever) were permitted to intervene as of right.
The intention of the OLRA to substitute a collective agreement for
individual contracts of employment would be thwarted'.79 It must
be said the granting of procedural rights, such as the right to be
heard, would be unlikely to be responsible for such catastrophic
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consequences.
In assessing the policy of the courts in respect of individual
rights of enforcement over collective agreements one can clearly
detect divergences between the approach in the US and Canada.
Both systems extend the union control over collective bargaining
into the arena of collective agreement administration.
Nevertheless the Canadian cou"ts have adopted a more individualist
stance and have burdened the operations of the grievance procedures
with procedural restraints. The US courts are content to let
individuals depend on the residual duty of fair representation.
This may be because the Canadian courts have been much slower to
take on board legislative policy in arriving at decisions. Again
the courts in Canada have on occasion shown a tendency to seek
assistance frcm common law concepts rather than comparable US
experience.
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Whilst the Donovan Commission1 did not recommend that collective
agreements should be made legally enforceable they did not reject
the idea in principle. Indeed the Commission indicated that once
their recommendations had been carried out there might be a role
(albeit a residual one) for legal sanctions to enforce collective
bargains.2 The purpose of this chapter is to re-examine the
question and, in particular, to consider whether post-Donovan
changes in industrial relations have made legal enforceability a
realistic option. At the outset one must distinguish two things.
On the one hand, legislative moves to compel observance of
collective agreements, eg "by removing immunity from industrial
action in breach of an agreement",3 and, on the other hand, legally
enforceable contracts entered into of the parties' own volition.
Donovan examined the issue of legal enforceability essentially in
the context of solutions to the problem of strikes which were both
unofficial and unconstitutional. There were, though, a number of
obstacles on the road to legal enforceability.
The British attachment to the "dynamic" or common law method of
collective bargaining was said to stand in the way of legal
intervention. CIegg has stated that the common law model
'...starts with an agreed disputes procedure to resolve differences
between the parties. Any dispute may be referred to the procedure
which resolves it by reference to any relevant substantive rule
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there may be between the parties, or to a custom which appears to
be generally accepted by the parties, or by finding a compromise
which is acceptable to the parties. For the model recognises no
sharp distinction between disputes of right ... and disputes of
interest ... Industrial action is allowed whenever the procedure
has failed to resolve a dispute, or whenever one party has given
notice to terminate an existing substantive agreement and the
notice has expired. In this model, agreements have no fixed term,
and there is no need for a single comprehensive agreement.
Substantive matters can be regulated by as many agreements as the
parties choose to make.,4
Clegg contrasts resolving a dispute by reference to any relevant
substantive rules with finding a compromise which is acceptable to
the parties. Thus going hand in hand with "dynamic" or "common
law" bargaining is said to be the irrelevance of the Continental
conflicts of rights/conflicts of interest distinction. Collective
bargaining being "... a continuous process in which differences
concerning the interpretation of an agreement merge imperceptibly
into differences concerning claims to change its effect".6
This view may be somewhat exaggerated - "rights" after all are not
so opaque as to be incapable of incorporation into individual
employment contracts. In chapter 9 it is suggested that the
Courts and Tribunals have been able to establish the terms of
collective agreements without too much difficulty in most cases.
On the other hand, the rights/interests distinction is considered
irrelevant in the context of dispute-solving. Thus British
procedures do not usually distinguish "between the process of
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applying and interpreting existing agreements as against the
process of formulating new ones".7 Putting it another way, the
same procedure is likely to be used for both contract
administration and contract negotiation in opposition to those who
believe "... that rights procedure inherently requires a "judicial"
rather than a conciliatory function". However, others argue that
"... a conciliatory function is in soma circumstances not only more
appropriate but often the only realistic way of approaching a
situation where the rights involved are not laid down with clarity
and the problem is therefore not so much to discover what the facts
are - the decision then being automatic - as to establish in the
light of the facts what should be done to the satisfaction of both
parties so that the situation can be resolved".8 A different line
of argument is advanced by Singleton who has stated that
"substantive consequences of same importance may turn on questions
of interpretation and the intention of the parties on any disputed
matter are seen by the parties as a further question of interest
for discussion and settlement by them rather than as matters of
construction of the terms of the written agreement. To lose the
[rights/interest distinction] ... as a general basis for
defining the arbitrable issues would require fundamental changes in
the nature and status of collective agreements. It is however a
distinction which may be useful to parties who are seeking to
identify and define arbitrable issues within their own
agreements".9
It therefore does not necessarily follow that one cannot determine
what the "rights" actually are. The importance of dynamic
bargaining then being not that it renders collective agreements
331
incapable of legal enforcement but that it casts a good deal of
doubt on the wisdom of doing so. Again trade unionists may be
wary of moves to promote a distinction between rights and interest
disputes lest this becomes a precursor of restrictions on the right
to strike over conflicts of rights.10
The model of collective bargaining generally regarded as being more
amenable to the legal process is the statute law model. This is
described by Clegg as being evidenced as •... a substantive
agreement on all matters currently subject to joint regulation.
This agreement governs relations between the parties until it
reaches the end of its term when a new agreement is negotiated.
In the meantime it is the job of the procedure laid down in the
agreement to settle disputes about its interpretation. Disputes
about matters outside the agreement cannot be settled by the
procedure but must await the termination of the agreement when they
may be resolved by amendments or extensions to the agreement if the
parties are willing. Industrial action is permitted only at the
end of the agreement as a means of reaching a new agreement.111
The fundamental point being that, even in the absence of law,
industrial relations operate on the basis of the rights/interests
distinction. It must be noted that Donovan focused mainly on
private manufacturing industry (especially engineering), and other
sectors (especially the public sector) bear a much closer
resemblance to the "contractual" or "statute" law model.12 Thus
disputes in the public sector are more likely to be disputes of
interpretation.
One must note, however, that the non-existence of the
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rights/interests distinction is apposite in areas where the
"primitive bargaining model" may exist. Clegg listed those as
discipline, redundancy and the organisation of work.13 In such
areas there may be no collective agreement or at least no
commitment to the collective bargaining process: management stands
on its prerogative, workers on custom, both sides taking the view
that "their respective rights entitle them to make rules and to
take industrial action to impose on the other side".14 So here
"it is not possible to use procedure as an instrument of
interpretation and application as such because in many cases it is
the existence of rules themselves which is being questioned rather
than the content of the rules as such".15 Accordingly, one can
hardly enforce an agreement which does not exist and it is
therefore futile to attempt to make the rights/interests
distinction. Such "bargaining" is a private sector phenomenon; -
moreover, its extent is uncertain.16 In addition, the parties
could move from this style of bargaining if they wished.
In conclusion, the "dynamic" method is not a universal bar to legal
enforceability. Certain employment sectors (eg public) bear a
much closer resemblance to the "statute" law or "contractual"
model. So in Britain, in the public sector, while "... apart from
specific instances of fixed term agreements ... notice can be given
at any time to revise or add to any substantive agreement ... at
any one time these agreements constitute the agreed rules governing
employment in the industry ... "17 Moreover, even within the
manufacturing industry heartland of dynamic bargaining, significant
moves towards greater formalisation have taken place.
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Donovan drew attention to Britain1 s dual system of collective
bargaining - the Britain of the conflicting "formal" and "informed."
systems. The informal system was said to be marked by "the
predominance of unwritten understandings and of custom and
, I Q , , , , , ,
practice". This informality was another difficulty m the path
of legal enforcement though such a judgment was again to same
extent caused by focusing on private manufacturing industry. In
any event the intervening years have seen an important increase in
the formality of industrial relations in manufacturing industry.
Thus there have been very substantial changes in the system of pay
bargaining in Britain.19 Methods of payment have changed, the use
of piecework has declined and the use of job evaluation has
increased as has the use of incentive schemes with standards set in
time. Moreover, "there appears to have been a trend away from
individual to group and plant-wide incentive schemes".20 As a
result pay bargaining is less informal and less fragmented. In
addition the importance of single-employer bargaining has grown
considerably - at both plant and corporate level21 and with it the
likelihood of agreements being in writing has increased. Such a
development accords with the Donovan prescription for greater
"order in industrial relations". The lack of enterprise
bargaining in the 1960s inhibited the conclusion of comprehensive,
formal agreements which actually regulated terms and conditions of
employment. The distinction between market and managerial
relations is important: the former meaning pay and the hours of
work and the latter meaning the deployment, organisation and
discipline of the labour force.22 Once one moves away from the
development of formality in market relations and looks at
collective bargaining over managerial relations a different picture
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emerges. There has been little formalisation of agreements on the
conduct of work and agreements these still tend to be unwritten.
Moreover, the view has been expressed that "there is no reason to
believe that collective bargaining over managerial relations will
became more formal in the future".23 Sissons and Brown go on to
argue that while •... same management opinion may still argue for
the legal enforceability of collective agreements, the absence of
formal agreements covering the deployment and organisation of
labour works to management's advantage when workers' bargaining
power is weak. The absence of codification makes it easier to
force through changes in works practices.'23 Having said that,
there is no disguising the existence of more formal and more
comprehensive agreements which have real regulatory effect -
potentially reducing the scope for informal work group bargaining.
One must, however, explore in more depth what formalisation may
mean. One might assume that industrial relations have became more
formal simply by acknowledging that more agreements are being made
in writing. On the other hand, even when such agreements are
effectual, a system may well contain a significant element of
informality. This point may be illustrated by looking at one
study which demonstrates that workers may not wish to use and abide
by the provisions of a new formal system:
First, the workers may not like the new rules, or at
least may consider that they can be improved. Secondly,
workers may be more prepared to challenge formal plant-
level rules than they were to challenge the same
understandings in a C & P form. This preparedness
is tied up with a lower degree of commitment to the
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new rules, and a feeling of a loss of personal control
over their working lives. Thirdly, where these
conditions apply, and the workers are in a position to
put pressure on foremen, this tactic will be the most
logical and likely one for them to apply. Fourthly,
the likely outcome of such low-level negotiations will
be informal rules and understandings.24
Systems which are ostensibly formal may therefore be supplemented
or to same extent even supplanted by informal agreements or
understandings.
Formalisation must be distinguished from legalisation. If a more
formal system of industrial relations is to be successful there
must be a commitment to its operation. By converting to greater
formality the parties may nevertheless intend that any agreement
will be operated flexibly. Legalisation, on the other hand, might
be thought to carry with it considerable rigidity and the parties
may not wish to commit themselves to this.
Adopting greater formality (for example, formalising existing works
practices) can be a difficult and time-consuming affair. However,
if sufficient care is not taken over matters such as the clarity of
drafting then problems are likely to emerge in the near future.
Parker found that 'the degree to which agreements were operated as
the parties intended at the outset generally related closely to the
thoroughness with which they were prepared and introduced ... In
the few cases where careful attention was also paid to the
introduction and explanation of agreements relatively few problems
of misinterpretation arose.'25 Moreover, 'Perhaps the most
important factor in the successful operation of agreements was the
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degree of sophistication and determination applied to their
administration by senior management and personnel departments on
the company side and by senior lay representatives on the union
sides, after the initial introductory phase'.26
It is clear that informality is most likely to be prevalent at the
lower points of workplace organisation. Workers, for example, may
obtain concessions on the shcpfloor through the actions of lower
level management. Alternatively, if at this level workers
unilaterally abrogate collectively agreed working arrangements
resort to the legal process by management would scarcely be
appropriate. Apart from anything else a trade union might not be
vicariously liable (see p 338). In any event the cost and delay,
to mention but two factors, in resolving a standard dispute over
piecework through the courts would rule out any legal action. It
is worth recalling at this juncture that much more has occurred in
the way of formalisation in the sphere of market relations compared
to managerial relations. It falls to be considered what
implications this has for legal enforcement. Looked at from the
point of view of management, and given that a union would not be
vicariously liable for much of what happened on the shcpfloor, it
would not detract from the enforcement of a union's commitment to
the peace obligation or indeed any substantive obligation.
Since informality at workshop level may often be the product of
management concession to workgroup pressure this is unlikely to be
of concern to the union hierarchy. Terry draws attention to the
advantages that informality can have for workers:'... first ...
[formalisation]... would encounter strong resistance from senior
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management which might jeopardise the de facto concessions, and
secondly, that there are tactical advantages which informal rules
have over formal ones. In particular, informal rules allow
whichever is the stronger party at the procedural level, or place
within the workplace, where the rules operate to behave in a way
which the other side might find hard to predict. Such an
advantage is itself a power resource, and the party which benefits
from it is unlikely to wish to see that situation altered'.27
The foregoing discussion suggests that formal isation, let alone
legalisation, is unlikely to achieve a tight grip on certain work
activities. In industries where this is the case moves towards
having legally enforceable collective agreements would be likely to
be a limited exercise further up the hierarchy. It must be said
of course that the formality of work relations varies considerably
between different industries.
The Problem of Sanctions
While Donovan had no objection in principle to the use of legal
sanctions for the enforcement of collective agreements28 in the
context of a solution to the unconstitutional strikes issue Donovan
• • •
rejected the various legal solutions mooted. 3 The 1941
Betteshanger Colliery dispute showed "... the fruitlessness of the
use of penal sanctions for the purpose of enforcing industrial
peace".30 Donovan concluded that the only potential way "to
enforce an agreement is through civil actions for damages" but it
was felt that employers would be unlikely to use the civil law.31
Would the active participation of the employer, essential to any
enforcement process, now be forthcoming? Recently, evidence has
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emerged "... to dispel any sense that employers have been uniformly
or unswervingly committed to an abstentionism which rules out the
invoking of the civil law ..."32 Therefore this hurdle may not be
the absolute one it once was.
Wham to sue? Often it would be clear that a trade union was party
to the agreement. What though of the difficulty raised by Donovan
as to "whether a shop steward or shop steward's committee
bargaining at plant or workshop level could, in the legal sense,be
regarded as acting for the union or unions concerned, or for the
individual workers . ,."?33 As Lord Justice Roskill emphasised "it
is ... from this element of duality in the position of shop
stewards that the difficulties in establishing responsibility for
their actions arise".34 Heaton's case shows both the difficulty
and the fact that "the position of other unions and of other shop
stewards in other industries will or may vary greatly".35 Of
course, a statutory definition of vicarious liability could be
enacted.36
No matter hew clear the question of parties became one is still
left with the problem of unofficial action. The State might go
further and legislate so that trade unions had a duty to "endeavour
to prevent its members frcm committing unlawful offensive actions",
or, where they have occurred, "to endeavour to cause such members
to cease committing such action".37 Such a proposal would be open
to a whole host of objections flowing frcm the view that while
"trade union leaders do exercise discipline frcm time to time ...
they cannot be industry's policemen".38 It has been suggested
that "the power of the work group has been reduced, and shop
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stewards have became more integrated into the union's official
structures, with a consequent tendency towards greater centralised
control by union officials over the strategy and tactics of
disputes".39 The extent of this tendency might be questioned.
In any event, other evidence indicates that while the role of shop
stewards might have been formalised the strength of decentralised
power should not be under-estimated.40 Shop steward organisation
has to same extent became more centralised (often at plant level)
and more sophisticated. There is a close link between the
formalisation of collective-bargaining at plant or company level
and in same cases increased power of the stewards (and the
workforce they represent). "The formal negotiating arrangements
have in the main been adapted to include them and the concomitant
rise of single-employer bargaining has increasingly made stewards
into the principal negotiators and guarantors of clear-cut factory
agreements and procedures",41 so that "the full-time official
assists rather than dominates the steward".42 While this is not
to say that stewards may not, on occasion, be moire remote from the
work groups they represent than at the time of Donovan,43 it does
not appear to be the case that trade union organisation is now
sufficiently integrated to enable unions to be "industry's
policemen".
In a case where a trade union was party to an agreement would a
court order be obeyed in the event of breach?44 Evan's research
into the use of injunctions in industrial disputes between
September 1980 and September 1984 revealed that 'The outcome, in
legal and industrial relations terms has been mixed. With few
exceptions, all the injunctions up until News International v Forey
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were complied with and the industrial action or dispute terminated.
Where they continued, their effectiveness was undermined since the
injunction had the effect of losing the support of other workers eg
delivery drivers, and the action eventually petered out... After
those early cases the use of injunctions met more resistance.
Injunctions were ignored in disputes involving larger and more
powerful groups ... and in disputes were senior union leaders were
more whole-heartedly committed to providing support ...'45 These
findings, however, are in relation to use of the new statutory
restrictions on the taking of industrial action and the union
response might well be different in relation to legally enforceable
collective agreements voluntarily entered into. One must, though,
consider what unions would gain from legal enforcement.
Kahn-Freund wrote that "it is not a gross exaggeration to say that
the contractual function of collective agreements is mainly for the
benefit of management and its normative function mainly for the
benefit of labour".46 When it comes to substantive terms though
individual employees will be able to enforce a number of them by
suing on the individual employment contract. If an action by the
collectivity were felt desirable the enforcement of industry
agreements would prevent under-cutting - always a likely event in a
recession. Given that industry agreements new often set merely a
"safety-net" - and not even a "floor" - this would often be
meaningless. Enabling a union to enforce through law a domestic
agreement would put an additional restraint on employers reneging
on agreements voluntarily entered into. One could also enforce
obligations which regulated the relationship between the collective
parties, for example, the provision of union facilities. Again an
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obligation to go to, and abide by the results of, arbitration could
be enforced.
The issue of status quo clauses must also be dealt with. *A
status quo arrangement in a dispute procedure comes into operation
when there is a dispute over a change or proposed change in
existing terms and conditions of work; the arrangement deals with
the status of the change or proposed change pending the resolution
of the dispute or the exhaustion of the procedure.*47 In any
discussion of legally enforceable collective agreements the issue
arises in the context of the peace obligation. Anderman has
argued that 'most proposals for legislation and indeed actual
enactments providing for legally enforceable collective disputes
procedures, have shown little understanding that no-strike
obligations in disputes procedures would be viewed by trade unions
party to such procedures or indeed any workers to wham such
obligations might be extended, as qualified by same form of status
quo limitation on managerial prerogatives'. It is submitted
that there appears to be less of a problem when legally enforceable
collective agreements, and not simply legally enforceable disputes
procedures, are looked at. Where you had a collectively agreed
clause on working arrangements then if management decided to act
upon a a new interpretation of this then the trade union side might
allege breach of contract. Given the doctrine of mutuality in
contract law, even in the absence of an express status quo clause,
in the face of an employer' s breach of contract a trade union would
no longer be bound to exhaust procedure before taking industrial
action. Had an express status quo clause been in the agreement
the position would have been just the same. An express clause
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might be valuable, however, to clarify the status of working
practices which were not contained in written collective agreements
but were the subject of custom and practice.
It may be doubted, therefore, whether sufficient "consideration"
would be on offer, in most cases, to attract union interest in a
legally enforceable agreement. There are further difficulties,
though, in enforcing the peace obligation. Donovan had emphasised
"... the absence of speedy, clear and effective disputes
ACk , , ,
procedures". 3 Particularly damning was the informality of
procedures. Those that were written were often "loose and
imprecise" - and would often be informally applied. Agreements
might be less than comprehensive in scope (as in building). Often,
though, agreements would be unwritten - oral agreements and custom
and practice prevailing.50 This led Marsh to conclude that "unless
greater formality were introduced, any labour court would be in the
position, not of an adjudicator and imposer of an appropriate
penalty, but of a conciliator".51
The post-Donovan period, though, has been marked by an increase in
the coverage of procedures and an increase in their
formalisation.52 Questions remain as to the "scope and
specificity of such procedures".53 However, "... there is no
simple choice between formal and informal systems of bargaining.
All collective bargaining systems are a mixture of the two".54
Informality may have different roles. It may fill gaps to
expedite the formal process or it may simply enrich an already
workable procedure.55 It may function as an alternative. One
recent survey indicates that adherence to the formal procedures
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might well be greater than is sometimes suggested.56 On the other
hand, it has been said "... that same informality is both
inevitable and desirable as an expression of human relations,not
merely technical ones, as recognition that no procedure can fit the
needs of all situations, and as a pre-requisite for a problem
solving approach to grievance resolution".57 Whatever the true
position may be there is no disguising the variation in the degree
of formality - both intra and inter industry.
Compelling Enforcement; In Perspective
Since Donovan there have been significant changes in the manner in
which collective bargaining is conducted. The conflicting formal
and informal facets of the dual system have disappeared - much
formcilisation and centralisation have taken place. The practice
of "dynamic" bargaining may not be the bar to legal enforceability
that is sometimes suggested. Moreover, sectors of the economy not
dwelt on by Donovan were, and are, more amenable to the legal
process. It even might be possible to deploy effective sanctions
on occasion. Other difficulties - such as the problem of
adjudication- may be less than insuperable.
None of this detracts from the tremendously wide and complex
variety of British collective bargaining practices. To take but
one example - the continued importance of what Clegg has styled the
primitive bargaining model. Accordingly, any attempt to inject
forcibly the law into the enforcement of collective bargains would
enable it to be deployed in circumstances where the institutional
conditions for its successful operations were not present. For
example, where a loose, imprecise and open-ended procedure
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agreement was in operation. Moreover, "effective dispute handling
depends on a flexible and delicate interaction of formal and
informal process against the background of the common but tacit
understanding of the parties".58 Imposition of the law would be
likely to be highly prejudicial to working relations. The "rule
of law" in industry "assumes sufficient common interest and
understanding between the parties to make the rules work". The
Ford case illustrates the damage that can be done to industrial
relations by the use of the legal process when that use conflicts
with customary modes of behaviour.
The position changes when one considers the position of parties
opting for legally enforceable collective agreements. We have
seen that collective bargaining has became a good deal more formal
since Donovan. Given that parties who wished legally enforceable
contracts could presumably overcome any difficulties that remain,
the productivity agreement of the early 1960s60 show what can be
achieved in the way of formal, comprehensive agreements when this
is mutually desired. Underlying much of the work of the Donovan
Commission is the assumption that collective bargaining could be a
good deal more formal. Also it is hard to disagree with Marsh
that "decisions arrived at in voluntary procedures are more likely
to be kept".61 The parties can provide for "status quo clauses",
adequate consideration and so on which will make for a mutually
satisfying agreement. A body such as the CAC could perhaps
function as a suitable adjudicator.
At the end of the day the acid test must be: "What can the law do
to help to improve our industrial relations?"62 The technical
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obstacles to legal enforceability may not be as great as is
sometimes depicted but that is not an argument for legal
enforceability. Use of legally enforceable contracts should only
be made where an employer and a trade union feel it would be to
their mutual benefit. It is to be expected that most parties will
prefer to reject the use of the law and the more static bargaining
that would result in favour of the flexibility offered by the
traditional arrangements. At the end of the day "it is a matter of
social expediency, not of social ethics". The sentiments
expressed in the following quotation being viewed as sound: '...
labour relations are primarily human relations, ... the situations
arising are so complex, so varied, so uncertain in their frequency
and intensity, that they cannot be forced into a predetermined set
of procedural channels ... At the lowest levels in particular, it
is not feasible in most instances to operate in a legalistic way;
a foreman needs flexibility to avoid cumbersome rules, or to
prevent minor transgressions of them on occasion, if he is to
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